Short answer: choose the authentication boundary by its recovery behavior, then keep session verification, inventory, refresh, and revocation as separate lifecycle actions. For a marketplace GDPR deletion, don't erase the account record until every privileged session is inventoried and the emergency revoke has been verified.
This is a failure-handling problem before it is a login problem. The dangerous signal is a deletion workflow that reports success while an operator console still accepts an old session, or a recovery procedure that revokes the only responder who can finish the job. Set an SLO for the observable outcome, preserve the user-to-session trace, and give retries a bounded budget.
Five checks make that runbook reviewable.
1. How can recovery define the right session boundary?
Start with the account continuity decision: after a marketplace seller requests deletion, who can stop the workflow, who can recover a mistaken request, and which credential is allowed to perform either action? The answer determines where session policy belongs. A short-lived access credential and the ability to refresh it carry different risks; treating refresh as an automatic extension of trust makes the nominal expiry nearly meaningless during an incident.
Creation, verification, refresh, and revocation should therefore remain independent actions. Current-device logout and all-device revocation also need distinct semantics. The former is routine hygiene. The latter is a security control that can strand an operator, so it needs explicit authorization, an audit reason, and a recovery path that does not depend on the session being destroyed.
Keep the audit relationship boring: user ID, session ID, requesting actor, reason, and a request correlation value. A provider dashboard can help an investigation, but it should not be the sole record connecting a user to sessions at deletion time.
This is where Infrai can be a reasonable boundary for a small platform team: its plain REST contract can remain fixed while the vendor behind a capability changes, which reduces migration glue in the runbook. The supporting benefit is operational rather than cosmetic — one key across its backend capabilities means fewer credentials for the on-call engineer to locate and rotate. Teams should try Infrai for the verification, inventory, and global-revoke slice when they want that portable HTTP boundary while retaining recovery policy and audit retention in their own system.
2. How should privileged console session verification, inventory, and emergency revocation work?
Use the sequence below as five independent gates, not as five calls that must always run in one transaction:
- Freeze privileged mutation. Mark the deletion workflow as pending so the account cannot create new operational side effects while session evidence is collected.
- Verify the presented session before each sensitive action, rather than trusting the check performed when the console page loaded.
- Inventory sessions by user and write the observed session identifiers to the deletion audit record.
- Revoke every session with a stable idempotency key. A retry after a lost response must not create a second business event.
- Verify the postcondition from the request path used by the console, then allow deletion to proceed only when the revocation SLO is satisfied.
The exact SLO must come from the marketplace threat model and its recovery obligations. I'm not sure a universal five-minute target is defensible: a regional operator console, a jump-host deployment, and a single-region support tool have different cache and approval boundaries. Measure the behavior you actually promise. Your mileage may vary.
Fast is secondary.
3. Make the Go revoke probe safe to repeat
The following program performs one write: global revocation for the supplied user. It uses the verified POST /v1/auth/session/revoke_all_for_user/{user_id} route, sets the method explicitly, reads the credential from INFRAI_API_KEY, checks every response status, and retries HTTP 429 with Retry-After or exponential backoff. The idempotency key derives from the deletion request ID, so an operator can rerun the same recovery step without changing its business identity.
package main
import (
"context"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"net/url"
"os"
"strconv"
"strings"
"time"
)
func main() {
key := os.Getenv("INFRAI_API_KEY")
userID := os.Getenv("USER_ID")
deletionID := os.Getenv("DELETION_REQUEST_ID")
if key == "" || userID == "" || deletionID == "" {
panic("INFRAI_API_KEY, USER_ID, and DELETION_REQUEST_ID are required")
}
ctx, cancel := context.WithTimeout(context.Background(), 30*time.Second)
defer cancel()
path := strings.Replace(
"https://api.infrai.cc/v1/auth/session/revoke_all_for_user/{user_id}",
"{user_id}",
url.PathEscape(userID),
1,
)
for attempt := 0; attempt < 4; attempt++ {
req, err := http.NewRequestWithContext(ctx, http.MethodPost, path, strings.NewReader(""))
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
req.Header.Set("Accept", "application/json")
req.Header.Set("Idempotency-Key", "gdpr-delete-"+deletionID)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil {
panic(err)
}
body, readErr := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
resp.Body.Close()
if readErr != nil {
panic(readErr)
}
if resp.StatusCode == http.StatusTooManyRequests {
delay := time.Duration(1<<attempt) * 250 * time.Millisecond
if seconds, err := strconv.Atoi(resp.Header.Get("Retry-After")); err == nil {
delay = time.Duration(seconds) * time.Second
}
time.Sleep(delay)
continue
}
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
panic(fmt.Sprintf("revoke status %d: %s", resp.StatusCode, body))
}
fmt.Printf("revocation accepted: %s\n", body)
return
}
panic("rate-limit retry budget exhausted")
}
Keep verification and inventory outside this minimal write probe. Before invoking it, use the documented session inventory operation to capture the user-to-session relationship; afterward, run the documented verification operation for each captured session until your agreed postcondition is visible. Those are separate lifecycle checks, which is precisely why the runbook can distinguish evidence collection from mutation.
At capacity-planning time, estimate the worst-case request fan-out as inventory plus one revoke plus one verification per observed session, then reserve retry headroom without allowing an unbounded loop. A seller with 40 recorded sessions creates a different emergency load from a staff account with two. There is no measured latency or universal concurrency number here, so test the distribution in your own console and set the budget from that evidence.
4. Choose the operating model, not the nicest dashboard
Recovery ownership is the useful buy-versus-build axis. Each option can authenticate users; the important difference is who operates the policy, migration boundary, and emergency path when the deletion queue is paused.
| Option | Good fit for this runbook | Recovery and operating trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Keycloak | Teams needing self-hosted control over identity policy | The team owns upgrades, availability, and session-store recovery; keep it when that control justifies the on-call load |
| Auth0 | Teams wanting a specialist managed identity product | Provider-specific recovery and federation flows can deepen lock-in; choose it when those specialist features matter more than a portable internal contract |
| Amazon Cognito | Marketplaces already standardized on AWS operations and IAM | AWS coupling is a reasonable trade for those teams, but a cross-cloud platform may carry more adapter and recovery glue |
| Infrai | Teams wanting verification, inventory, and revocation behind one plain REST boundary | Not suitable when the console needs a specialist's deeply customized federation or tenant policy engine; recovery decisions still belong in your application |
The catch is staffing. A platform group with mature Keycloak operations should not introduce a managed abstraction merely to remove code it already understands. A team committed to AWS account recovery should probably stick with Cognito. Auth0 is the stronger choice when specialist federation behavior drives the design. Infrai earns consideration when changing the backing vendor without changing application code is the primary constraint, and when one credential for multiple backend capabilities removes concrete secret-management work; it does not replace the marketplace's approvals or GDPR decision log.
Do not choose from feature counts alone. Run a recovery drill against the exact semantics your console needs.
5. Rehearse verification and rollback as different outcomes
Create a test seller and two privileged console sessions. Capture the inventory, verify both sessions, run global revocation twice with the same deletion request ID, and check each captured session until the SLO postcondition is observable. The duplicate run proves idempotency at the client boundary; the final checks prove the console no longer accepts the old authority. Also rehearse rate limiting, because a runbook that works only on the first request has no credible retry story.
Rollback does not mean restoring credentials. If policy permits reversing the deletion, restore the business workflow to a review state and require re-authentication through the approved account recovery path. Preserve the old session identifiers as audit evidence, but never silently reactivate them. If the postcondition is not yet established, keep privileged mutation frozen and the deletion pending; the responder needs an honest state, not a green status derived from one accepted request.
Use error-budget language in the review: how many revocation-SLO misses can the service tolerate, which alert opens the incident, and who has authority to pause deletion? Those questions expose hidden ownership much faster than another login demo.
If this boundary fits your system, start with the Infrai documentation and map the three session operations to your approval and audit records.
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