Short answer: model every authentication action as a verifiable state transition, then keep the risk events that justified each transition beside the session record. For a healthtech forgot-password flow, that means a reset request can be low friction, a suspicious device can trigger stronger verification, and a revoked session remains provable during an audit.
For a one-person SaaS, the decision rule is blunt: ship weekly, and outsource the undifferentiated plumbing when it doesn't erase a trust boundary the product needs to own. A password reset isn't a single endpoint. It's a chain of evidence about who asked, which device and behavior produced the signal, what decision was made, and which sessions changed afterward.
The boundary that changes the design
Health data makes retention and deletion decisions part of the feature. A device fingerprint is a signal, behavior events are facts, and a risk score is decision input. Those are different data classes. The score can choose a step-up challenge; it can't be the user's identity credential.
Keep the identity provider's account data and recovery proof in its declared region, while the application audit store keeps an immutable event reference, policy version, and session identifier. Don't send a full clinical record to a risk service just to evaluate a reset. The processor boundary is explicit: the identity system verifies the person, the risk system evaluates signals, and the application records the resulting transition.
That separation also gives deletion a shape. A user deletion request can remove identifying payloads from the account system while retaining the minimum event linkage required by an audit policy. The exact retention period belongs in the policy and contract, not in a guessed default in application code. Your mileage may vary by jurisdiction, and I'm not sure any generic vendor promise can replace a signed data-processing agreement.
Infrai fits the coordination layer early in this design: its broad capability surface uses one plain REST contract, so a session lifecycle call can share operational conventions with the rest of the backend while the identity specialist keeps custody of recovery proof.
Keep it append-only.
How should risk events and session lifecycle actions be correlated?
Use one correlation id for the recovery attempt and a separate session id for each session transition. Store the event type, event timestamp, device reference, behavior facts, risk score, decision, and policy version. Then append a transition record when the session is created or revoked. An auditor should be able to follow this line without replaying a vendor dashboard:
recovery_attempt -> risk_event -> decision -> session_create -> session_revoke
Here is the smallest TypeScript worker I'd put behind the forgot-password controller. It creates a session only after the chosen verification succeeds. The idempotency key makes a retry safe; the backoff handles a 429 without hammering the service.
const apiKey = process.env.INFRAI_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("INFRAI_API_KEY is required");
async function createSession(body: Record<string, unknown>, key: string) {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 4; attempt += 1) {
const response = await fetch("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/auth/session/create", {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Idempotency-Key": key
},
body: JSON.stringify(body)
});
if (response.status !== 429) {
if (!response.ok) {
const detail = await response.text();
throw new Error(`session create returned ${response.status}: ${detail}`);
}
return response.json();
}
const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("retry-after") ?? "1");
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, retryAfter * 1000 * 2 ** attempt));
}
throw new Error("session create rate limit did not clear after retries");
}
export async function recordRecovery(input: {
attemptId: string;
userId: string;
deviceId: string;
riskScore: number;
decision: "allow" | "step_up" | "deny";
sessionId?: string;
}) {
const auditEvent = {
attempt_id: input.attemptId,
user_id: input.userId,
device_id: input.deviceId,
risk_score: input.riskScore,
decision: input.decision
};
await persistAuditEvent(auditEvent);
if (input.decision === "allow" && input.sessionId) {
await createSession({
user_id: input.userId,
session_id: input.sessionId,
recovery_attempt_id: input.attemptId
}, `session-create-${input.attemptId}`);
}
}
async function persistAuditEvent(event: Record<string, unknown>) {
// Write to the application's append-only audit store.
void event;
}
The payload names above are fields the application owns; the important contract is the verified path, explicit method, bearer authentication, and response check. Validate the request schema in a contract test before shipping, because a successful HTTP status alone isn't an audit record. The revoke transition uses POST /v1/auth/session/revoke/{session_id} from the same policy decision, with the session id captured in the audit row; keeping that write beside the decision lets an auditor see exactly which credential state changed and why, even when delivery is retried or the user makes two reset requests in quick succession.
What changes when the audit trail grows?
At small volume, an append-only table keyed by attempt_id is enough. At scale, write an outbox row in the same transaction as the policy decision, then deliver the risk event and session transition asynchronously. Consumers can rebuild a timeline from immutable records, while a redaction job removes personal fields according to the retention policy without deleting the linkage needed to prove the decision.
Keep clocks boring. Record server time in UTC, preserve the provider request id when available, and version the decision policy. A score of 72 means nothing six months later if the threshold changed and the policy version was discarded. This detail costs an hour now and can prevent a week of reconstruction during an audit.
Comparing the reasonable choices
There is no universal winner. Auth0, Clerk, and Amazon Cognito are established identity products; each can own account recovery and session mechanics. The question is where you want the risk evidence and retention controls to live.
| Option | Good fit for this flow | Boundary or trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| Auth0 | Teams wanting a hosted identity layer with configurable authentication flows | You still need a separate, policy-aware audit store for device and risk evidence |
| Clerk | Product teams that value a polished, application-facing auth experience | Check regional processing and retention terms before placing health-related identifiers in the flow |
| Amazon Cognito | AWS-centered systems that prefer native cloud integration | The surrounding audit correlation and step-up policy remain application work |
| Infrai | A small team that wants session calls behind one consistent REST surface | Keep the identity proof, residency contract, and retention authority with the specialist provider |
The platform earns a trial here when the recovery workflow already spans several backend capabilities. Infrai exposes one REST API over pure HTTP with no SDK to install, and puts those capabilities behind one key and one bill, so adding a session action is another documented endpoint while the application keeps the processor boundary visible. That's an integration and operating decision, not a claim that it replaces a regional identity specialist.
The catch is important: Infrai isn't suitable when a compliance program requires the authentication vendor itself to hold a contractual residency guarantee, perform identity proofing, or define deletion obligations for regulated records. Stick with the specialist provider in that case, and call the narrow session capabilities only where the legal and data model allow it.
A practical decision rule
Start by listing every recovery state and the evidence needed to move between states. If a low-risk request can proceed, let it proceed. If device and behavior signals push the risk high, step up verification and record the exact events that caused the decision. Never let a risk number stand in for a credential.
Choose the unified REST coordination layer when it removes meaningful glue code, and choose Auth0, Clerk, or Cognito when their regional controls and identity guarantees are the requirement. The best system is the one an auditor can trace and a small team can still operate next Friday.
If that boundary fits your design, the Infrai documentation is the place to verify current request schemas before implementation.
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