On 22 October 2026 the security firm V12 reported that the x402 client SDKs, before version 2.23.0, signed whatever amount a 402 response asked for. The default client had no spending limit, so a hostile API could turn a routine request into a request for the wallet's full balance of a supported token. The fix shipped in the 18 August releases: a $1 cap per payment and recognised dollar stablecoins only, by default. No security advisory was published, and npm audit shows nothing for the vulnerable versions (The Hacker News, 23 Oct 2026).
That is the code side. We read the settlement side.
The question
Every stablecoin transfer into an x402 seller listed in the Bazaar on Base lands in our ledger (definition x402.settle.submitter.v4). So: how often does a settlement arrive far above what the seller is usually paid?
The numbers
Measured 2026-10-24T08:50Z, for 12 to 23 October 2026, at the 80 sellers with 20 or more settlements in the window (32,605 settlements, $18,950.78 in total):
| Rule | Settlements |
|---|---|
| At least 10× the seller's median | 1,126 (3.5%) |
| At least 100× the seller's median | 65 |
| At least 100× and at least $1 | 25, worth $1,928.23, from 13 payers to 7 sellers |
The largest cases:
| Settlement | Seller's median | Seller's settlements in the window |
|---|---|---|
| $588.00 | $0.01 | 233 |
| $340.00 | $0.002 | 32 |
| $302.40 | $0.001 | 27 |
| $276.37 | $0.001 | 27 |
All four were re-read from Base's public node by transaction receipt; the USDC transfer to the seller carries exactly these amounts.
What it is, and what it is not
It is the on-chain shape of the flaw: a client that signs the amount it is asked for. It is also the shape of tiered or usage-based pricing, and the chain cannot tell the two apart. Read these as the ceiling of what the overcharge vector could have been on Base in those twelve days, not as a count of overcharges.
The payer side points the same way. Over 30 days the 25 cases come from 13 payers; none of them is an ERC-8004-bound agent wallet; ten of the thirteen made only one or two settlements in the whole month. The large cases look like single purchases, not an agent in a loop.
What it does establish: payments far above a seller's usual price settle on mainnet in the normal course of business, and a per-payment cap does not see them. A $1 cap lets a tenfold overcharge of a cheap resource through without a trace. The control that would have had something to act on is a caller-side price expectation.
If you run an x402 client
- Upgrade to
@x402/fetch/@x402/axios2.23.0 or later (2.28.0 as of 23 Oct); apps using SIWx also need@x402/extensions2.23.0+. - Set
maxAmountPerPaymentat the price you expect to pay, not at a round number. - Use the
onBeforePaymentCreationhook to compare amount,payTo, network and asset in the 402 with the quote you accepted, and refuse when they differ (x402-foundation/x402#3866 has the discussion and fixtures). - Never pass
spendControls: falsein production.
Where the series lives
We publish the count every day as x402_settle_oversize_7d (and x402_settle_oversize_usd_7d): definition, per-settlement list, free, CC BY 4.0. We posted the figures in x402#3866 so the people fixing the client have mainnet numbers next to their fixtures.
This is how we intend to treat every disclosed flaw in an agent-payment rail: write the on-chain shape, measure it two ways, publish the series, keep publishing after the news moves on. Witness, not police; the client decides.
Top comments (5)
The key finding for me is that a flat per payment cap does not see an overcharge that is large relative to the seller's usual price, so a $1 limit still lets a hundredfold markup on a $0.01 endpoint through. Settlements far above the seller median do show up on mainnet, but as you say the chain cannot separate a hostile quote from legitimate usage based pricing. That makes a caller side price expectation the only control with something to act on. Do you think sellers could publish a signed price schedule that clients check the 402 quote against, so the expected amount does not depend on each developer hardcoding it?
A signed schedule would close most of it, and the x402 discovery working group is already arguing about its shape: price-range fields in discovery (x402-foundation/wg-domain-discovery#10) and a well-known entry per host (#11). The catch is who signs. If the key that signs the schedule is the same one that serves the 402, a compromised server can sign a new schedule too, so it helps most when the schedule lives somewhere the endpoint cannot rewrite on its own: a registry entry, or a signed document the client pins.
Until that exists, the chain gives a fallback: what an address is usually paid. Our payee facts publish it per payTo, the median and 95th percentile of what registered agents paid it over 30 days, so a client can refuse a quote far above that before it signs. It is a price expectation from history rather than from the seller, which is weaker, but nobody has to hardcode it.
One thing to watch with the per payTo median: a fresh address has no history, and a patient attacker can build one with small wash payments from agents they register themselves. The hold is strongest when a quote far above the median and a young or thin history both count against it.
A fresh payTo has no history at all, so a median cannot hold it on its own. The two signals have to be read together: an amount far above what that payee usually receives, and how young and how independent that history is. In our Watch, a payment to a destination the agent never paid, at a size it never sent, already counts as a reason (fresh_destination_at_new_size), so a young payee gets no benefit of the doubt. Washing a history is possible, but it means funding several payers that look unrelated for long enough, and who funded a payer is the trail that gives a wash away.
Reading the two signals together makes sense, and who funded the payers is a strong tell. Flagging a first payment at a new size closes most of the gap a young payee would otherwise get.