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Bartosz Osiej
Bartosz Osiej

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Detecting ransomware with eBPF in Rust

#ebpf #rust #security

Detecting ransomware with eBPF in Rust

Title: Detecting ransomware with eBPF in Rust
Target: ~1000 words, B1-safe English, working-code-first
Build: demo + article for DEV.to / Draft.dev share
Source repo: github.com/BartoszOsiej/talus-process-monitor (MIT)

1. The idea (hook)

Ransomware works in a simple way: it opens your files, encrypts them, and writes them back. Fast. One process can open hundreds or thousands of files within seconds.

You do not need a huge model to spot it. You need to watch one number: how many files a single process opens per second.

This article shows a small eBPF program in Rust that does exactly that. It hooks two syscalls (execve and openat), counts file-open rate per process, and — when the rate is too high — kills the process.

All code comes from a real open-source project: talus-process-monitor (MIT, github.com/BartoszOsiej/talus-process-monitor).

2. What is eBPF in one sentence

eBPF lets you attach small programs to kernel events (syscalls, network packets, timers) without writing or loading a kernel module. The programs run in a sandboxed VM in the kernel. You get kernel-level visibility with low overhead.

In Rust, the library is called aya. aya-ebpf is the runtime for the kernel side. aya manages loading from userspace.

3. Kernel side: a tiny eBPF program

We define one "event" struct. Both kernel and userspace must agree on the layout, so it uses #[repr(C)]:

#[repr(C)]
pub struct ProcessEvent {
    pub event_type: u8,
    pub pid: u32,
    pub uid: u32,
    pub comm: [u8; 16],     // process name
    pub filename: [u8; 64], // opened file path
}

#[map]
pub static EVENTS: PerfEventArray<ProcessEvent> = PerfEventArray::new(0);
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PerfEventArray is the channel between kernel and userspace. Each CPU has its own buffer, so concurrent processes do not block each other.

Next, two tracepoints. These run when a process starts (execve) or opens a file (openat):

#[tracepoint(name = "sys_enter_execve", category = "syscalls")]
pub fn sys_enter_execve(ctx: TracePointContext) -> u32 {
    emit_event(&ctx, EVENT_EXECVE, 0)
}

#[tracepoint(name = "sys_enter_openat", category = "syscalls")]
pub fn sys_enter_openat(ctx: TracePointContext) -> u32 {
    emit_event(&ctx, EVENT_OPENAT, 1)
}
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The main work happens in emit_event. First we read PID and UID of the current process:

let pid = (bpf_get_current_pid_tgid() >> 32) as u32;
let uid = bpf_get_current_uid_gid() as u32;
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Then we read the filename argument from the tracepoint args. The tracepoint layout is (common fields, filename, flags, mode), so the filename pointer sits at a fixed offset:

let ptr_size = core::mem::size_of::<*const c_char>();
let filename_offset = 16 + filename_arg as usize * ptr_size;

if let Ok(filename) = unsafe { ctx.read_at::<*const c_char>(filename_offset) } {
    if !filename.is_null() {
        // bpf_probe_read_user safely copies userspace memory
        if let Ok(bytes) = unsafe {
            bpf_probe_read_user_str_bytes(filename.cast::<u8>(), dst)
        } { /* copy into event.filename */ }
    }
}
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Finally, we push the event into the buffer:

EVENTS.output(ctx, &event, 0);
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One note about eBPF: you cannot use normal Rust std function calls. No memcpy, no memset, no format!. The code uses hand-written byte loops (raw_copy) to avoid LLVM builtins. This is a common eBPF gotcha:

unsafe fn raw_copy(dst: *mut u8, src: *const u8, len: usize) {
    let mut i = 0;
    while i < len {
        *dst.add(i) = *src.add(i);
        i += 1;
    }
}
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4. Userspace: the detection engine

On the userspace side we read events off the perf buffer and keep a 1-second sliding window of open events per PID:

self.windows.entry(ev.pid).or_default() // VecDeque<Instant>

let cutoff = now - Duration::from_secs(WINDOW_SECS); // 1s
while window.front().is_some_and(|t| *t < cutoff) {
    window.pop_front();
}
window.push_back(now);
let opens_now = window.len();
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If opens_now reaches the threshold (default 50 opens in 1 second), we fire an alert:

if self.threshold > 0 && stats.window_opens == self.threshold {
    stats.alerts += 1;
    outputs.push(Output::Alert(Alert { /* pid, comm, opens */ }));
    if self.auto_kill {
        let result = kill_process(ev.pid);
        outputs.push(Output::Action(ResponseAction { /* ... */ }));
    }
}
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kill_process is a plain kill(2) with SIGKILL:

fn kill_process(pid: u32) -> bool {
    let rc = unsafe { libc::kill(pid as i32, libc::SIGKILL) };
    rc == 0
}
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SIGKILL cannot be caught. The offending process stops immediately. That is the full "detect and respond" loop: hook → count → alert → kill.

5. Run it

Requirements: Linux kernel 5.8+, root (or CAP_BPF + CAP_SYS_ADMIN), Rust nightly and clang.

# Build
./build.sh

# Monitor only (no killing)
sudo target/release/process-monitor --alert-threshold 50

# EDR mode: detect and kill
sudo target/release/process-monitor --alert-threshold 50 --auto-kill
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Test it with a loop that opens many files fast:

sudo process-monitor --alert-threshold 3 --auto-kill
# in another terminal:
for i in $(seq 1 100); do touch /tmp/f$i; done
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The process that runs the loop violates the threshold and gets SIGKILL.

6. Limits and next steps

This heuristic has false positives (a backup tool also opens many files fast) — that is why a configurable threshold and a lower default matter. Real-world improvements from the same repo:

  • Shannon entropy scoring on filenames: encrypted/randomized names have high entropy.
  • Network egress tracing (connect, sendto): catch data exfiltration.
  • File-extension tracking: mass .enc / .locked writes.

The project also ships a small online-trained MLP model (no external deps) that turns raw event features into score: benign / suspicious / ransomware.

7. Summary

  • eBPF gives you kernel-level tracing without kernel modules.
  • Rust + aya makes the whole pipeline safe to build and maintain.
  • A 1-second sliding window on openat rate is a cheap, real ransomware signal.
  • Responding with SIGKILL turns a monitor into an EDR-style agent — 30 lines of Rust.

Full source code: github.com/BartoszOsiej/talus-process-monitor
Follow me on DEV.to for the next part: network egress detection with eBPF.

Try it on your machine

Talus is open source (MIT) — community edition includes the TUI, real-time eBPF tracing, and the ransomware heuristic.

If you want the full version — web dashboard, auto-kill response, SIEM exports (Kafka / ClickHouse / Memgraph) — Talus Enterprise is $50 one-time, perpetual: Get Talus Enterprise

Activation: talus license activate <KEY>

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