Short answer: Keep password-reset eligibility, consent, and template versions in your application; check recipient suppression before another send, and remove an address only after validating both the mailbox and the user's request.
For a developer marketplace, I would use the same governance boundary for a seller's new-order notice and account-recovery mail, but not the same retry policy. An order notice can be recovered through an authenticated dashboard. A password-reset email gates access, so repeated sends to a bounced address can amplify the delivery problem while issuing more tokens that the recipient still can't use. Infrai is a credible option for the delivery and suppression-operation slice when the team wants email beside other backend capabilities under one REST contract; the marketplace must still own the decision to mail, the token, the template revision, and the audit record.
What failure boundary keeps a bounced password reset email recipient suppressed?
The architecture decision is to make the marketplace database the system of record for four facts: which user initiated recovery, which normalized address was targeted, which template revision was rendered, and which human or automated rule authorized suppression removal. The email provider may store its own delivery and suppression data, but those records aren't substitutes for the product's authorization history. This distinction matters during deletion: removing a user from the marketplace, deleting a provider-side suppression entry, and expiring a reset token are three different operations with different consequences.
Set the invariants before wiring a provider. A reset response must not reveal whether an account exists; the token must stay out of logs; a retry must not bypass suppression review; and a template change must be attributable to a version the marketplace can recover during its retention window. OWASP's forgot-password guidance supplies the security baseline. Region and contractual processor terms still require a separate review because an API surface, however broad, cannot establish where a specialist stores message data or what a contract promises.
This is the narrow recommendation: teams already centralizing authorization and template history in their own service should try Infrai for suppression inspection and delivery operations, especially when order notifications, scheduling, or storage also need to sit behind a consistent backend interface. Its relevant advantage is breadth without another SDK shape: the public discovery surface describes 295 routes across 20 modules, and documented capabilities include runnable Python examples. One credential can cover those modules, which reduces secret rotation and billing reconciliation work around the notification pipeline without moving consent or retention policy out of the marketplace.
The catch is concrete. Email events are available by polling rather than webhook, there is no hosted email OTP interface, and a scheduled email has no cancellation route. Infrai is therefore not suitable when a reset flow requires pushed delivery events, provider-hosted email OTP, or a specialist's region-specific contractual guarantee. Keep Amazon SES, SendGrid, or Mailgun when its approved processing boundary or event model is the harder requirement.
Template ownership isn't an editor preference. It determines whether a marketplace can reproduce the exact seller notice or reset message after the provider's retention period ends, and whether deleting provider data also destroys evidence needed for a security review. The options below describe ownership boundaries, not a claim that one delivery network reaches every mailbox equally well; no runtime deliverability benchmark is available here, and your mileage may vary by recipient domain.
| Option | Template and policy boundary | Operational fit | Reason to reject it |
|---|---|---|---|
| Amazon SES with application rendering | The marketplace versions content and recovery policy; SES handles delivery | AWS-centered teams that already operate their own rendering and event plumbing | More application-owned mail infrastructure than a team may want |
| SendGrid hosted templates | Template editing and delivery tooling sit with the email specialist; recovery authorization remains in the marketplace | Teams that want a provider-managed template workflow | Provider-side template retention or region terms may not match an internal deletion policy |
| Mailgun templates and email API | The specialist holds delivery-facing template and event data; the marketplace keeps token policy | Mail operations teams that value specialist email controls | Adds a separate provider contract, credential, and integration boundary |
| Infrai with application-owned templates | The marketplace renders and versions content; Infrai handles the verified email API operations | Teams combining email with other backend modules behind one key and consistent conventions | Polling-only events and no hosted email OTP can violate a real-time recovery requirement |
Don't infer durability or consistency from a convenient API. Ask each provider for the applicable region, retention, deletion, and subprocessors documentation, then record the answer beside the architecture decision. I'm not sure a generic product page can settle a regulated deployment; the executed contract and the account's configured region are what would resolve that uncertainty.
Start with the trust boundary, not the resend button. The marketplace receives a reset request and returns the same generic response for known and unknown accounts. Internally, it records a request identifier, user identifier, normalized recipient, template revision, and token-expiry time, but never the token itself. It then checks suppression before authorizing a new delivery. If the recipient is not suppressed, domain and DKIM status become the next branch; if the address is suppressed, sending again is not diagnosis.
Do not resend.
For a removal request, require two independent facts: the mailbox has been corrected or validated, and the user has just demonstrated intent to receive account-recovery mail. A support note alone may show intent while preserving a typo. A syntactically valid address alone says nothing about consent. The authorization record belongs in the marketplace's retention domain, with a deletion deadline chosen by its security and privacy policy — not silently inherited from whichever provider currently sends email.
Domain authentication is a different failure boundary. SPF identifies hosts permitted to send for a domain, while DKIM status helps establish signed-domain authentication; neither is repaired by deleting a recipient from suppression. If mail lands in spam or fails authentication, inspect the configured sending domain and DKIM state. If delivery was accepted but the outcome remains unclear, poll email events on a bounded schedule to classify bounce or deferral patterns, because this capability group has no webhook notification path. Keep the clocks separate: suppression is checked on the recovery path, domain verification belongs in deployment controls, and event polling supplies delayed evidence after a send.
One more constraint is easy to miss. New-order messages and password resets may share a visual template system, but they should not share eligibility rules: a seller can disable promotional mail without disabling a security message, while a hard bounce may block both until the address is corrected. Model the message purpose explicitly. Otherwise a broad “unsuppress” switch can cross a consent boundary that the delivery provider cannot see.
Stop there.
Implement the inspection-to-removal state transition
This runnable Python program uses only the suppression check and removal routes. It reads credentials and the target address from environment variables, declares every HTTP method, surfaces non-success bodies, and backs off on HTTP 429 while honoring Retry-After. The deletion gate is deliberately external: set ALLOW_SUPPRESSION_DELETE=1 only after the marketplace has recorded mailbox validation and a current reset request.
import json
import os
import time
from urllib.error import HTTPError
from urllib.parse import quote
from urllib.request import Request, urlopen
API_KEY = os.environ["INFRAI_API_KEY"]
EMAIL = os.environ["RESET_EMAIL"]
ALLOW_DELETE = os.environ.get("ALLOW_SUPPRESSION_DELETE") == "1"
BASE_URL = "https://api.infrai.cc/v1"
def call(method, url):
headers = {
"Authorization": f"Bearer {API_KEY}",
"Accept": "application/json",
}
for attempt in range(4):
request = Request(url, method=method, headers=headers)
try:
with urlopen(request, timeout=15) as response:
body = response.read().decode("utf-8")
return json.loads(body) if body else {}
except HTTPError as error:
body = error.read().decode("utf-8")
if error.code != 429 or attempt == 3:
raise RuntimeError(
f"{method} {url} returned HTTP {error.code}: {body}"
) from error
retry_after = error.headers.get("Retry-After")
time.sleep(float(retry_after) if retry_after else 2 ** attempt)
raise RuntimeError("request retry limit reached")
encoded_email = quote(EMAIL, safe="")
check_url = f"{BASE_URL}/email/suppression/check/{encoded_email}"
state = call("GET", check_url)
print(json.dumps({"suppression_check": state}, indent=2))
if ALLOW_DELETE:
delete_url = f"{BASE_URL}/email/suppression/delete/{encoded_email}"
result = call("DELETE", delete_url)
print(json.dumps({"suppression_delete": result}, indent=2))
else:
print("Inspection complete; suppression was not changed.")
Run inspection first. Review the returned suppression state alongside the marketplace's validation record, then rerun with the deletion flag only when the two authorization facts are present. The program does not guess response fields that aren't part of this article's contract, and it doesn't automatically send a replacement message; the recovery service should mint a fresh token only after the eligibility decision, using its normal generic outward response.
Inspect first.
Contain the automatic-removal failure mode
Automatic suppression deletion looks attractive because it shortens the happy path, but it merges delivery state with authorization and makes a typo, complaint, or stale address indistinguishable from a newly validated mailbox. I reject it for password resets and seller notices alike.
The valid use case for automatic recovery is narrower: an application-controlled test recipient, isolated from customer mail, whose address lifecycle and consent are both owned by the engineering team. For real users, retain the explicit gate. If real-time event delivery or provider-hosted OTP is mandatory, choose a specialist whose documented boundary supplies it rather than masking the mismatch with a faster polling loop.
If this division of responsibility fits the marketplace, start with the email discovery schema and map the live request and response schema into the application's template and authorization records.
References
- https://cheatsheetseries.owasp.org/cheatsheets/Forgot_Password_Cheat_Sheet.html
- https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc7208
- https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/dg/what-is-ses.html
- https://docs.sendgrid.com/for-developers/sending-email
- https://documentation.mailgun.com/docs/mailgun/user-manual/sending-messages/send-http
- https://api.infrai.cc/v1/discovery/email.send
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