TL;DR
- what: An attacker exploited a vulnerability in Optimizely Web Experimentation to write a malicious loader into the Project JavaScript of customer projects, which the official snippet then served to every page that loaded it.
- impact: Visitors to at least 178 organizations, including CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, HSBC and Equifax, received a crypto address swapper, a card skimmer, and on iPhones and iPads the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits.
- fix: Optimizely says it has fixed the flaw, removed the code, secured affected accounts and added protections against unauthorized code delivery, but has not disclosed the root cause, the number of projects changed or whether attacker access is fully closed.
- who: Any organization running Optimizely Web Experimentation snippets, their site visitors entering card data in first-party form fields or crypto addresses, and users on iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1 or iOS 18.4 to 18.7.
For roughly 17 hours on November 16, a trusted third-party script turned into a delivery system for financial theft and iPhone exploitation. An attacker exploited a flaw in Optimizely Web Experimentation and planted a loader in customer snippets served from cdn.optimizely.com. Report URI, which monitors the scripts websites run, found the code in 188 of the 1,611 Optimizely snippets it checked, belonging to 178 organizations. The list includes CNN, the BBC, Zoom, Salesforce, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Equifax, Air France-KLM, Ledger and Peacock. Optimizely's own main site and login page also carried the code. Some researchers are calling the campaign OPTIMJACK.
The payload swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers, expiry dates and CVVs, and on Apple mobile devices loaded the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits. The attacker's wallets had received about $7,040 by 19:25 UTC. Report URI cannot see how many card numbers were exposed.
How the Snippet Became the Weapon
Sites that run experiments with Optimizely load a vendor script called a snippet. The snippet updates itself whenever the customer changes a setting, and each time it loads it runs a field of custom code called Project JavaScript. The attacker wrote a loader into that field and left the rest of the snippet untouched. Because the snippet was still served from cdn.optimizely.com under the vendor's own certificate, every page that loaded it ran the loader. Sites that serve the snippet from their own domain were affected too, because the content comes from the same project.
The loader came in three variants. Most loaded 1688360[.]cc/track.js directly. One hid that address in base64 so a plain text search for the domain would miss it. A third carried a full copy of the payload that runs if the domain is blocked, which defeats a simple domain blocklist.
Delivery is not compromise — A site that served this code has not necessarily had its own systems breached. The malicious content lived in the Optimizely project and was delivered through the vendor's CDN. Cynet, whose endpoint detection flagged browser connections to the attacker's server, traced the loader back to a file served from cdn.optimizely.com and captured the code on CNN and Zoom pages.
What track.js Did in the Browser
The payload targeted money first. According to a payload analysis by StepSecurity, it replaces valid crypto wallet addresses with the attacker's in page text, forms, links, the clipboard and outgoing requests. It only swaps an address that passes its chain's checksum and sits near a payment word such as wallet, deposit or send. An address a visitor copies from an affected page may already belong to the attacker by the time it is pasted.
- Card skimmer, added at 13:43 UTC: captures card number, expiry date and CVV on submission from the site's own form fields and sends them to the attacker's server.
- Skimmer limit: it cannot read cards entered in a cross-origin payment iframe such as Stripe's hosted fields or Adyen's.
- Session theft: after swapping an address near wallet or payment wording, it sends the visitor's cookies and a page screenshot to the attacker.
- Cookie limit: it cannot read cookies marked HttpOnly.
The iOS Exploit Chain
On iPhones and iPads, the code loads boot.js from two .icu domains. That script reads the iOS version and opens an exploit chain in a hidden iframe: Coruna for iOS 13 to 17, DarkSword for iOS 18, and for iOS 26 a separate chain that so far only collects device details. Both kits were previously documented by Google researchers. Coruna targets iOS 13.0 to 17.2.1 and DarkSword targets iOS 18.4 to 18.7. The kit's own comments mark iOS 18.7.3 and later, and iOS 26.3 and later, as patched.
Between 17:13 and 17:57 UTC, the attacker escalated, adding a Coruna iframe to every visit from iOS 18.6 or earlier. Those pages reloaded every 60 seconds to retry the exploit. Cynet retrieved the second stage using an emulated iPhone browser and describes the result as conditional delivery, "not a successful compromise of a physical iPhone or iPad." No confirmed device takeovers have been reported.
Timeline
- September 17: the same actor's injector, webshell[.]lol, first appears on Turkish sites.
- Late last week: the injector is planted through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media scripts.
- November 16, 04:21 UTC: first Optimizely injection observed, in the BBC's snippet, loading webshell[.]lol.
- 13:43 UTC: card skimmer added to the payload.
- 17:13 to 17:57 UTC: Coruna iframe forced on every iOS 18.6 or earlier visit.
- 19:25 UTC: attacker wallets hold about $7,040.
- About 20:40 UTC: mass cleanup begins; by 21:52 UTC only TalkTalk's snippet still carries the code.
- November 17, 01:02 UTC: Optimizely posts its incident notice.
What Optimizely Has and Has Not Said
Optimizely's notice states the attacker "exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation" to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects. The vendor says it has fixed the flaw, removed the code, taken steps to secure affected user accounts and added protections to stop unauthorized code from being delivered. The notice does not explain how the flaw worked, how many projects were modified, when the fix went in, whether the attacker retains any access, or what customers should do. Before the notice appeared, Report URI said it did not know how the attacker gained write access to so many unrelated customer projects: "That's for Optimizely to explain."
⚠️ Re-infection after cleanup — Smartsheet's snippet was cleaned once and then re-infected with an obfuscated version of the loader. Report URI says this indicates the attacker still had access at that point. Combined with the vendor's silence on residual access, a single clean check of a snippet is not proof the project stays clean.
RedEye Assessment
This is the third-party script problem at full scale. One vendor-side write primitive reached 178 organizations, and the delivery path carried a valid certificate from an allowlisted CDN, so content security policies and domain trust offered no protection. The attacker also showed operational maturity: obfuscated and blocklist-resistant loader variants, checksum-aware address swapping, live payload changes through the day, and persistence that survived at least one cleanup. The same actor had already run this playbook through Kissmetrics, StorifyMe and Minute Media, which points to a deliberate hunt for writable script supply chains rather than a one-off.
Report URI notes the real count is likely higher, since it could only check the snippets it found in time. Until Optimizely discloses the root cause and confirms the attacker's access is closed, organizations running Experimentation snippets should treat their exposure window and their regulatory obligations around card data as open questions. RedEye can assess your third-party script exposure, review client-side monitoring coverage and support incident scoping for this campaign.
Originally published on RedEye Threat Intelligence.
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