TL;DR
- what: CISA added CVE-2026-115731, a deserialization flaw in Puppet's report-processing code, to the KEV catalog on November 17, 2026, after reports of active exploitation.
- impact: An attacker can run code on the Puppet Server as the service user and steal the CA signing keys, which puts every node the server manages at risk.
- fix: Perforce fixed the flaw on November 3, 2026, in Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1, 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13 and in Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2. OpenVox fixed it in Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0 and in Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0.
- who: Organizations running unpatched Puppet Enterprise, Puppet Core or OpenVox servers, especially servers with permissive CA autosigning that are reachable from untrusted networks.
On November 17, 2026, CISA added CVE-2026-115731 to its Known Exploited Vulnerabilities catalog, confirming that attackers are actively using a critical flaw in Perforce Puppet. The bug has a CVSS score of 9.4. It lets any client with a CA-signed agent certificate run arbitrary code on the Puppet Server as the service user. If the certificate authority signs requests without strong verification, anyone who can reach the server over the network can get a certificate and use the bug, with no prior access.
Puppet servers sit at the center of enterprise configuration management. They push code and configuration to whole fleets of systems, often with full privileges. If an attacker takes over the server, every system it manages is exposed.
What the Flaw Does
The flaw is in Puppet's report-processing code. Agents send run reports to the server in PUT requests. CISA says the server unsafely deserializes a report that contains a crafted rich-data type, and the result is code execution under the Puppet service account.
Whether an attacker can get in depends on the CA. The attacker needs a certificate signed by the Puppet CA. In a tightly controlled deployment, that means they already control an enrolled node. If the server automatically signs incoming requests without strong verification, an attacker can simply request a certificate, receive it and exploit the bug with no foothold at all.
⚠️ Autosigning Turns This Into Pre-Auth RCE — CISA says that if the CA automatically signs requests without strong verification, an unauthenticated network attacker can get a valid certificate and exploit the flaw. At that point the only thing stopping them is whether they can reach the Puppet Server over the network.
Affected and Fixed Versions
Perforce released fixes on November 3, 2026. The affected releases are:
- Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.0 before 2026.0.1
- Puppet Enterprise 2025.0.0 before 2025.12.1
- Puppet Enterprise 2023.8.0 before 2023.8.13
- Puppet Core 9.0.0 before 9.1.3
- Puppet Core 8.x before 8.22.2
The fixed releases are Puppet Enterprise 2026.0.1 (which includes Puppet Core 9.1.3), Puppet Enterprise 2025.12.1 and 2023.8.13 (both include Puppet Core 8.22.2), and standalone Puppet Core 9.1.3 and 8.22.2.
OpenVox, the open-source implementation of Puppet, is also affected. Its fixes shipped in OpenVox Agent 9.3.0 and 8.32.0 and in OpenVox Server 9.2.0 and 8.18.0. Teams that moved from Puppet to OpenVox are in scope.
Exploitation Started Within a Day
CISA has not said how attackers are using the flaw, and no threat actor has been named. The first public sign came on November 4, one day after the patch shipped. A Reddit user posting as transdimensia said they found a severely misconfigured CA in their fleet and traced the activity back to a CVE-2026-115731 intrusion.
That account fits the scenario CISA describes. A permissive CA handed out certificates, and that gave the attacker the credential needed to reach the vulnerable code. With exploitation reported 24 hours after release, defenders had almost no time between the patch becoming available and attacks in the wild.
Under Binding Operational Directive 26-04, Federal Civilian Executive Branch agencies must apply the fixes by December 1, 2026. That is 28 days after the patch shipped and 27 days after the first reported exploitation.
Why a Compromised Puppet Server Is a Worst Case
Neodyme AG, whose researcher found the flaw, said the impact depends heavily on how the server is configured and which orchestration protocols are enabled, if any. One consequence holds whatever the configuration: an attacker with code execution on a Puppet server can take the CA signing keys and impersonate other hosts.
This matters more than the code execution itself. A stolen CA key lets an attacker issue certificates that the Puppet environment trusts. Patching closes the deserialization bug, but it does not invalidate anything already signed with a stolen key.
Neodyme described the downstream risk directly: ransomware deployment, mass data exfiltration and lateral movement into other parts of the network. Puppet is built to push changes to every system it manages. An attacker who controls the server gets that delivery channel too.
Patched Does Not Mean Clean — A Puppet Server that was reachable and unpatched after November 3 may already have had its CA signing keys stolen. Upgrading removes the flaw. It does not remove an attacker who already took the keys or issued certificates.
The Companion Flaw: CVE-2026-115732
Alain Rödel of Neodyme AG is credited with finding and reporting CVE-2026-115731. He also reported CVE-2026-115732 (CVSS 9.0), a critical certificate-name authorization bypass that affects both Puppet and OpenVox. Neodyme's report covers both issues. Only CVE-2026-115731 is in the KEV catalog right now.
Neodyme said it found both flaws with AI assistance and precise steering. Together they show how quickly critical bugs are now being found in mature infrastructure software: these two sit in the certificate and reporting layers that Puppet's trust model depends on.
RedEye Assessment
Three factors decide exposure: the version running, the CA signing policy and whether the Puppet Server can be reached from the network. The highest risk is an unpatched server with permissive autosigning that is reachable from untrusted segments. That is the setup in the only public intrusion report so far.
Any organization that ran an unpatched Puppet Enterprise, Puppet Core or OpenVox server after November 3 should treat this as a possible intrusion, not a routine patch. The Puppet Server holds the keys to the fleet, and the vendor fix does not reach back to undo a compromise that has already happened.
Originally published on RedEye Threat Intelligence.
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