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Mohammad Taha Azizi Ahad
Mohammad Taha Azizi Ahad

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The government asked Signal for everything. Signal had two timestamps.

The government asked Signal for everything. Signal had two timestamps.

On October 5, 2026, the U.S. Attorney's Office for the District of Columbia sent Signal a grand jury subpoena. It asked for "all customer or subscriber account information" for four phone numbers, and it gave Signal three days to answer.

The attachment narrowed the ask to two things: the date and time each account was created, and the date and time it last connected. The standard production instructions stapled to the subpoena, evidently written with banks in mind, also asked for images of checks and deposit slips.

Signal's answer, filed by the ACLU the next day, was short enough to fit in a single paragraph. Three of the four phone numbers had no Signal account at all. For the one that did, Signal handed over the account creation date and time, and the date of its last connection. Not the time of that last connection, just the date, because Signal only keeps the date. That was everything. There was nothing else to give.

This was the second subpoena from the same court in seven months. The first one asked about 37 numbers. The answer was the same shape: a handful of timestamps, and a list of accounts that did not exist. The new one did not even come with a nondisclosure order, so Signal published it right away, with the phone numbers and the names of government personnel redacted.

The request is not the interesting part. The answer is.

Read the subpoena as a test of the system, and it tells you exactly what Signal's architecture is worth. A grand jury can order a company to hand over whatever it has. It cannot order a company to hand over what it never collected. Signal's response was not a refusal. It was an inventory.

Here is what Signal says it holds, in its own words: messages, calls, contacts, groups, profile name and avatar, stories, and stickers are end-to-end encrypted. Much of the metadata other services log by default is never collected at all. The company cannot turn over information it never had access to in the first place.

That sentence does a lot of work, and it is worth slowing down on it, because it describes a design decision, not a policy position. A policy can change under pressure. A database that was never built cannot be subpoenaed.

The two timestamps Signal did hand over are the interesting exception, and they are worth being honest about. Signal keeps a Unix timestamp for when you registered, and the date you last connected. Those are real data points. A last-connection date can tell an investigator that an account was alive during a window, and that matters. Signal is not invisible. It is minimal, and minimal is a specific, defensible claim. It is not the same as nothing.

What other messengers keep

The contrast is what makes this useful for anyone building a messenger, because the subpoena only looks dramatic if you assume every app stores the same things.

Telegram's ordinary chats are cloud chats. Telegram's own FAQ says they use server-client encryption, and its end-to-end encryption manual says secret chats are the exception: one-on-one, device-specific, started by hand. Everything in a cloud chat, including the content, sits on Telegram's servers in a form Telegram can read. If a court asked Telegram for a cloud chat, the answer would look very different from Signal's two timestamps. Telegram's privacy policy also says it may disclose a user's IP address and phone number on a valid court order, and that it keeps metadata such as IP addresses, devices, and username history for up to 12 months.

WhatsApp sits in the middle. Personal messages are end-to-end encrypted by default, using the Signal protocol. But the metadata around the message is a different story. Its privacy policy requires your mobile number, collects your IP address, device, and usage data, and shares information with other Meta companies. A 2021 FBI training document reported that WhatsApp can return who-messaged-whom metadata every 15 minutes under a pen register order. Backups are only end-to-end encrypted if you turn that option on.

So three apps, three different answers to the same question, and the difference is not how much they care about privacy. It is what their servers were built to hold.

The lesson I took for my own messenger

I build an encrypted messenger. My protocol, PQ-MPRBA, pairs ML-KEM-768 key exchange with ML-DSA-65 identity signatures, and the server routes sealed envelopes it cannot open. Writing that sentence is easy. The subpoena is the test that tells you whether you actually built it.

Here is the test I now run in my head before adding any field to the server: if a court ordered me to hand this over tomorrow, could I? If the answer is yes, I have to decide whether the field is worth keeping, because "we would rather not share it" is not a defense. "We do not have it" is.

That test changes small decisions. A last-seen timestamp feels harmless when you add it for a presence feature. It is a piece of evidence once it exists. A read receipt feels like a convenience until someone asks who read what and when. A contact list uploaded "to find your friends" is a social graph sitting on your server, waiting for a request. Every one of these is a product decision that becomes a legal answer later.

It also changes how I think about verification. Last month I shipped safety numbers in my messenger: a fingerprint of both parties' identity keys, shown as 60 digits, with a warning if a key changes. That feature exists because the server cannot vouch for who you are talking to. If the server held the keys, verification would be the server's job, and the server's word would be the weak point. The server does not hold them, so the check has to happen between the two people, on their own devices. Data minimization and user-side verification are the same decision seen from two sides.

None of this makes a messenger bulletproof, and anyone who tells you otherwise is selling something. The messages still live on the phones at both ends. A seized device, a device warrant, a forensic extraction: that is where the evidence actually is, for Signal and for mine. Sealed sender hides the sender from the server, not from the recipient's screen. And a phone number as an account identifier is itself a data point, which is why Signal's September launch of Signal Login, an account without a phone number, matters more than it looks. It removes one more field from the inventory.

Run the subpoena test before you ship

The Signal subpoena is useful precisely because it is boring. Nobody's messages leaked. No backdoor was found. No engineer had to choose between their users and a court order. The system was asked a question and answered with the contents of its own database, and the database was nearly empty by design.

That is the standard I want my own messenger held to. Not "trust us, we would fight for you." The ACLU did fight for Signal, and deserves the credit, but the fight was short because there was almost nothing to fight over. The real work happened years earlier, when someone decided which fields the server would never store.

If you are building anything that holds other people's conversations, write the subpoena down before you write the schema. List every field your server will keep, and imagine handing that list to a stranger with a court order. Then delete every field you cannot defend. What is left is your privacy policy, except it will be true, because it will be the only thing your database can say.


Sources: Signal's published response, "Grand jury subpoena for Signal user data in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia (again!)", signal.org/bigbrother; Telegram FAQ and end-to-end encryption manual; WhatsApp privacy policy and messaging guidelines, September 2026.

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