An IP lookup that returns a city can feel like a pin on a map. It is not. IP99 derives a location from registry and routing data for the address block, not from measuring a device. Country is usually reliable; region and city are usually right for consumer broadband; a street address is impossible. The same free, no-key call that returns risk also returns geo. JSON samples were verified on 17 November 2026 UTC, using the free profile only. Notes: IP99, API, IP location, free geolocation and risk API.
One curl, the whole geo object
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/8.8.8.8
No API key, no registration. Verified 17 November 2026 UTC (computed_at 2026-11-17T13:11:28Z):
{
"ip": "8.8.8.8",
"computed_at": "2026-11-17T13:11:28Z",
"evidence_state": "none",
"geo": {
"continent": "NA",
"country": "US",
"region": "California",
"city": "Mountain View",
"district": "",
"lat": 37.38605,
"lon": -122.08385,
"tz": "America/Los_Angeles"
},
"network": { "asn": 15169, "usage_type": "IDC" },
"risk": { "score": 0, "level": "none", "signals": ["hosting"] }
}
Read the fields as a contract, not as a street. geo.country is an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code; geo.region and geo.city are Latin place names; geo.tz is an IANA zone; geo.continent is one of AS, EU, NA, SA, AF, OC, AN. geo.lat / geo.lon are coordinates of the block, rounded to at most five decimal places, sent as a pair and omitted together when unknown — because 0,0 is a real point in the Gulf of Guinea.
The six string keys — continent, country, region, city, district, tz — are always present. A name the database does not have is an empty string, never a missing key and never a 0. That is why district is "" here: the English-language place-name database covers countries other than China down to the city. One parser can handle every row.
hosting and usage_type: "IDC" describe the network scene, not a fraud verdict — official guidance is not to block on hosting or mobile alone. Score 0 with evidence_state: "none" means IP99 holds no current risk evidence, not that the address is safe. risk.score is the freshness and strength of verifiable evidence, not attacker probability. Google Public DNS is anycast; Mountain View is a reasonable registration point for the block, not "the building this packet left."
Accuracy falls off as you zoom in
Official guidance on how IP location works is a gradient, not a single accuracy number:
- Country — high confidence. Errors are rare and usually mean a whole block was moved, not that one address was misread.
- Region — good. Large ISPs often register every address to the region that holds their equipment.
- City — statistical, not a fix. Consumer broadband usually lands in the right metropolitan area; mobile, corporate, and VPN ranges regularly show the wrong city or the carrier's headquarters.
- District — only where IP99 has it. The value is non-empty for addresses in China; elsewhere the key is present as an empty string. Finer than city, coarser than a street.
The geolocation database is IP99's own. As of data version 20261117 it covers 244 countries and regions for IPv4 block attribution, operator, ASN, and usage type, and it is rebuilt daily. The risk database is separate and updates every 10 seconds.
Anycast is not "where the user is"
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/1.1.1.1
Verified the same day (computed_at 2026-11-17T13:11:32Z):
{
"ip": "1.1.1.1",
"computed_at": "2026-11-17T13:11:32Z",
"evidence_state": "none",
"geo": { "continent": "OC", "country": "AU", "region": "Queensland", "city": "Brisbane", "district": "", "lat": -27.4679, "lon": 153.0281, "tz": "Australia/Brisbane" },
"network": { "asn": 13335, "usage_type": "IDC" },
"risk": { "score": 0, "level": "none", "signals": ["hosting"] }
}
Cloudflare's public resolver is also anycast. The lookup reports Brisbane, Australia — a registration and routing fact about the block, not the city of the node that answered you, and not the city of a person using 1.1.1.1 as DNS. Using that city to pick a legal region, or to fire a "login from a new country" rule, would be reacting to the exit's documentation, not to a traveller.
IPv6 uses the same endpoint and the same geo fields. A lookup of 2001:4860:4860::8888 the same day returned the same Mountain View record as 8.8.8.8. Coverage still depends on the registrations for that prefix; a newly allocated range may resolve only to a country.
District, when the database has it
For an address in China the same three Latin name fields are filled, and district is no longer empty. Official docs use 27.22.66.200 as the example. Live on 17 November 2026 UTC (computed_at 2026-11-17T13:11:34Z):
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/27.22.66.200
{
"ip": "27.22.66.200",
"computed_at": "2026-11-17T13:11:34Z",
"evidence_state": "active",
"geo": { "continent": "AS", "country": "CN", "region": "Hubei", "city": "Xiangyang", "district": "Fancheng", "lat": 32.04482, "lon": 112.13546, "tz": "Asia/Shanghai" },
"network": { "asn": 4134, "usage_type": "DYN" },
"risk": { "score": 15, "level": "low", "signals": ["dialup_pool", "hijacked_proxy", "proxy"] }
}
region / city / district here are Hubei / Xiangyang / Fancheng. Because the geolocation database is rebuilt daily, a published example can move by a district as the mapping is updated — treat the live response as the source, not a screenshot from last month. This address also carries current risk evidence (dialup_pool, hijacked_proxy, proxy) at score 15 / low, a separate reading from geo. Official guidance: hijacked_proxy often means the holder is a victim, so do not hard-ban the account on that signal alone. See https://ip99.com/en/geo/cn for a country-level range view.
When the location looks wrong
Nothing in the API is "broken" in the usual cases people report. A block can be registered in one city and used in another; the lookup reports the registration. A VPN or proxy replaces the egress, so the lookup reports where the exit is. Mobile and carrier-grade NAT share one address across a region (MOB or GTW means the city is approximate by construction). Corporate and satellite links can egress through a headquarters or a ground station. A datacenter address describes the server or anycast announcement, rarely the users.
A practical order, from the official guide: check for a VPN or proxy first — it is the most common cause, and the fix is not in the geolocation database. Compare geo.tz, not just the city: a wrong city with a correct time zone usually means "registered at the regional equipment, used elsewhere." Then look at usage_type. Then treat the result as an estimate. Use city-level location to pick a language, a currency, or a legal region — not to decide that a specific person is in a specific place.
Try it
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/8.8.8.8
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/1.1.1.1
curl https://ip99.com/v1/ip/27.22.66.200
curl https://ip99.com/v1/me
Anonymous quota is 500 lookups/day per client IP (60/min); a free logged-in key raises it to 5,000/day. Check remaining with GET https://ip99.com/v1/me or the X-Daily-* headers. OpenAPI: https://ip99.com/openapi.json. Pricing: https://ip99.com/en/pricing.
Do not treat IP99 scores or geo as identical to other ThreatHunter datasets — this article only claims what free /v1/ip and the cited product pages document.
IP99 is a ThreatHunter product. An IP location is an estimate for a network block, not a street address and not a person. Start at https://ip99.com; the field contract is on IP location, the free geolocation and risk API, and https://ip99.com/api.
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