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Behavioral Prediction Model: Knowledge–Emotion–Confidence–Trust–Fatigue–Attention–Memory Load–Curiosity

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@kungfufk

Sample for The Physics of Bounded Rationality:Why AI Needs a "Cognitive Mechanics" Engine(Virtual Intelligence)
STATUS: SAMPLE / ILLUSTRATIVE MODEL — NOT EMPIRICALLY VALIDATED
This model does not predict truth, belief, or what is correct. It predicts behavior — latency, hesitation, stability, degradation — following the reframing that this only claims to model observable outputs, not internal states as fact. That reframing is the reason this version is more testable than earlier ones: latency and mind-changing are measurable; "emotional energy" is not. Every physics borrow is still flagged as an Assumption. Free parameters ( kik_i , λij\lambda_{ij} , β\beta , θ\theta , γ\gamma ) are unfit — they'd need calibration against real response-time and behavior data before any number here means anything quantitatively. Directional claims (does latency rise when load rises?) are at least checkable in principle.


1. Variable roles (Assumption 0)

The eight inputs don't behave the same way, so they're split into three functional groups instead of being treated as eight identical oscillators:

Group Traits Role
Active / energy-contributing Knowledge ( KK ), Emotion ( EmEm ), Trust ( TrTr ), Attention ( AtAt ), Curiosity ( CuCu ) Behave like the trait-waves in the earlier model — they superpose and interfere to produce a composite "cognitive energy"
Capacity-draining Fatigue ( FaFa ), Memory Load ( MLML ) Don't add engagement energy — they shrink the ceiling the active traits are operating under
Calibration / output Confidence ( CfCf ) Kept as a real input (self-reported/observed amplitude) and compared against a value the model predicts from the other traits — the gap between the two is itself a useful signal

Assumption 0: This split is a modeling choice, not a fact about cognition. Fatigue and Memory Load could instead be modeled as active traits with negative coupling; Confidence could be treated as fully independent. This version was chosen because it matches the behavior of your own worked examples (Fatigue/overload degrading capacity; Confidence as an outcome of Knowledge/Emotion/Capacity).


2. Assumptions

  • Assumption 1 — Wave representation. Each active trait is approximated as Ψi(t)=Ai(t)sin(ωt+ϕi)\Psi_i(t) = A_i(t)\sin(\omega t + \phi_i) , with amplitude Ai(t)A_i(t) varying slowly relative to ω\omega (a "slowly-varying envelope" borrow from signal processing/AM modulation). No evidence these traits actually oscillate.
  • Assumption 2 — Shared frequency. All active traits assumed to share ω\omega within one exchange, for tractability only.
  • Assumption 3 — Energy \propto amplitude 2^2 . Same simple-harmonic-motion borrow as before.
  • Assumption 4 — Fatigue/Memory Load drain capacity linearly. γFa,γML\gamma_{Fa}, \gamma_{ML} are free "drain rate" constants with no measured value.
  • Assumption 5 — Confidence has a predictable component. Modeled as a function of Knowledge, Emotion, and spare capacity, matching your stated example directly.
  • Assumption 6 — Incoming information is itself a wave. Represented as Φinfo(t)=Ainfosin(ωt+ϕinfo)\Phi_{info}(t) = A_{info}\sin(\omega t + \phi_{info}) hitting the Trust wave — a direct continuation of the interference idea from the original framework.
  • Assumption 7 — All thresholds ( β,θ,N0\beta, \theta, N_0 ) are free parameters. Chosen for plausible direction of effect, not fit to data.

3. Derivation

Step 1 — Active traits as waves (Assumption 1, 2)

Ψi(t)=Ai(t)sin(ωt+ϕi),iK,Em,Tr,At,Cu \Psi_i(t) = A_i(t)\sin(\omega t + \phi_i), \qquad i \in {K, Em, Tr, At, Cu}

Step 2 — Composite active energy (same method as the EEAH model: superpose, square, time-average)

Ecognitive(t)=12ikiAi(t)2  +  i<jλijAi(t)Aj(t)cos(ϕiϕj),i,jK,Em,Tr,At,Cu E_{cognitive}(t) = \frac{1}{2}\sum_i k_i A_i(t)^2 \;+\; \sum_{i<j} \lambda_{ij}\, A_i(t) A_j(t)\cos(\phi_i-\phi_j), \qquad i,j \in {K, Em, Tr, At, Cu}

Step 3 — Dynamic capacity ceiling (Assumption 4)

C(t)=C0γFaAFa(t)γMLAML(t) C(t) = C_0 - \gamma_{Fa} A_{Fa}(t) - \gamma_{ML} A_{ML}(t)

Fatigue and Memory Load don't add to EcognitiveE_{cognitive} — they lower the ceiling everything else has to operate under.

Step 4 — Load ratio

R(t)=Ecognitive(t)C(t) R(t) = \frac{E_{cognitive}(t)}{C(t)}

This single number is what most of the seven predictions below are built from: R1R \ll 1 means spare capacity, R1R \approx 1 is the bounded-rationality regime, R>1R > 1 is forced degradation.

Step 5 — Interference from incoming information (Assumption 6)

D(t)=AinfoATr(t)[1cos(ϕinfoϕTr)] D(t) = A_{info}\cdot A_{Tr}(t)\cdot\bigl[1-\cos(\phi_{info}-\phi_{Tr})\bigr]

Small disagreement ( ϕinfoϕTr\phi_{info}\approx\phi_{Tr} ) cos1D0\Rightarrow \cos\approx1 \Rightarrow D\approx0 . Direct contradiction ( ϕinfoϕTr+π\phi_{info}\approx\phi_{Tr}+\pi ) cos1D2AinfoATr\Rightarrow \cos\approx-1 \Rightarrow D\approx 2A_{info}A_{Tr} , maximal disturbance.


4. The seven predictions

1. Decision latency (reasoning cycles)

Ncycles(t)N0(1+R(t))βAK(t) N_{cycles}(t) \approx \frac{N_0\,(1+R(t))^{\beta}}{A_K(t)}

Carries over T1/KT \propto 1/K from the original framework, now compounded by load. Rising R(t)R(t) (more load, less spare capacity) increases the number of cycles needed; more knowledge reduces it.

2. Confidence — predicted vs. self-reported

Predicted confidence from Knowledge, Emotion, and spare capacity, floored at zero:

Cfpredicted(t)=AK(t)AK(t)+AEm(t)max(0, 1R(t)) Cf_{predicted}(t) = \frac{A_K(t)}{A_K(t)+A_{Em}(t)} \cdot \max\bigl(0,\ 1-R(t)\bigr)

This reproduces your example directly: high KK , low EmEm , low R(t)R(t) (high spare capacity) Cfpredicted1\Rightarrow Cf_{predicted}\to1 . Low KK , high EmEm Cfpredicted0\Rightarrow Cf_{predicted}\to0 (hesitation, heuristics).

Calibration gap (a genuinely new derived quantity, not just a restatement of the input):

ΔCf(t)=ACf(t)Cfpredicted(t)\Delta Cf(t) = A_{Cf}(t) - Cf_{predicted}(t)

ΔCf>0\Delta Cf > 0 : expressed confidence exceeds what Knowledge/Emotion/load would justify (overconfidence). ΔCf<0\Delta Cf < 0 : underconfidence — the person has grounds for more certainty than they're showing.

3. Emotional stability under incoming information

Directly from Step 5's disturbance D(t)D(t) :

  • Small disagreement D0\rightarrow D\approx0 \rightarrow minor disturbance
  • Huge contradiction D2AinfoATr\rightarrow D\approx 2A_{info}A_{Tr} \rightarrow large interference

This is the same constructive/destructive interference idea from the original framework's Section 2, now given an actual formula instead of just a description.

4. Cognitive overload

Directly from Step 4: when R(t)>1R(t) > 1 (i.e. Ecognitive>CE_{cognitive} > C ), predicted symptoms are qualitative, not separately derived — slower thinking (rising NcyclesN_{cycles} from #1), more heuristic shortcuts, degraded encoding (which would show up as rising AMLA_{ML} , a feedback loop back into Step 3), simplified problem framing.

5. Attention switching

dAEmdt>0  and  dAAtdt<0  reasoning quality falls \frac{dA_{Em}}{dt} > 0 \ \text{ and } \ \frac{dA_{At}}{dt} < 0 \ \Rightarrow \ \text{reasoning quality falls}

A reasoning-quality proxy, built the same way as the confidence ratio in #2:

Q(t)=AAt(t)AAt(t)+AEm(t) Q(t) = \frac{A_{At}(t)}{A_{At}(t) + A_{Em}(t)}

QQ falls as emotion rises relative to attention.

6. Learning speed

This isn't a new formula — it's a direct corollary of #1: as AK(t)A_K(t) rises over time, Ncycles(t)N_{cycles}(t) falls, matching T1/KT\propto 1/K . Internal consistency, not new machinery.

7. Information acceptance — contradiction tolerance

Reframes "will they believe it" as "how much contradiction can the current state absorb," using Step 5's disturbance formula solved for a tolerance threshold:

Ainfotolerable(t)θ(t)C(t)ATr(t)[1cos(ϕinfoϕTr)] A_{info}^{tolerable}(t) \approx \frac{\theta(t)\cdot C(t)}{A_{Tr}(t)\cdot\bigl[1-\cos(\phi_{info}-\phi_{Tr})\bigr]}

Higher trust and more spare capacity raise the tolerable contradiction amplitude. Curiosity's role: rather than sitting unused, Curiosity is assumed to raise the disruption threshold itself — a curious state treats contradiction as interesting rather than destabilizing:

θ(t)=θ0+δACu(t) \theta(t) = \theta_0 + \delta \cdot A_{Cu}(t)

( θ0\theta_0 , δ\delta free parameters — Assumption 7.) Note: at ϕinfo=ϕTr\phi_{info}=\phi_{Tr} exactly (perfect agreement) the denominator is zero and the expression is undefined — the trivial case where there's nothing to tolerate.


5. Worked toy example (synthetic numbers, illustration only)

AK=0.7, AEm=0.3, AFa=0.6, AML=0.5, C0=1.5, γFa=γML=0.5A_K=0.7,\ A_{Em}=0.3,\ A_{Fa}=0.6,\ A_{ML}=0.5,\ C_0=1.5,\ \gamma_{Fa}=\gamma_{ML}=0.5

Capacity: C=1.50.5(0.6)0.5(0.5)=1.50.30.25=0.95C = 1.5 - 0.5(0.6) - 0.5(0.5) = 1.5 - 0.3 - 0.25 = 0.95

Suppose Ecognitive=0.8E_{cognitive}=0.8 at this moment R=0.8/0.950.84\Rightarrow R = 0.8/0.95 \approx 0.84 (near capacity, not yet over).

Predicted confidence: Cfpredicted=0.70.7+0.3×(10.84)=0.7×0.160.11Cf_{predicted} = \frac{0.7}{0.7+0.3}\times(1-0.84) = 0.7\times0.16 \approx 0.11 — low, despite decent knowledge, because the system is running near its (fatigue/memory-load-reduced) ceiling. This is the model's way of saying: knowledge alone doesn't guarantee confidence if capacity is already spent elsewhere.


6. Limitations

  • Same free-parameter problem as before. ki,λij,γFa,γML,β,θ0,δk_i, \lambda_{ij}, \gamma_{Fa}, \gamma_{ML}, \beta, \theta_0, \delta are all unfit. Until they're calibrated against real latency/behavior data, only the direction of predictions is meaningful, not the magnitude.
  • The active/drain/output split (Assumption 0) is a design choice, not a discovery. A different, equally defensible split could be made.
  • Behavior \neq ground truth, and that's the point — but it's also a limit. This model can, in principle, predict that someone hesitates or takes longer; it cannot say whether their eventual answer is correct.
  • The interference formulas (Step 5, Prediction 7) inherit the same shared-frequency and phase assumptions flagged in the earlier model — still the weakest structural assumption in the whole framework.
  • Nothing here has been tested against real response-time or behavioral data. The toy example in Section 5 is illustrative arithmetic, not a finding.

This is a sample model of what a testable version of the framework could look like — the next real step is picking one prediction (decision latency is the easiest to measure) and checking whether real response-time data moves in the direction this model predicts.

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