CyberDefenders HawkEye Lab – Official Blue Team Write-up
Author: Mounica S Goodala
Date: 2026-07-31
Lab: Network Forensics - KeyLogger Exfiltration
Objective: Investigate a suspicious network trace to identify the malware variant, exfiltrated data, and attacker infrastructure.
1. Scenario Overview
An accountant at the organization received a phishing email containing a link to a malicious invoice. Shortly after, SOC analysts detected suspicious outbound network traffic. This investigation focuses on analyzing the provided stealer.pcap capture to identify the attack chain, the malware used, and the data exfiltrated.
2. Tools & Environment
- Wireshark v4.x – Packet analysis
- CyberChef – Base64 decoding
- Mac Vendor Lookup – OUI identification
- AbuseIPDB – IP geolocation
- Terminal (macOS) – MD5 hashing
3. Investigation Methodology
Phase 1: Initial Packet Reconnaissance
-
Open PCAP: Loaded
stealer.pcapin Wireshark. - Timezone Configuration: Adjusted View → Time Display Format to UTC to align with SIEM standards (crucial due to UAE UTC+4 offset).
-
File Statistics (Statistics → Capture File Properties):
-
Total Packets:
4003 -
Duration:
01:03:41 -
First Packet UTC:
2019-04-10 20:37(Corrected from local time).
-
Total Packets:
Phase 2: Host & Network Mapping
-
Most Active Device (Link Layer) (Statistics → Conversations → Ethernet):
-
MAC Address:
00:08:02:1c:47:ae(Sorted by highest packet count). -
NIC Manufacturer: Looked up OUI
00:08:02via MAC lookup → Hewlett Packard. - Manufacturer HQ: Palo Alto, California, USA.
-
MAC Address:
-
Private IPs & Host Count (Statistics → Endpoints → IPv4):
- Identified subnet
10.4.10.0/24. - Counted actual hosts:
10.4.10.2,10.4.10.4, and10.4.10.132(broadcast.255excluded). -
Total Computers:
3.
- Identified subnet
-
Victim Hostname (Filter:
dhcp→ ExpandOption: Hostname):- The most active host (
10.4.10.132) isBEIJING-5CD1-PC.
- The most active host (
-
Network Services:
-
DNS Server: Filtered
dnstraffic → Destination IP of queries is10.4.10.4.
-
DNS Server: Filtered
Phase 3: Malware Download & Webserver Analysis
-
Malicious Domain & Infrastructure:
-
Packet 204 (DNS): Queried
proforma-invoices.com→ Resolved to217.182.138.150(Geolocation: France).
-
Packet 204 (DNS): Queried
-
Malicious File Download:
- Filtered
httptraffic and used File → Export Objects → HTTP. - Located
tkraw_Protected99.exe. -
MD5 Hash (via Terminal):
71826ba081e303866ce2a2534491a2f7. - Webserver Software: Analyzed the HTTP response header (Server field) → LiteSpeed.
- Filtered
-
Victim OS Fingerprinting:
- Inspected the
User-Agentin the HTTP GET request →Windows NT 6.1→ Windows 7.
- Inspected the
-
Victim Public IP:
- Followed TCP Stream on Packet 3166 → External NAT IP:
173.66.146.112.
- Followed TCP Stream on Packet 3166 → External NAT IP:
Phase 4: Exfiltration Analysis (SMTP / Email)
-
SMTP Server Identification:
- Filtered
smtpand followed the first TCP stream. - Server Banner:
ESMTP Exim 4.91. -
Email Server IP:
23.229.162.69(Geolocation: United States).
- Filtered
-
Recipient & Credentials:
- The malware sent stolen logs to:
sales.del@macwinlogistics.in. - SMTP
AUTH LOGINcredentials decoded via CyberChef:- Username (Base64):
sales.del@macwinlogistics.in - Password (Base64
U2FsZXNAMjM=):Sales@23.
- Username (Base64):
- The malware sent stolen logs to:
-
Stolen Data & Malware Variant:
- Decoded the Base64 email body.
-
Malware Variant:
HawkEye Keylogger - Reborn v9. -
Bank of America Credentials (extracted from the log):
roman.mcguire:P@ssw0rd$.
4. Summary of Answers
Here is the complete list of answers derived from the investigation:
| # | Question | Answer |
|---|---|---|
| 1 | How many packets does the capture have? | 4003 |
| 2 | At what time was the first packet captured (UTC)? | 2019-04-10 20:37 |
| 3 | What is the duration of the capture? | 01:03:41 |
| 4 | Most active computer at the link level (MAC)? | 00:08:02:1c:47:ae |
| 5 | Manufacturer of the NIC? | Hewlett Packard |
| 6 | HQ of the manufacturer? | Palo Alto |
| 7 | How many computers are on the private /24 network? | 3 |
| 8 | Name of the most active computer (Network level)? | BEIJING-5CD1-PC |
| 9 | IP of the organization's DNS server? | 10.4.10.4 |
| 10 | Domain asked about in packet 204? | proforma-invoices.com |
| 11 | IP of the domain in Q10? | 217.182.138.150 |
| 12 | Country of the IP in Q11? | France |
| 13 | OS of the victim's computer? | Windows 7 |
| 14 | Malicious file downloaded? | tkraw_Protected99.exe |
| 15 | MD5 hash of the malicious file? | 71826ba081e303866ce2a2534491a2f7 |
| 16 | Webserver software hosting the malware? | LiteSpeed |
| 17 | Public IP of the victim computer? | 173.66.146.112 |
| 18 | Country of the email server? | United States |
| 19 | Email server software used? | Exim 4.91 |
| 20 | To which email account is data sent? | sales.del@macwinlogistics.in |
| 21 | Password used by malware to send email? | Sales@23 |
| 22 | Malware variant that exfiltrated the data? | HawkEye Keylogger - Reborn v9 |
| 23 | Bank of America access credentials? | roman.mcguire:P@ssw0rd$ |
5. Conclusion & Recommendations
The investigation confirms a successful HawkEye Keylogger (Reborn v9) infection. The attack chain is as follows:
-
Initial Access: Phishing email directed the accountant to download
tkraw_Protected99.exefromproforma-invoices.com. -
Execution: The malware executed on a Windows 7 host (
BEIJING-5CD1-PCwith internal IP10.4.10.132). - Data Theft: The malware harvested credentials (including Bank of America login) and logged keystrokes.
-
Exfiltration: Stolen data was Base64-encoded and exfiltrated via SMTP to
sales.del@macwinlogistics.inusing anExim 4.91mail server located in the US.
Recommended Actions:
- Immediately reset credentials for
roman.mcguireacross all platforms. - Isolate and reimage the compromised Windows 7 host (
BEIJING-5CD1-PC). - Block indicators of compromise (IOCs):
proforma-invoices.com,217.182.138.150, and23.229.162.69at the network perimeter. - Educate employees on phishing awareness.




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