Originally published at K3 Capital sBOLD Exploit: $3.43M Share-Price Drain
On 18 November 2026 at 12:25:23 UTC, the reported asset value of K3 Capital's sBOLD vault on Ethereum began to fall. Eight minutes later, the vault's totalAssets() reading had dropped from 3,428,803.95 BOLD to 2,000.01 BOLD. Blockaid disclosed an ongoing exploit at 12:50:39 UTC, said attackers flash-loaned wstETH, minted cheap sBOLD shares, swapped collateral and redeemed other depositors' BOLD, and reported about $3.43 million drained. We independently called the same vault around that alert: totalAssets() was already down to 14.58 BOLD. K3 Capital said at 13:08:03 UTC that it was "investigating malicious activity involving sBOLD" and that "contracts have been paused." The vault's paused() flag flipped to true at 13:05:11 UTC, when totalAssets() was 4.53 BOLD. Liquity said Liquity V2 is not affected, described sBOLD as a vault built and run independently by K3 Capital, and asked users not to deposit into sBOLD until further notice.
A later review published by CoinLab, citing Bitquery, estimated about $3.42 million and disputed part of Blockaid's initial mechanism. The two dollar figures describe the same incident and must not be added together. This is a defensive account of a public incident, not a reconstruction of how to repeat it, and it does not establish that remaining funds or other Liquity V2 products are safe.
What Happened
sBOLD is an ERC-4626 vault. Users deposit BOLD, Liquity V2's dollar-pegged stablecoin, and receive sBOLD shares. The vault places that BOLD into Liquity V2 stability pools and is supposed to convert liquidation collateral back into BOLD. Liquity's own blog describes sBOLD as a third-party K3 Capital project, not part of Liquity's immutable core protocol. The vault has adjustable parts, including its price oracle and swap adapter.
Blockaid said the attackers flash-loaned wstETH, self-liquidated a Liquity V2 trove into the stability pools, minted cheap sBOLD shares, swapped the collateral and redeemed BOLD that belonged to other depositors. A follow-up listed:
- One of the exploiters:
0xDC0e2FDEb89D2F363F2EA1B50E923d464C414dAA - Helper contract:
0x19Ad153B83f9a1cbCAc2182DcEf14D0E825A9634 - Flagged transaction:
0xa61572b5…2c5c - Victim vault:
0x50Bd66D59911F5e086Ec87aE43C811e0D059DD11
The transaction is on Ethereum in block 26441931, at 12:25:47 UTC. The exploiter address called the helper with selector 0xa444f5e9, which 4byte.directory records as run(uint256), with the argument 8. The call succeeded, consumed 10,148,678 gas, and emitted 233 ERC-20 Transfer events among 722 logs. Tokens that moved included BOLD at 0x6440f144…eb01d, the official Liquity V2 BOLD token, as well as sBOLD, wstETH, WETH, stETH and rETH. Aggregate wstETH transfers inside the transaction were about 40,012, a flash-loan-sized turnover rather than a net profit.
Unchained, reviewing the same record, placed the transaction at 12:25 UTC, about 25 minutes before the alert, and counted 231 token transfers. Our Transfer count is 233.
What the Vault's Books Showed
The sBOLD contract does not hold a large idle BOLD balance — its ERC-20 BOLD balance was 1.0 BOLD immediately before and after the flagged transaction. The economically meaningful number is the vault's ERC-4626 totalAssets() view, which is supposed to cover BOLD in the contract and in the stability pools, accrued yield, and the priced value of accumulated collateral.
We called that view historically on an archive node:
-
12:25:11 UTC (block 26441928, last block before the decline):
totalAssets()3,428,803.95 BOLD,totalSupply()3,128,293.34 sBOLD - 12:25:23 UTC (block 26441929, first drop): 3,327,813.52 BOLD; supply unchanged
- 12:25:47 UTC (block 26441931, the flagged transaction): 3,117,155.10 BOLD; supply unchanged. That single transaction reduced reported assets by 106,819.18 BOLD
- 12:33:35 UTC (block 26441970): 2,000.01 BOLD
- 12:50:35 UTC (block 26442055, around Blockaid's alert): 14.58 BOLD
-
13:05:11 UTC (block 26442128, first block in which
paused()returns true): 4.53 BOLD
From the last block before the decline to the first paused block, totalAssets() fell by 3,428,799.42 BOLD. That accounting drop, in a dollar-pegged stablecoin, sits in the same range as Blockaid's $3.43 million and Bitquery's $3.42 million. It is the vault's own reported asset value, not a later estimate of sale proceeds.
For the first several minutes, totalSupply() stayed fixed at 3,128,293.34 sBOLD, so the implied share price fell from about 1.096 to well below 1 without a net change in outstanding shares — consistent with a mint and a redeem that cancel in supply but not in assets. Later in the window the share supply inflated sharply as remaining assets approached dust, and by the pause convertToAssets for one share returned 0. We are not treating that late supply inflation as a second, separate loss.
CoinLab, citing Bitquery, reconstructed the main drain as approximately eight minutes, from 12:25:23 to 12:33:35 UTC, and counted 97 transactions. Blockaid's initial post, as reported by Unchained, estimated roughly 34 transactions as of 12:50 UTC. Those are different snapshots of the same incident, not a final official count. Our first observed drop is in the 12:25:23 UTC block, matching Bitquery's start time; by its end time only about 2,000 BOLD remained. Residual 4.52 WETH on the helper and 0.43 rETH on the exploiter in the flagged transaction are not the loss figure.
Share Valuation, and What Is Still Unknown
Blockaid and Bitquery agree that cheap sBOLD shares and a later redeem were part of the path. They do not agree on every step.
Bitquery, as reported by CoinLab, attributed the cheap shares to a mismatch between collateral the vault held and the value it assigned to those shares: WETH collateral below a configured threshold was excluded from the valuation. Participants acquired undervalued shares, converted that collateral into BOLD that was counted, then redeemed after the calculated share value rose. Bitquery also said its event review found no self-liquidations, contrary to Blockaid's initial description. We did not independently confirm or refute a trove liquidation in the flagged transaction. K3 Capital has not published a post-mortem, and we are not treating either firm's mechanism as a final official account.
That valuation gap has a documented history in the public audit record, which is not proof of what was deployed on 18 November 2026. ChainSecurity's 19 May 2025 audit described, as CS-SBOLD-008, a Version 1 design in which calcFragments() included BOLD in the stability pools but omitted collateral value up to maxCollInBold. The report said this was intended at the time, but implied a value-extraction path, including through repeated self-liquidations, and listed the finding as code corrected. Version 2 notes still treated collateral below that threshold as uncounted "unrealized gains." In Version 3 the whole collateral amount was counted in the valuation, and the executive summary states that self-liquidation value extraction "has been mitigated." Bitquery, as CoinLab notes, did not verify which source-code version was deployed, so a resemblance to an earlier finding does not establish that a particular fix was omitted.
The defensive lesson does not depend on that unresolved point. An ERC-4626 share is only as honest as totalAssets(). If some collateral the vault already owns is omitted from that number, shares can be minted more cheaply than the assets behind them, and a later swap that folds the omitted collateral back into the counted total can reprice those shares against everyone else's deposits. The sketch below is illustrative, not sBOLD source, and is not a reproduction of the incident. It only states a property a share-price function should not be able to skip:
// Simplified, illustrative invariant — not sBOLD source.
// Share price must not ignore collateral the vault already owns.
function assetsIncludeHeldCollateral(
uint256 boldInVaultAndPools,
uint256 collateralValueInBold
) pure returns (uint256) {
// Omitting collateralValueInBold here would understate totalAssets
// and let shares mint too cheaply.
return boldInVaultAndPools + collateralValueInBold;
}
Vault pricing bugs of this family are not new. In the Loopscale Genesis Vault pricing incident, a mis-set pricing path misvalued collateral and opened a hole in a tokenized vault. In the MORE Markets liquidation, a liquidation path could separate collateral from the debt it was supposed to cancel, leaving a reserve short for other suppliers. The surfaces differ; the lesson does not: a share, a debt or a claim has to stay tied to the assets that back it. We made the same point when ACryptoS's vault accounting accepted a deposit that did not match the assets it recorded.
What Users Should Know
If you deposited into sBOLD or hold sBOLD, follow updates only from the project's own channels, beginning with K3 Capital on X and sBOLD's documentation. Liquity's statement that V2 is unaffected is not a recovery plan for sBOLD holders. Treat unsolicited "refund" or "recovery" messages as phishing — including look-alike accounts — until the project describes a process.
The 4.53 BOLD still reported by totalAssets() after the pause is not a measure of remaining user deposits, and the inflated late totalSupply() reading is not a second payout. K3 Capital has not published a final loss, a compensation plan or a reopening date. Do not deposit additional funds until the team has published a fix and said the vault is safe to use. Revoking approvals granted to the vault cannot undo a redeem that has already left, but it can limit later misuse of an allowance.
Sources
- Blockaid disclosure (18 Nov, 12:50:39 UTC): ongoing exploit on K3 Capital sBOLD on Ethereum; cheap shares and redeem of other depositors' BOLD; about $3.43 million drained
-
Blockaid follow-up with on-chain pointers: exploiter
0xDC0e2FDE…14dAA, helper0x19Ad153B…59634, flagged transaction0xa61572b5…2c5c, victim vault0x50Bd66D5…DD11 -
Etherscan, flagged transaction: 18 November 2026, 12:25:47 UTC, block 26441931;
run(uint256)call with argument 8; 233 Transfer events - 4byte.directory, selector 0xa444f5e9: run(uint256)
- K3 Capital statement (18 Nov, 13:08:03 UTC): investigating sBOLD malicious activity; contracts paused
- Liquity statement (18 Nov, 13:59:05 UTC): sBOLD is a vault built and run independently by K3 Capital; do not deposit until further notice; V2 is not affected
- Unchained report: $3.43 million and roughly 34 transactions as of the 12:50 UTC alert; flagged transaction at 12:25 UTC
- CoinLab timeline, citing Bitquery: $3.42 million; main drain 12:25:23–12:33:35 UTC across 97 transactions; share-valuation mismatch; no self-liquidations found in Bitquery's event review
-
ChainSecurity sBOLD audit, 19 May 2025: CS-SBOLD-008 and later notes on collateral below
maxCollInBold; executive summary says self-liquidation value extraction was mitigated in Version 3 - Liquity blog, introducing sBOLD: sBOLD is a third-party K3 Capital vault on Liquity V2
- sBOLD documentation: ERC-4626 vault depositing BOLD into Liquity V2 stability pools
-
Liquity V2 technical docs: BOLD token at
0x6440f144b7e50d6a8439336510312d2f54beb01d
Closing Thoughts
The sBOLD loss did not require a failure of Ethereum or of Liquity V2's core contracts. A third-party ERC-4626 vault's reported assets fell by 3,428,799 BOLD in minutes. The contract was paused only after that number was already dust. If you are building a yield vault that prices shares against deposits, yield and unswapped collateral, talk to our team or check our audit pricing to have totalAssets() accounting, threshold logic and self-liquidation paths reviewed before a flash-loaned mint-and-redeem is the first production test of those books.
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