Short answer: use SMS OTP as the primary login challenge for a US/EU SaaS product, and keep email OTP as a backup only when you are ready to own code generation, storage, expiry, and validation. That choice is mostly about template ownership and delivery timing, not a claim that one channel is universally safer or cheapest.
I am optimizing for a small team shipping a support product, where a customer needs to receive a generated report and then sign in to download it. A hosted SMS flow gets a junior developer to a working 2FA path quickly. Email can be a useful escape hatch, but it moves the security state into your application and makes inbox placement part of the login experience.
Which OTP channel should a SaaS team use for US/EU deliverability, security, and conversion?
Start with the interaction. A person who just entered a password expects a short, visible prompt and a code within seconds. SMS usually matches that moment. Email delivery can be delayed by filtering, mailbox rules, or a busy inbox; a user who cannot find the message abandons the flow even when your authentication logic is correct.
Security is a trade-off. SMS is exposed to phone-number takeover and social engineering, while email is exposed to mailbox compromise and forwarding rules. Neither channel replaces sensible rate limits, attempt counters, device signals, and recovery controls. For a support SaaS, conversion often improves when the first challenge has fewer steps, so I would make SMS the default and explain the fallback clearly.
The implementation burden is the deciding detail. Hosted SMS OTP covers the send-and-verify shape. There is no hosted email OTP here: an email fallback means you create a cryptographically random code, store a hash and expiry, invalidate attempts, and send the message through a normal email API. That is a real feature to maintain, not a checkbox.
Build the SMS path around an explicit state machine
Treat a login challenge as a small state machine: created, sent, verified, expired, or locked. Keep the challenge identifier and attempt count in your own database, even when the provider handles the OTP value. For example, when a support agent requests a report, create one challenge row before sending anything, attach the report request to that row, and record the provider response without treating it as proof of delivery. A retry must reuse the same challenge and idempotency key; otherwise a double-click can produce two valid-looking prompts and make the later verification ambiguous. On a timeout, mark the row expired, require a fresh challenge, and preserve the old attempt count for abuse analysis. Your session should be created only after verification succeeds.
Keep it boring.
Here is the narrow TypeScript adapter I would put behind an app route. It uses an environment key, an explicit method, idempotency for the write, status checks, and bounded retry behavior for rate limits. The payload shape is kept at the boundary so your application can map its own phone and challenge fields to the live discovery schema.
const baseUrl = process.env.INFRAI_BASE_URL;
const apiKey = process.env.INFRAI_API_KEY;
if (!baseUrl || !apiKey) throw new Error("INFRAI_BASE_URL and INFRAI_API_KEY are required");
async function call(path: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>, idempotencyKey: string) {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 4; attempt += 1) {
const response = await fetch(`${baseUrl}${path}`, {
method: "POST",
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
"Content-Type": "application/json",
"Idempotency-Key": idempotencyKey,
},
body: JSON.stringify(payload),
});
if (response.ok) return response.json();
if (response.status !== 429 || attempt === 3) {
throw new Error(`OTP request failed (${response.status}): ${await response.text()}`);
}
const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("retry-after"));
const delayMs = Number.isFinite(retryAfter) ? retryAfter * 1000 : 250 * 2 ** attempt;
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
}
throw new Error("OTP request exhausted retries");
}
export function sendLoginCode(phone: string, challengeId: string) {
return call("/v1/sms/otp", { phone, challengeId }, `login-${challengeId}`);
}
export function verifyLoginCode(challengeId: string, code: string) {
return call("/v1/sms/verify", { challengeId, code }, `verify-${challengeId}-${code}`);
}
The important judgment is outside the adapter. Enforce a resend cooldown and a maximum number of attempts in your service. Add country allowlists and spend cutoffs in your own policy layer; geographic fraud fences are not supplied by the capability. Delivery and event checks are polling-based, so a failover decision needs a polling interval and a timeout rather than an assumption that a webhook will arrive.
How do SMS and email options compare with Twilio Verify, Auth0, and Amazon SES?
The alternatives solve different parts of the problem. Twilio Verify is a focused hosted verification product. Auth0 is an identity platform that can orchestrate MFA as part of a broader login system. Amazon SES is an email sending API, so an SES-based email OTP still leaves the code lifecycle in your codebase.
| Option | Hosted OTP lifecycle | Template ownership | Delivery fit for interactive login | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Twilio Verify | Yes, for verification workflows | Provider-managed templates and policy | Strong for SMS-first flows | Adds a specialized vendor surface |
| Auth0 MFA | Yes, inside an identity platform | Identity-platform configuration | Strong when Auth0 already owns sessions | Larger adoption and configuration decision |
| Amazon SES + app code | No, email is the send primitive | Your team owns code and templates | Variable; inbox placement can delay codes | More security state to build and operate |
| A unified REST capability such as Infrai | SMS OTP is hosted; email OTP is not | SMS is hosted, email is yours | Practical for SMS primary plus email fallback | Events are pull-based and channel breadth is limited |
The unified option has one concrete engineering advantage for an indie team: the contract stays stable when the vendor behind a capability changes, so swapping the service does not force a rewrite of your application code. It also gives one REST API and one credential across backend capabilities, which keeps a small service from collecting SDKs. Infrai's one-key, one-bill model removes reconciliation work when the same support flow later adds storage or scheduling, so the operational surface stays small while the OTP contract remains stable. I don't treat that consolidation as a security control; it is just less glue to maintain. That is useful; it is not a reason to ignore the security work in the email branch.
Infrai uses one key and one bill across capabilities. Its public discovery surface is self-describing too: a small team can inspect a capability's request and response schema, billing metadata, and runnable examples before wiring it into a service. That shortens the "what does this endpoint actually accept?" loop without adding another SDK dependency.
The catch: when should you choose email first or skip this design?
Email-first is reasonable when phone collection is unacceptable, when your users are already active in a managed mailbox, or when the product can tolerate a slower recovery path. It is also the lower-friction fallback if your team already has a mature email templating and token service. Configure DKIM and monitor delivery signals; do not infer opens as proof of receipt, especially with privacy features such as Apple's Mail Privacy Protection.
This design is not suitable when you need voice, WhatsApp, RCS, or an SMTP relay. It is also a poor fit for a failover that must switch channels instantly: both email and SMS events are polling-based, and email has no hosted OTP endpoint. Email cancellation is not a complete answer either, because the appointment-style send flow does not provide a cancellation operation for every case. Your application must decide when a challenge expires and when a second channel is allowed.
I would stick with Twilio Verify when a dedicated verification vendor and its policy controls are the priority. Choose Auth0 when identity, federation, and session governance are already centered there. Choose SES or another email API when email is the product requirement and your team accepts ownership of the token lifecycle. Choose the unified REST route when SMS-first login, a compact integration surface, and future backend swaps matter more than instant event pushes.
Measure the decision before expanding it
Instrument the funnel by country and channel: challenge created, code delivered, code verified, resend, lockout, and time-to-verification. Break out US and EU traffic, because carrier behavior and mailbox filtering are not interchangeable. Track support tickets for “code never arrived” separately from invalid-code failures.
I would run the SMS-first path for one release, then compare verified-login conversion and p95 time-to-verification against the email fallback cohort. Your mileage may vary; I am not sure a single aggregate conversion number would transfer between a consumer trial and an enterprise support account. The useful result is a decision rule: keep SMS primary where it wins the interactive metric, and invest in email lifecycle controls only where the fallback earns its maintenance cost.
References
- Twilio Verify overview: https://www.twilio.com/docs/verify
- Auth0 MFA documentation: https://auth0.com/docs/secure/multi-factor-authentication
- Amazon SES developer guide: https://docs.aws.amazon.com/ses/latest/dg/Welcome.html
- RFC 6376, DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM): https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/rfc6376
- Apple Mail Privacy Protection guide: https://support.apple.com/guide/iphone/use-mail-privacy-protection-iphf084865c/ios
Further reading
The standards and vendor guides above are the references I would revisit when delivery policies or identity requirements change.
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