SFTP Machine-to-Machine Threat Model
STRIDE Methodology + MITRE ATT&CK Framework
System Architecture Overview
Components:
- Client Server (Server A): Initiates SFTP connections, automated file transfers
- SFTP Server (Server B): Receives connections, hosts files, manages access
- Network Infrastructure: Routers, switches, firewalls between servers
- Credential Management: Key stores, certificate authorities, secret management
- File Systems: Local and shared storage for file operations
- Monitoring Systems: Logs, SIEM, security monitoring tools
Trust Boundaries:
- Network perimeter (internal vs external networks)
- Server boundaries (OS kernel, application space)
- Credential storage boundaries
- File system access boundaries
S - SPOOFING IDENTITY
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T1.1: Server Identity Spoofing
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1557.002 - Man-in-the-Middle: ARP Cache Poisoning
- Attacker poisons ARP tables to intercept traffic
- Redirects SFTP connections to malicious server
-
T1590.005 - Gather Victim Network Information: IP Addresses
- Reconnaissance to identify target server addresses
-
T1556.003 - Modify Authentication Process: Pluggable Authentication Modules
- Compromise authentication mechanisms on target server
Attack Vectors:
- DNS spoofing/cache poisoning to redirect Server A to malicious endpoint
- BGP hijacking to route traffic through attacker infrastructure
- Certificate authority compromise to issue fraudulent certificates
T1.2: Client Credential Compromise
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1552.004 - Unsecured Credentials: Private Keys
- Extract SSH private keys from compromised systems
-
T1555.003 - Credentials from Password Stores: Credentials from Web Browsers
- Harvest stored credentials from management interfaces
-
T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- Use compromised service accounts for unauthorized access
Attack Vectors:
- Memory dumping to extract private keys from running processes
- File system access to steal credential files
- Supply chain attacks targeting credential management tools
Countermeasures:
- C1.1: Certificate pinning and HPKP (HTTP Public Key Pinning)
- C1.2: Mutual TLS authentication with hardware-backed certificates
- C1.3: Network monitoring for ARP/DNS anomalies
- C1.4: Regular credential rotation with automated key management
T - TAMPERING WITH DATA
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T2.1: Data Modification in Transit
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1040 - Network Sniffing
- Capture network traffic for analysis and modification
-
T1557.001 - Man-in-the-Middle: LLMNR/NBT-NS Poisoning
- Intercept and modify network communications
-
T1601.002 - Modify System Image: Downgrade System Image
- Force use of weaker encryption protocols
Attack Vectors:
- SSL/TLS downgrade attacks forcing weaker ciphers
- Protocol manipulation to bypass integrity checks
- Network appliance compromise for traffic modification
T2.2: File System Tampering
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1565.001 - Data Manipulation: Stored Data Manipulation
- Modify files on source or destination servers
-
T1070.004 - Indicator Removal on Host: File Deletion
- Remove evidence of file tampering
-
T1222.002 - File and Directory Permissions Modification: Linux and Mac File and Directory Permissions Modification
- Alter permissions to enable unauthorized access
Attack Vectors:
- Rootkit installation for persistent file system access
- Backup system compromise to modify archived files
- Configuration file tampering to alter transfer behavior
Countermeasures:
- C2.1: End-to-end encryption with authenticated encryption modes
- C2.2: File integrity monitoring (FIM) with cryptographic hashes
- C2.3: Immutable infrastructure and infrastructure as code
- C2.4: Digital signatures for critical files and configurations
R - REPUDIATION
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T3.1: Log Tampering and Evidence Destruction
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1070.001 - Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Windows Event Logs
- Delete authentication and transfer logs
-
T1070.002 - Indicator Removal on Host: Clear Linux or Mac System Logs
- Remove evidence of unauthorized activities
-
T1562.002 - Impair Defenses: Disable Windows Event Logging
- Prevent future logging of activities
Attack Vectors:
- Log server compromise to modify audit trails
- Time synchronization attacks to create timeline confusion
- Credential theft to perform actions under legitimate identities
T3.2: Transaction Denial
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1070.006 - Indicator Removal on Host: Timestomp
- Modify file timestamps to hide activities
-
T1036.005 - Masquerading: Match Legitimate Name or Location
- Disguise malicious activities as legitimate operations
Countermeasures:
- C3.1: Immutable audit logging with cryptographic integrity
- C3.2: Multi-destination log streaming to prevent single point of failure
- C3.3: Blockchain-based audit trails for critical transactions
- C3.4: Time synchronization with authenticated NTP servers
I - INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T4.1: Credential and Key Exposure
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1552.001 - Unsecured Credentials: Credentials In Files
- Extract credentials from configuration files
-
T1005 - Data from Local System
- Access sensitive files on compromised systems
-
T1140 - Deobfuscate/Decode Files or Information
- Decrypt or decode stored credential material
Attack Vectors:
- Memory forensics to extract encryption keys
- Configuration file exposure through web servers
- Environment variable disclosure in process listings
T4.2: Traffic Analysis and Data Interception
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1040 - Network Sniffing
- Capture and analyze network traffic patterns
-
T1020 - Automated Exfiltration
- Systematically steal data through compromised channels
-
T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
- Use command and control infrastructure for data theft
Attack Vectors:
- Side-channel attacks on encryption implementations
- Traffic pattern analysis to infer sensitive information
- Compromised network infrastructure for data collection
Countermeasures:
- C4.1: Hardware Security Modules (HSMs) for key protection
- C4.2: Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) in all encrypted communications
- C4.3: Traffic padding and dummy transactions to obscure patterns
- C4.4: Zero-knowledge architecture for credential management
D - DENIAL OF SERVICE
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T5.1: Resource Exhaustion Attacks
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1498.001 - Network Denial of Service: Direct Network Flood
- Overwhelm network infrastructure with traffic
-
T1499.004 - Endpoint Denial of Service: Application or System Exploitation
- Exploit application vulnerabilities to cause crashes
-
T1565.003 - Data Manipulation: Runtime Data Manipulation
- Modify system behavior to cause resource exhaustion
Attack Vectors:
- SSH connection flooding to exhaust server resources
- Large file upload attacks to consume storage
- Fork bomb attacks through compromised accounts
T5.2: Infrastructure Disruption
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1489 - Service Stop
- Stop critical services required for SFTP operations
-
T1529 - System Shutdown/Reboot
- Force system restarts to disrupt operations
-
T1485 - Data Destruction
- Delete critical system files or configurations
Countermeasures:
- C5.1: Rate limiting and connection throttling
- C5.2: Resource quotas and monitoring with automated responses
- C5.3: Redundant infrastructure with automated failover
- C5.4: DDoS protection at multiple network layers
E - ELEVATION OF PRIVILEGE
Threat Scenarios & MITRE ATT&CK Techniques
T6.1: SSH Service Exploitation
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1068 - Exploitation for Privilege Escalation
- Exploit SSH daemon vulnerabilities for root access
-
T1055.012 - Process Injection: Process Hollowing
- Inject malicious code into SSH processes
-
T1543.002 - Create or Modify System Process: Systemd Service
- Create persistent backdoors through system services
Attack Vectors:
- Buffer overflow attacks against SSH implementations
- Configuration vulnerabilities (weak ciphers, root login enabled)
- Race condition exploits in file handling
T6.2: Container and Virtualization Escapes
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1611 - Escape to Host
- Break out of containerized environments
-
T1055.001 - Process Injection: Dynamic-link Library Injection
- Inject malicious libraries into running processes
-
T1134.001 - Access Token Manipulation: Token Impersonation/Theft
- Steal and impersonate privileged access tokens
Attack Vectors:
- Container runtime vulnerabilities for host access
- Kernel exploits through syscall interfaces
- Shared resource exploitation (shared volumes, networks)
T6.3: Lateral Movement
MITRE Techniques:
-
T1021.004 - Remote Services: SSH
- Use compromised credentials for lateral movement
-
T1550.003 - Use Alternate Authentication Material: Pass the Ticket
- Reuse authentication tokens across systems
-
T1080 - Taint Shared Content
- Modify shared files to compromise additional systems
Countermeasures:
- C6.1: Principle of least privilege with mandatory access controls
- C6.2: Container security with runtime protection
- C6.3: Regular vulnerability scanning and automated patching
- C6.4: Network microsegmentation and zero-trust architecture
Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) Scenarios
APT Scenario 1: Supply Chain Compromise
MITRE Techniques Chain:
- T1195.002 - Supply Chain Compromise: Compromise Software Supply Chain
- T1554 - Compromise Client Software Binary
- T1078.002 - Valid Accounts: Domain Accounts
- T1020 - Automated Exfiltration
Attack Flow:
- Compromise SFTP client software or libraries
- Establish persistent backdoor in client systems
- Harvest credentials and perform automated data exfiltration
- Use legitimate channels to avoid detection
APT Scenario 2: Living Off The Land
MITRE Techniques Chain:
- T1078.003 - Valid Accounts: Local Accounts
- T1021.004 - Remote Services: SSH
- T1083 - File and Directory Discovery
- T1005 - Data from Local System
- T1041 - Exfiltration Over C2 Channel
Attack Flow:
- Compromise legitimate service accounts
- Use SSH for authorized but malicious access
- Perform reconnaissance using standard system tools
- Exfiltrate data through legitimate protocols
Risk Assessment Matrix
| Threat ID | STRIDE Category | MITRE Technique | Likelihood | Impact | Risk Level |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| T1.1 | Spoofing | T1557.002 | Medium | High | High |
| T1.2 | Spoofing | T1552.004 | High | Critical | Critical |
| T2.1 | Tampering | T1040, T1557.001 | Low | High | Medium |
| T2.2 | Tampering | T1565.001 | Medium | High | High |
| T3.1 | Repudiation | T1070.001/002 | Medium | Medium | Medium |
| T4.1 | Info Disclosure | T1552.001 | High | Critical | Critical |
| T4.2 | Info Disclosure | T1040 | Medium | High | High |
| T5.1 | DoS | T1498.001 | High | Medium | Medium |
| T5.2 | DoS | T1489 | Low | High | Medium |
| T6.1 | Privilege Escalation | T1068 | Low | Critical | High |
| T6.2 | Privilege Escalation | T1611 | Medium | Critical | High |
| T6.3 | Privilege Escalation | T1021.004 | High | High | Critical |
Detection and Monitoring Framework
MITRE ATT&CK-Based Detection Rules
Credential Access Detection:
- Monitor for: T1552.004 (Private Keys)
- File access to .ssh directories
- Unusual process access to key files
- Memory dumps of SSH processes
- Monitor for: T1555.003 (Password Stores)
- Access to credential management APIs
- Unusual queries to secret management systems
Lateral Movement Detection:
- Monitor for: T1021.004 (SSH)
- SSH connections from unusual source IPs
- Multiple failed authentication attempts
- SSH sessions outside normal business hours
- Connections to unusual destination ports
Defense Evasion Detection:
- Monitor for: T1070.001/002 (Log Clearing)
- Log deletion events
- Log service stopping/starting
- Unusual log volume changes
Behavioral Analytics
- Baseline normal M2M communication patterns
- Detect anomalies in file transfer volumes, timing, and destinations
- Monitor for unusual network traffic patterns
- Track credential usage patterns and detect anomalies
Implementation Roadmap
Phase 1: Critical Risk Mitigation (0-30 days)
- Implement secure credential management (HSM/Vault)
- Deploy certificate-based authentication
- Enable comprehensive audit logging
- Implement network monitoring for ATT&CK techniques
Phase 2: Defense in Depth (30-90 days)
- Deploy file integrity monitoring
- Implement network microsegmentation
- Set up behavioral analytics and anomaly detection
- Establish incident response procedures
Phase 3: Advanced Security (90+ days)
- Deploy zero-trust architecture
- Implement advanced threat hunting capabilities
- Establish threat intelligence integration
- Conduct regular red team exercises
Continuous Operations
- Monthly credential rotation
- Quarterly vulnerability assessments
- Annual penetration testing with MITRE ATT&CK framework
- Continuous monitoring and alerting
- Regular threat model updates based on new attack techniques
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