The supplier sent a CSV
every night.
A small bash script
read it line by line
and skipped rows with nothing to order.
IFS=, read -r sku qty <<< "$line"
if [[ $qty -eq 0 ]]; then
continue
fi
No eval.
No unquoted command.
It looked safe.
Then one row arrived
with this in the quantity column:
x[$(touch /tmp/owned)]
And a file appeared
that nobody had asked for.
It could as easily
have been anything else
the attacker wanted to run.
Here is the mechanism.
Inside [[ ]],
the operands of -eq
are not compared as text.
They are evaluated
as arithmetic expressions.
The bash manual says so,
in one quiet sentence.
In an arithmetic expression,
a word that is not a number
is treated as a variable name.
a[...] is an array element.
To find which element,
bash expands the subscript.
Expansion includes
command substitution.
So $( ... ) runs.
The value of qty
was never executed as a command.
It was looked up
as a variable,
and looking it up
ran one.
The same evaluation happens in
(( qty > 0 ))
$(( qty * price ))
let and declare -i
and any array index
built from input.
Quoting does not help.
[[ "$qty" -eq 0 ]]
evaluates the same string.
The fix is to prove
it is a number first,
as text,
before arithmetic ever sees it:
if [[ ! $qty =~ ^[0-9]+$ ]]; then
echo "bad quantity: $sku" >&2
continue
fi
After that line,
qty can only be digits,
and digits are just numbers.
Do the same
for anything you feed into (( )):
fields from files,
headers from webhooks,
branch names in a pipeline.
Code review will not catch it either.
The line looks like
the safest line in the script.
Bash does not warn you.
It sees a word,
does its best to understand it,
and its best
includes running it.
Validate the shape.
Then do the maths.
– Serguey Asael Shinder
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