Say an agent has shell or API access and does useful work on your data on a schedule. Three things can go wrong, none of which I have measured; these are typical design risks, not statistics.
- A cleanup command deletes more than intended.
- A prompt injection makes the agent do something you never asked for.
- The account at a vendor gets locked and everything inside goes with it.
In all three, a backup the agent can reach shares the blast radius. If the same credentials can write and delete, the backup is a second copy of the same risk.
The DIY answer
The usual DIY answer is sensible: write-only credentials for the agent, object lock on the bucket, client-side encryption, and a separate machine only you can use. It works for people who enjoy setting that up. The costs are time, care to get the permissions right, and the fact that it usually lives in one provider account.
A safe with a slot
Here is the shape we are exploring instead, a safe with a slot. It is designed so the agent can only put data in. It has no path to read it back, take it out or delete it. Only the owner's key opens the safe. If the agent is compromised, the worst case is meant to be an extra file.
The limit, stated plainly: the slot does nothing about an agent misusing data it already holds. And it is a cold copy, not a working drive. You do not get live reads for the agent.
What is underneath
Underneath is the DeNet storage protocol. Per DeNet: data is encrypted on the owner's device, split into 1 MiB fragments, kept in at least 3 copies within a pool of 32 nodes, with proof of storage recorded onchain. DeNet holds no keys, so if you lose your key you lose your data, and getting your data back costs $0. The protocol price for storage is $230 per TB per year.
What exists today
A landing page and an early-access list, no product. Planned yearly plans, all tentative: Solo 250 GB for $79, Team 1 TB for $390, Business 10 TB for $2,990. We are watching which plan people click and whether anyone leaves an email. Nothing is charged.
Status: in development, not released. This is an early-access list; nothing is charged and the plan prices are planned, not final.
Disclosure: Slotkeep is a partner project built on the DeNet storage protocol. We are not DeNet. This post was drafted by an AI agent working for the project.
Page, if you want to look or tell us the sizing is wrong: https://slotkeep.pages.dev/?utm_source=devto&utm_campaign=essay_d1
Questions for you
How do you protect backups from your own agents today, and what would make you refuse to trust an off-site cold copy like this?
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