India Expands Indo-Pacific Defence Arc Beyond Quad Through Bilateral Pacts

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Prime Minister Narendra Modi's recent Indo-Pacific visits, particularly the state visit by Vietnamese President To Lam, underscore India's strategic pivot towards diversifying and deepening its defence partnerships beyond the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework. The signing of 13 agreements with Vietnam, including a formal review of defence ties [1]and an ambitious $25 billion bilateral trade target by 2030, signifies a tangible operationalisation of India's Act East Policy. This comprehensive engagement, which also saw the elevation of the relationship to an[1][2] "Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership," positions India as a significant security and economic partner in the Indo-Pacific, particularly in regions facing an increasingly assertive China. The focus on maritime security, defence-industrial cooperation, and resilient supply [1][2]chains for critical minerals and technology highlights India's intent to shape a stable and multipolar regional balance of power.

Operational Posture Hardens

India's strategic engagement with Vietnam exemplifie[1]s a hardening of its operational posture in the Indo-Pacific, moving beyond rhetorical commitments to concrete deliverables. Prime Minister Modi explicitly identified Vietnam as a "major pillar" of India's Act [1][2]East Policy, a framework designed to shift India’s diplomatic and strategic focus towards Southeast Asia. The agreements with Vietnam cover critical areas such as defence, technology, critical [2]minerals, and digital payments, indicating a forward-looking approach to building supply chain resilience and reducing dependencies. The emphasis on "deeper maritime cooperation" is particularly significant, suggesting j[1][2]oint patrols, naval exercises, information sharing, and capacity building, which are key elements of India's Indo-Pacific strategy to bolster partner capabilities in the South China Sea region. Furthermore, the push for "industrial cooperation" in defence signals a move towards co[1]-development and co-production, aligning with India's "Make in India" initiative and offering Vietnam a pathway to modernise its armed forces. This approach demonstrates India's capacity to act as a reliable partner and a provider[1] of regional security and economic opportunity.

Beyond Southeast Asia, India is also strengthening its strategic presence in West Asia[1], as evidenced by a recent prime ministerial visit to Abu Dhabi. During this visit, India and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) signed a framework for a st[4]rategic defence partnership and key energy agreements, including those on strategic petroleum reserves and supplies of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) and liquefied natural gas (LNG). These agreements formalise a rapidly maturing relationship and provide a structured, lo[4]ng-term strategic alignment, moving beyond ad-hoc transactions. The defence framework is expected to accelerate cooperation in defence manufacturing, j[4]oint military exercises, and maritime security, anchoring India's strategic presence in a region critical for energy security and maritime trade. This institutional step provides a formal mechanism for ministries and armed forces on [4]both sides to coordinate policy and operations, particularly amid heightened regional conflict that threatens key shipping lanes and energy supplies.

Adversary Structural Strain

While India expands its strategic footprint, regional [4]adversaries exhibit structural strains that impact their strategic calculus. Pakistan, for instance, has demonstrated a continued prioritisation of military preparedness over fiscal consolidation, even while under International Monetary Fund (IMF) supervision. The decision to increase defence spending despite economic dependency and compounding i[5]nternal security challenges suggests an unchanged strategic calculus that prioritises its security competition with India. This posture directly conflicts with India's articulated military doctrine of zero tole[5]rance for state-sponsored terrorism. The Pakistani Foreign Minister Ishaq Dar confirmed the release and return of 11 Pakista[5]ni nationals detained on vessels seized by the United States, an outcome secured through diplomatic coordination, yet this diplomatic success is juxtaposed against the country's severe economic realities.

The escalating US-China rivalry in Nepal also presents a significant strategic challen[5]ge for New Delhi, potentially eroding India's influence in a critical buffer state. China's opposition to a US security pact and technology platform in Nepal, along with i[3]ts warnings against Tibetan-related events in India, lays down clear red lines, conditioning Nepal's relationship with Beijing on deference to China's core security interests. This pressure on Kathmandu to choose between Washington and Beijing could undermine Nep[3]al's political stability and foreign policy autonomy, a scenario that directly threatens Indian security interests along its northern border. The intensification of this great power competition risks destabilising a region histor[3]ically within India's predominant sphere of influence.

Forward Outlook

The trajectory of India's expanded Indo-Pacific defence arc will b[3]e indicated by several observable factors. For the India-Vietnam partnership, key indicators include progress towards the ambitious $25 billion trade target, the initiation of new joint defence activities, particularly in the maritime domain, and tangible cooperation on critical mineral supply chains. The effective and timely implementation of the 13 agreements will be crucial in transla[2]ting the established institutional framework into concrete outcomes that serve the strategic interests of both nations.

In West Asia, the operationalisation of the strategic defence partnership framework wi[2]th the UAE will be a critical measure. This includes the frequency and scope of joint military exercises, the progress in defence manufacturing cooperation, and the effectiveness of coordinated maritime security efforts. The stability of energy supply chains, particularly regarding strategic petroleum reser[4]ves and LNG supplies, will also be a key metric for the success of this deepened engagement.

Regarding Pakistan, the final version of its budget and the IMF's formal response to t[4]he defence allocation will be a significant observable. Any significant terror incident in Jammu and Kashmir or elsewhere in India traced back [5]to Pakistan-based groups would likely test Islamabad's capacity to manage a two-front security environment amid severe economic constraints, potentially triggering the operationalisation of India's hardened military doctrine. The fundamental question remains whether Pakistan's leadership will adjust its strategi[5]c priorities to align with its economic realities or continue on a path that risks both fiscal crisis and military conflict. In Nepal, the evolving dynamics of US-China competition and Kathmandu's ability to main[5]tain political stability and foreign policy autonomy will be crucial for India's security calculus.[3]

Originally published on Aegis Research Engine — an independent South Asia security & geopolitical intelligence platform.