PoK Unrest Exposes Pakistan's Internal Fissures, Regional Instability

#pakistan #geopolitics #analysis

The Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) has accused Pakistani authorities of withholding the bodies of slain activists, demanding their return alongside the release of detained members and the withdrawal of terrorism designations to de-escalate ongoing protests in the region. This development underscores the deepening internal crises within Pakistan, which are manifesting across its security, administrative, and economic architecture, and carry significant implications for regional stability, particularly for India. The unrest in PoK, a territory central to India's strategic interests, highlight[1]s the Pakistani state's struggle to manage internal dissent and maintain control, even as it grapples with similar challenges in other provinces like Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Balochistan.

Operational Posture Hardens

The escalating unrest in PoK, marked by accusat[1][4]ions of state overreach and demands for accountability, reflects a broader pattern of internal security challenges confronting Pakistan. The Pakistani state has a consistent track record of blaming external actors, particularly India, for its internal problems, especially insurgencies in regions like Balochistan. This narrative of external threat is often employed to deflect from policy failu[6]res and to rally nationalist sentiment. However, the current situation in PoK, where local activists are protesting agai[6]nst state actions, points to indigenous grievances rather than external instigation.

This internal pressure on Pakistan's security apparatus is not isolated. In Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, for instance, the provincial government and a "grand tribal jirga" have expressed strong opposition to the current drone policy, indicating a broad-based consensus against certain counter-terrorism strategies. This pushback is a direct reaction to security operations in a region where mili[2]tant violence remains a constant reality, with groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) retaining operational capacity despite sustained military operations. The Pakistani military's Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR) has frequently a[2][3]ttributed responsibility for its internal militancy problem to India, even as it conducts counter-terrorism operations in areas like Lakki Marwat and Bannu. The complex nature of these militant groups is further highlighted by reports of[8] a high-profile terrorist killed in Bannu being a former member of the Afghan Taliban regime's special forces, indicating the uncontrollable nature of proxies Pakistan has historically cultivated.

The friction between the federal government and provinces like KP has escalated[13] into open political defiance, with the KP Chief Minister sharply criticising Islamabad over alleged human rights abuses. This public discontent and the assertion of provincial autonomy over resources, [4]such as natural gas, signal a fragile federal compact within Pakistan. For India, instability and political confrontation in KP, a province bordering A[4]fghanistan, are significant security concerns, as internal turmoil can create space for non-state actors and impact cross-border security.

Adversary Structural Strain

The accusations of withholding bodies and the d[4]emands from the JWAAC in PoK are symptomatic of the deep structural fissures within the Pakistani state, which are exacerbated by severe economic distress and political fragmentation. Pakistan's economy is under immense strain, with the central bank hiking interes[1][5]t rates to control inflation and provincial governments struggling with massive debt. This economic hardship fuels domestic discontent, which the state often attempts[1] to manage through information operations and by framing internal issues as "Indian-sponsored" terrorism.

The Pakistani military's media wing, ISPR, has consistently reported on foiling[5] infiltration attempts along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, often framing these incidents as acts of "Indian-sponsored" terrorism. However, these claims are made against a backdrop of deepening internal crises, [5]including crippling fuel price hikes and political dissent over counter-terrorism tactics in KP. The narrative of external threat serves as a convenient tool for the Pakistani e[5]stablishment to deflect from its own policy failures.

Furthermore, Pakistan's long-standing "strategic depth" policy, which assumed t[6]hat a Taliban-controlled Afghanistan would secure its western border, has proven to be a profound miscalculation. Instead, the Taliban's return to power has emboldened Pashtun nationalist sentim[10]ents on both sides of the Durand Line and provided sanctuary and operational freedom to groups like the TTP, creating a more dangerous security environment for Pakistan. Clashes between Pakistani forces and the Afghan Taliban have led to the isolatio[10]n of remote districts in Nuristan province, bordering Pakistan, indicating a complex and potentially adversarial relationship developing on the Durand Line. This friction contradicts the assumption of seamless control over the Taliban an[7]d highlights the complete failure of Pakistan's strategic depth policy.

The internal security challenges are compounded by a pervasive influence of the[7][10] security establishment over state policy, which extends to the judiciary. The Judicial Commission of Pakistan (JCP) has scheduled meetings to consider the[4] transfer of judges from the Islamabad High Court, a move watched closely as an indicator of the executive's relationship with the judiciary. This institutional pressure, coupled with political polarisation, as evidenced b[4]y walkouts in the Senate over issues like the treatment of former Prime Minister's spouse, further challenges the stability of state institutions.

Forward Outlook

The ongoing unrest in PoK and the accusations against Pakis[12]tani authorities will serve as a critical indicator of the Pakistani state's capacity to manage internal dissent and maintain control over its administered territories. Observable indicators to watch include any official statements from the Pakistani government or military regarding the demands of the JWAAC, particularly concerning the return of bodies and the release of activists. The response of the Pakistani state to these protests will reveal its approach to internal grievances and its willingness to engage with local populations in PoK.

Further, the trajectory of the federal-provincial relations, particularly with Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, will be crucial. Any further escalation of political defiance from KP, or increased assertions of provincial autonomy, will signal a deepening fragility of Pakistan's federal compact. The economic situation, marked by fuel price hikes and provincial debt, will con[4]tinue to be a significant driver of internal discontent. Monitoring the Pakistani central bank's interest rate decisions and the governme[1][5]nt's fiscal policies will provide insights into the state's ability to address its economic woes.

Finally, the evolving dynamics on the Durand Line and the relationship between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban will remain a key area of observation. Any further clashes or reports of militant activity originating from Afghanistan will underscore the continued failure of Pakistan's strategic depth policy and its implications for regional security. For India, these developments collectively present a complex strategic landscape[10], where Pakistan's internal instability could either reduce its capacity for adventurism on the eastern front or lead to diversionary actions and an uptick in cross-border infiltration in Jammu and Kashmir.[10]

Originally published on Aegis Research Engine — an independent South Asia security & geopolitical intelligence platform.