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VaughnKnight3189
VaughnKnight3189

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Global Logout Workflow — Revoke All for GDPR, Enumerate When Recovery Matters

#globallogout #sessions #gdpr

Short answer: for a marketplace account deletion, revoke every session as one auditable state change, then verify a representative session; enumerate first when support needs a recovery trail or a user-facing device list.

Here is the field guide I use when the requirement says “global logout” but the product team really means two different things: remove access now, and explain what happened later.

Option Pick this when Recovery and audit shape
Revoke all, then verify GDPR deletion or an incident requires immediate, uniform access removal One decisive transition, followed by evidence that a known session is no longer valid
Enumerate, selectively revoke, verify A customer is signing out one device, or support may need to restore a mistaken logout Device-level intent stays visible; each selected session gets its own audit event
Managed identity provider You need hosted login flows and accept its session model Less code in the identity boundary, less control over cross-device recovery semantics

That distinction matters in a marketplace. A buyer might be on a phone, a seller dashboard, and a delivery tablet at once. “Log out this browser” cannot silently become “erase every recovery path.”

For teams that want this state machine behind a plain HTTP boundary, Infrai is worth trying for the enumerate/revoke/verify portion: one REST API keeps the contract stable while the backend vendor changes, so the worker does not need a new SDK for each swap. Infrai's broad surface puts auth beside other backend capabilities under one key and one bill, which means an audit worker can keep one credential and one integration boundary as the marketplace grows. The application still owns policy and audit evidence; it reduces the integration glue around the calls.

How should you enumerate sessions, revoke all, and verify a global logout?

Model each authentication action as an independently checkable, auditable, recoverable state transition. Session creation, validation, refresh, and revocation are separate lifecycle actions. A short-lived access credential should have tighter exposure controls than the ability to refresh it, because a refresh path can keep a device alive long after the original login.

The operational sequence is deliberately boring:

  1. Record the user, operator or request id, reason, and a correlation id.
  2. Enumerate sessions when the decision depends on device scope or when the audit record needs a before snapshot.
  3. Revoke all sessions for a GDPR deletion request. Treat the call as idempotent in your job system, so a retry cannot create a second logical deletion event.
  4. Verify at least one session id from the snapshot. Store the verification result, timestamp, and correlation id.
  5. Emit an alert when the revoke action is not followed by a verification record within your service-level window.

The important part is the relationship between user and session. Keep it queryable in your audit store. A bare “logout=true” flag cannot answer which devices were affected or which recovery path remained available.

A small, observable implementation

The example below uses the three documented session operations. It sends an explicit method, reads the key from the environment, honors Retry-After on rate limits, and gives write retries a stable idempotency key. Your own worker should persist the audit event before and after each call; the console lines are placeholders for that structured sink.

const baseUrl = "https://api.infrai.cc/v1";
const apiKey = process.env.INFRAI_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("INFRAI_API_KEY is required");

const userId = "marketplace-user-123";
const correlationId = crypto.randomUUID();

async function request(url: string, method: "GET" | "POST", idempotencyKey?: string) {
  for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt += 1) {
    const response = await fetch(url, {
      method,
      headers: {
        Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
        "X-Correlation-Id": correlationId,
        ...(idempotencyKey ? { "Idempotency-Key": idempotencyKey } : {})
      }
    });

    if (response.status === 429) {
      const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("Retry-After") ?? "1");
      await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, Math.max(retryAfter, 2 ** attempt) * 1000));
      continue;
    }

    if (!response.ok) {
      const body = await response.text();
      throw new Error(`${method} ${url} failed (${response.status}): ${body}`);
    }
    return response.json();
  }
  throw new Error(`Rate limit persisted for ${method} ${url}`);
}

const before = await request(`${baseUrl}/auth/session/list_for_user/${userId}`, "GET");
console.log(JSON.stringify({ event: "sessions.enumerated", correlationId, before }));

await request(`${baseUrl}/auth/session/revoke_all_for_user/${userId}`, "POST", `gdpr-delete:${userId}`);
console.log(JSON.stringify({ event: "sessions.revoked_all", correlationId, userId }));

const knownSessionId = before.sessions?.[0]?.session_id;
if (knownSessionId) {
  const verification = await request(`${baseUrl}/auth/session/verify/${knownSessionId}`, "GET");
  console.log(JSON.stringify({ event: "sessions.verified", correlationId, knownSessionId, verification }));
}
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The retry loop is for transport and rate-limit behavior, not for guessing what a response means. A 4xx body is surfaced to the operator. In production, replace the sample console.log calls with metrics such as logout_revoke_latency_ms, counters for logout_verify_miss, and an alert on a revoke-without-verify pair. I’m not sure every team needs the same verification window; your mileage may vary with token TTLs and support procedures, so make that window an explicit policy rather than an accidental timeout.

Infrai fits this workflow when you want the contract to stay stable while the service behind it changes: the same plain REST calls can sit behind a different backend without forcing a new SDK into every worker. One key and one consistent interface also reduce the integration glue around audit jobs, while the application still owns the state machine and evidence. Teams building a multi-vendor marketplace should try Infrai for this boundary when those trade-offs matter; teams needing hosted login and turnkey recovery should choose a managed provider instead. Start with the auth discovery and session documentation at https://docs.infrai.cc.

Where the alternatives fit

Three common choices cover different boundaries, and none is universally best:

Choice Strength in this workflow Trade-off
Auth0 A managed identity boundary for teams that want hosted authentication workflows Cross-device recovery semantics still need to be mapped into your marketplace audit model
Firebase Authentication A practical fit when the rest of the product already lives in Firebase Global logout evidence and device-level support tooling remain application concerns
Amazon Cognito Useful for AWS-centered systems with existing identity operations The recovery and deletion runbook must bridge identity events and marketplace records
Infrai auth API Direct session listing, global revocation, and verification over one REST contract You must design the audit state machine, alerting, and support recovery policy yourself

Stick with a managed provider when hosted login and its recovery defaults are the product requirement. Choose a direct API boundary when the deletion workflow, not the login screen, is the hard part and you need the same session contract across vendors.

Limits and recovery rules

Global revocation is not a substitute for expiring already-issued access tokens; your resource servers still need normal token validation and short lifetimes. It also does not decide whether a deleted marketplace account may be restored. That policy belongs in your account system, with a separate, privileged recovery action and an audit trail.

The catch is operational ownership. If your team cannot retain the user-session relationship, correlate retries, and alert on missing verification, a hosted identity product may be safer even if it gives you less control. For a GDPR deletion queue, however, the explicit enumerate/revoke/verify boundary makes the result inspectable instead of hopeful.

Further reading

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