I've just finished reading Hardcore Software, by Steven Sinofsky. This let me know about some intrinsics about Microsoft and some of its projects: Office and Windows.
Sinofsky started at Microsoft inside a project using C++ to ease Windows programming, called AFX. The project was not successful, but it seems the lessons learned were interesting enough. After that he worked as a technology assistant to Bill Gates. He was then named responsible of Office development, and finally the head of Windows. Well, this is a small paragraph, but it's a hell of a career!
The projects he was responsible of were Office 1997 until the start of the development of Office 365, and (the end of) Windows Vista, Windows 7 and Windows 8. He was in general considered a very good manager, responsible of (fulfilled) tight release schedules, but with two controversial takes: Office UI's ribbons, and Windows 8 itself.
Intro
Bill Gates
This book is not about Bill Gates. In general he is perceived as a dedicated boss, with a remarkable fixation in capturing customers through proprietary technology.
Microsoft
The book captures a long period of time in which Microsoft was starting to be a big company, through its life in the 2000's and 2010's, and finally the behemoth it is today.
At the beginning, they even mocked IBM because of details like the levels of management up to the firm's direction. At the end, all-hands employees' meetings were celebrated in stadiums.
What details are covered in the book? Who's the audience?
This is not a tech nerd book. Expect more details about management than technical details about C++ or C#. This disappointed me a lot, but it also has the virtue that anybody can read it.
Sinofsky's management traits
This is definitely Sinofsky's forte. He started a management in Office in which each subgroup is responsible for a functionality present in the final product, and therefore keeps (probably) motivated for the whole development process.
While this sounds reasonable, surprisingly that was not the kind of management carried out in the Windows group. It seems that the maximum expectation of an individual programmer was to supervise a small group of three to five programmers, responsible of any functionality of any level, without necessarily keeping the final product in mind.
Another difference in Sinofsky's management is that, while the Windows group used to hire on-demand, he only assumed a new functionality or extension if he could separate a group of programmers from the crew and devote them to that new work. If not, then that characteristic would be left for a new version.
Monopoly
The trial in which Microsoft risked to be separated in two business, Windows and Office, is mentioned in the book as something worrisome for microsoftees. It is sometimes mentioned as a reason to not to do this or that, since it could trigger another trial.
I think it is remarkable that the author questions the buying politics of the firm, which led to a position in the market in which only Adobe stood against Microsoft as a big, independent firm. Sinofsky says that this didn't feel right.
The ribbon
This is one of the two hot sections of the book. There have been two big changes in MS Office, the first one being the ribbon, the second one changing the whole desktop app to a cloud app.
The ribbon groups the most related functionality in panels of buttons, instead of individual tool bars of buttons. The former technique has the advantage of a more organized user interface with the downside of a steep learning curve. The latter, the classic interface, respects IBM's CUA, adding toolbars for easy access to the most common functionalities. The problem: the number of functionalities grew so much that the number of tool bars also grew, and the whole user interface became big and clumsy.
Another problem was those obstinate people (like myself), that used a subset of functionalities and didn't need, or want, a so radical change in the user interface.
I had used WordStar, and WordPerfect in my MS-DOS days; then Microsoft Office up until Microsoft Office XP with Windows 3.11 through Windows 98 SE and Windows XP, and finally (with the menacing ribbon looming over me), I discovered LibreOffice (then OpenOffice.org, (now stagnated and hosted by the Apache Foundation), and blindly jumped into it.
BTW, for my programming tasks I used ne, the Norton Editor 1.3... Anyone?
So yeah, before learning to use that ribbon feature I changed office suites. I'm that stubborn. Nevermind, even if LibreOffice is said in the book to have less functionality, it was more than up to the task for me. I wrote my PhD Thesis with it!
Going back to the book, I was curious about the reason behind a so radical change to the user experience. Well, he defends himself with the telemetry obtained. It seems that this change was definitely good for those wanting to take it. But there was a set of people that didn't want to change anything, and as he himself says in the book, there was not "plan B" for them. In my opinion, he was so convinced this was the best possible interface for the app he wasn't prepared for those who did not want it.
Even Bill Gates asked him how to turn off the ribbon interface and go back to the classic tool bars. He answered it wasn't possible. The book does not describe the conversation after that, while it would have been interesting.
While I read the book, I felt it was the sole decision of one person (Sinofsky), making it mandatory for anyone else to follow behind.
Windows 8
Sinofsky was the responsible of the beloved Windows 7. That development involved the final implementation of his team management strategies, and a lot of code reordering and polishing. Windows 7 was a complete success, after the mayhem of Windows Vista.
This leads us to the other hot topic in the book, which is Windows 8. After all, With the release of Windows 8, Sinofsky abandoned Microsoft and searched for other pastures.
By that time, I was already using Linux, so looked at Windows with curiosity but from the distance. I think I still used Windows for games, but certainly saw no reason to change to Windows 8.
What was the whole point of Windows 8? Mobile and desktop convergence. Windows 8 was prepared for tablets (Windows Phone was still based on Windows 7 mobile), and worked pretty well there, one has to admit. The main idea was that it still ran desktop apps, so you could manage your desktop needs from Windows 8 without trouble. And without notice. Right?
Windows 8 was not a new Windows created from Windows 7 mobile upwards to embrace desktop apps (based on the Win32 API, as it was patent it was still the preferred platform). Windows 8 was the previous version of Windows 7, with a lot of tweaks so you could use it in your favourite tablet. I'm not in any case trying to demeanor its value, it also carried out a lot of improvements under the hood, as well.
There was one big caveat, though: the Start button. Telemetry showed that people was using it less and less. Shortcuts, search bars... the button was designed to launch applications, but it was mostly ignored for its declared objective. Also, when clicking with your finger the Start button was cumbersome to use. So... they removed the Start button. Now, you had a Start screen, in which you could do everything you could do before, but better, finger-friendly, and modern.
It must be remarked that Win32 was perceived as ancient. Fortunately, Microsoft has had a big history of keeping backwards compatibilty. But a new API was needed, and they chose .NET to fill the gap.
Well, no, actually they didn't, they ignored .NET because it seems it was a mess at that point. They still could, choosing Silverlight, but Sinofsky bet for another technology: HTML5. Yep, that's right. Well, HTML5 was all the rage at the time. So, people could build apps running on the browser, using HTML as the placeholder, CSS for styles, and JavaScript for the code. This meant that more or less the same app could run as a native app on Windows.
It must be remarked that nowadays all those technologies have been deprecated. .NET has reconcentrated in itself with .NET core, keeping WPF but loosing Silverlight, and WinForms in the process. That HTML5 building system, Modern or Metro API, is also deprecated. Of course, Windows 8 was a bad dream for Microsoft, and at least the Start button was back at Windows 8.1, while Windows 10 was apparently a step back, it did not put all that effort in tablet convergence. Finally, Windows Surface on ARM (again, ARM was all the rage at that time, but without any apps for Windows), was discontinued.
As I commented before, Sinofsky was also fired let go, so, what remained of his vision? Well, HTML5 is still used in Windows. The Surface laptop/tablet all-in-one is still marketed, to a good degree of success (part of Sinofsky's vision was to partner with hardware manufacturers to create great successors to the PC), and the UI tweaks for Windows's user experience are still there, powering the hardware.
If it was a so big flop, why couldn't it be prevented? Were any clues that this was coming?
If you read the book, well... there were plenty. Sinofsky is right in that success has many parents, while failure is an orphan. If we take a broad look at the post-sinofsky era, what do we get? Well, many of Sinofsky realizations are there, but definitely not all. So, the matter would have been not to be so stubbborn extreme and let the technology merge in a somewhat hybrid. Yeah, like Windows 10.
Take into account that (to only a low degree) Windows 7, and Windows 10 are tablet-capable. When built for a desktop, those capabilities are deactivated, while when built for a tablet they are completely available. It's even able to change from one mode to the other in an all-in-one device. So, was it needed for Windows 8 to be so much tablet-focused? The answer is no.
Would've been possible to modify the vision and let Windows be not so extreme? Well, it turns out it was possible. As I commented above, there were plenty of clues. Reviews were not at all good with Windows 8. It was perceived as a tablet OS, while most of the people would use it on the desktop. And from a desktop point of view, you still had to pass through the Start screen in order to get to where things are done. And if you need to change apps, well, back to the Start screen again. Sinofsky and his team was convinced this was the right move, telemetry showed that their objectives were being achieved, but still the reviews of disappointed users were piling up.
Do you see a pattern? Well, I do. At least, this time Sinofsky recognizes that they were not listening to users.
To sum up, Sinofsky was a sheer force in management; took Microsoft, and Windows, out of the hole developing Windows 7; and Windows and Office grew well under his command. On a not-so-bright side, he had strong opinions and ideas that he implemented anyway, even when the users were warning him they did not want this or that.
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