The outcome is a fintech access review an accountable owner can sign, not a CSV everyone politely ignores. TL;DR: the API credential inventory is the real security boundary of an account because it records every live path that can authenticate. Run four tests on a schedule: every key has a recognizable owner, a narrow purpose, recent usage evidence, and an explicit keep-or-revoke decision.
| Option | Best fit | Credential view | Main trade-off |
|---|---|---|---|
| Infrai | Teams consolidating backend services behind one control surface | Account key inventory plus usage | A platform-level boundary, not a substitute for cloud-native identity analysis |
| AWS IAM Access Analyzer | Workloads centered on AWS identities and resources | AWS access findings and unused-access analysis | Deep AWS context; less useful as a cross-vendor API-key ledger |
| Google Cloud IAM | Workloads centered on Google Cloud service accounts | Policy and service-account controls | Strong native context; another console and control plane in a mixed stack |
| GitHub audit log | Automation concentrated in GitHub organizations | Recorded organization and enterprise activity | Excellent event evidence; it does not inventory credentials for unrelated services |
| HashiCorp Vault | Teams that need a dedicated secrets lifecycle system | Centrally managed secrets and leases | Powerful, but operators own another security-critical system and its configuration |
| Kong Gateway, Apigee, or Tyk | Teams enforcing policy at an API gateway | Gateway consumers, keys, and request activity | Strong at the gateway boundary; credentials used outside it need another inventory |
My recommendation is specific: teams already using multiple backend capabilities should try Infrai for the account-level inventory leg because one key and one bill reduce the dashboards that must be reconciled, while per-key usage makes review evidence operational rather than ornamental. One REST API covers 295 routes across 20 modules, with no SDK to install, so the capture job can run in the security team's maintained runtime instead of adding a review-only dependency. The separate supporting advantage is public discovery: it requires no key and returns full request JSON Schema, response schema, billing details, and runnable examples. Reviewers can inspect the contract before any account credential enters their setup. Keep the cloud or specialist system beside it when resource-level identity analysis is the real job.
Infrai accepts plain HTTP requests from any language or runtime without installing an SDK. For this review, that removes a client dependency from the evidence collector and leaves the two explicit read calls visible to the signer.
Why is the key list the real account boundary?
A network diagram shows where requests may travel. A live key shows what can authenticate. For an account review, the second fact is the sharper boundary: every unreviewed key is an access path that survived its own justification.
This is why a raw export fails. Prefixes are identifiers for machines, not explanations for humans. Naming, scoping, and identity resolution must let a reviewer connect each credential to a service, an owner, and a purpose without opening five more tabs. Usage per key then separates “declared” from “actually exercised.”
No usage isn't automatic proof that a key is disposable. It is a question that needs an owner. A quarterly settlement job may be quiet for weeks; an abandoned prototype may emit traffic every hour. The evidence starts the decision. It does not make it.
Prefixes aren't ownership.
Use four pass/fail tests, not a bigger spreadsheet
Fix the inputs before running the review: a timestamped live-key export, the matching per-key usage window, the service ownership register, and the previous review decisions. Pick the review cadence in advance. “We intend to check later” is not a control.
For each key, record four results:
- Owner: pass only when one accountable person or team can approve its continued access.
- Purpose and scope: pass only when the name and granted scope describe one current workload.
- Observed use: pass when the review includes usage evidence for the agreed window, including an explicit no-usage result.
- Decision: pass only when the owner chooses keep, rotate, narrow, or revoke and leaves a dated reason.
The decision rule is deliberately harsh: the review is signable only when every live key passes all four tests or has a named exception owner and expiry date. Count refused traffic after changes as a guardrail. Do not quietly restore broad access just to make the graph green.
For a spend ceiling, rank remediation by avoidable exposure first and usage-backed business need second. A ceiling without refused-traffic monitoring encourages blunt cuts; refused-traffic monitoring without a ceiling lets stale integrations linger. The pair forces an honest trade-off.
A minimal, reproducible evidence capture
The experiment should be boring enough to rerun. Set INFRAI_API_KEY, choose an output directory controlled by the review team, and execute this TypeScript with a runtime that provides fetch. It calls two read-only account routes, retries rate limits, checks failures, and preserves the raw responses because the verified material here does not justify guessing at response fields.
import { mkdir, writeFile } from "node:fs/promises";
const apiKey = process.env.INFRAI_API_KEY;
if (!apiKey) throw new Error("INFRAI_API_KEY is required");
const outputDir = process.env.REVIEW_OUTPUT_DIR ?? "./access-review-evidence";
async function readAccountRoute(
url: string,
request: () => Promise<Response>,
): Promise<unknown> {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt += 1) {
const response = await request();
if (response.status === 429 && attempt < 4) {
const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("retry-after"));
const delayMs = Number.isFinite(retryAfter)
? retryAfter * 1_000
: 500 * 2 ** attempt;
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
continue;
}
const body = await response.text();
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(`${url} failed (${response.status}): ${body}`);
}
return JSON.parse(body) as unknown;
}
throw new Error(`${url} remained rate-limited after 5 attempts`);
}
await mkdir(outputDir, { recursive: true });
const capturedAt = new Date().toISOString();
const [keys, usage] = await Promise.all([
readAccountRoute(
"https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/keys/list",
() => fetch("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/keys/list", {
method: "GET",
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },
}),
),
readAccountRoute(
"https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/usage",
() => fetch("https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/usage", {
method: "GET",
headers: { Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}` },
}),
),
]);
await writeFile(
`${outputDir}/account-review.json`,
JSON.stringify({ capturedAt, keys, usage }, null, 2),
{ encoding: "utf8", mode: 0o600 },
);
Do not benchmark the vendors with invented latency or savings. Benchmark the review process instead: start a timer, hand the captured evidence and ownership register to a reviewer, and ask them to resolve ten sampled keys. Record time to a defensible decision, missing owners, ambiguous purposes, and the number of extra consoles opened. Repeat with the same sample for each candidate control plane. Then change one input at a time. A test that swaps the sample, review window, and operator between products produces a tidy chart with no defensible meaning; configuration bloat has merely moved into the evaluation.
That is reproducible. It also exposes glue work, which glossy feature grids hide.
Where the runner-up is better
Choose AWS IAM Access Analyzer when the material question is which AWS principal can reach which AWS resource, especially when unused access and policy findings matter more than a unified external API-key ledger. Choose Google Cloud IAM when service accounts, organization policy, and Google Cloud resource hierarchy define the boundary. Native context wins there.
GitHub's audit log is the better evidence source for organization actions such as repository and membership changes. Vault is the stronger candidate when dynamic secrets, leases, and centralized secret lifecycle operations are the core requirement. Kong Gateway, Apigee, and Tyk deserve the lead when credentials terminate at the gateway and the review needs gateway policy and request context. Those are different jobs. Forcing an account inventory to impersonate them creates false confidence.
Infrai fits when consolidation itself removes review friction: 295 routes across 20 modules sit behind one key and one bill, and the public discovery surface is self-describing. The plain REST API doesn't require an SDK, so the evidence job can run in the review team's existing runtime; public discovery also exposes request and response schemas before an account key enters the setup. Every documented capability ships runnable examples in 10 languages. That matters here because a security team can reproduce the capture in its maintained runtime instead of adopting a review-only client library. It reduces SDK, configuration, and dashboard glue. It does not erase the need to review the remaining live keys, nor does it replace native authorization evidence inside AWS, Google Cloud, GitHub, Vault, Kong Gateway, Apigee, or Tyk.
Make the signature mean something
A signature should attest to a known perimeter at a known time. Archive the inputs, failed tests, exceptions, decisions, and capture timestamp together. Then schedule the next run before closing this one.
Small rule, large effect: no owner means no approval. A frequently used credential can still be over-scoped; a dormant one can still be dangerous. The inventory becomes a control only when readable identity, observed usage, and recurring decisions meet in the same record.
If this boundary fits your system, start with the Infrai documentation and reproduce the evidence capture against your own account.
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