"Every app eventually needs to answer one question: 'Who agreed to what, and can you prove it?' Voting, payments, contracts, permissions — all the same problem. DKBK Core is a 100-line state machine that solves it with nothing but hashes and signatures. No blockchain. No crypto tokens. No global consensus. Just math you can run on a Raspberry Pi."
"The Atomic Unit of Agreement"
Mangomindai
/
dkbk-core
Deterministic State Machine for Verifiable Governance
markdown
DKBK Core v1.1
Deterministic State Machine for Verifiable Governance
⚠️ Disclaimer
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐ │ THIS IS RESEARCH CODE - NOT PRODUCTION READY │ │ │ │ ✅ Mathematically proven determinism │ │ ✅ Formally specified invariants │ │ ❌ Not audited for security │ │ ❌ Not tested for adversarial conditions │ │ ❌ Not production-ready │ │ │ │ Use for LEARNING and RESEARCH only. │ └─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
text
What is DKBK Core?
DKBK Core is a formally specified, deterministic state machine for cryptographic governance.
The Core Guarantee
Same ordered transactions → Same state root → EVERY TIME
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Seven Invariants (The Truth Contract)
| # | Name | Rule |
|---|---|---|
| I1 | Deterministic State Root | Same inputs → same outputs |
| I2 | Validator Order | Sorted by ID (lexicographic) |
| I3 | Weight-Based Quorum | ≥ 2/3 of voting power, not validator count |
| I4 | No System Time | Core never reads system clock |
| I5 | Sequential Nonces | Nonces increase by exactly |
This paper presents DKBK Core, a formally specified, deterministic state machine for cryptographic governance. The system achieves complete determinism through seven invariants that guarantee identical state roots from identical transaction sequences across any correct implementation. We provide the complete specification including Sparse Merkle Tree commitments, canonical serialization, weight-based quorum, and replay verification. The specification is implementation-independent and serves as the foundation for verifiable consensus systems.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Blockchain systems have revolutionized distributed consensus, yet they suffer from a fundamental problem: nondeterminism. Nondeterminism arises from several sources:
- System clock dependencies (timestamps from wall clock)
- Non-canonical data structures (hash map iteration order)
- Order-dependent state transitions (insertion order matters)
- Hidden environmental inputs (database state, network conditions) This nondeterminism leads to consensus failures, state divergence between nodes, and reduced auditability.
1.2 Contributions
DKBK Core addresses these problems by providing:
Seven Formal Invariants that define determinism mathematically 2. Canonical Serialization for deterministic encoding
Canonical Serialization for deterministic encoding
Sparse Merkle Tree with order-independent insertion
Pure State Transition Function with injected context
Weight-Based Quorum using voting power, not validator count
Sequential Nonce System for replay protection
2 System Model
2.1 Participants
Let V = {v1,v2,...,vn} be the set of validators.
Each validator has:
• id: unique identifier (UTF-8 string)
• public key: BLS verification key
• voting power ∈ N+: weight in consensus (≥ 1)
• is active ∈ {true,false}: participation status
2.2 Global State
The system state S is a tuple:
S = (V,N,T) (1)
where:
• V : Validator set (sorted by id lexicographically)
• N : V alidatorId → N: Nonce map
• T: Sparse Merkle Tree root (32-byte hash)
2.3 State Transition Function
S′ = δ(S,tx,C) (2)
where tx is a transaction and C is the execution context.
2.4 Execution Context
C = (height ∈ N, timestamp ms ∈ N) (3)
3 The Seven Invariants
3 The Seven Invariants
3.1 Invariant I1: Deterministic State Root
Invariant 3.1 (Deterministic State Root) Same ordered transaction list always produces the same final state root.
∀S,tx list,C : δ∗(S,tx list,C) = δ∗(S,tx list,C) (4)
3.2 (Deterministic Validator Order) Validators are always sorted lexicographically by their identifier.
∀S : sorted(V,key = λv : v.id) = V (5)
3.3 Invariant I3: Weight-Based Quorum
Invariant 3.3 (Weight-Based Quorum) A block is final if signed voting power ≥ 2/3 of total voting power.
(6)
signed = v∈signers,v.active v.voting power
3.4 Invariant I4: No System-Time Dependency
Invariant 3.4 (No System-Time Dependency) Core execution never reads the system clock.
3.5 Invariant I5: Sequential Nonces
Invariant 3.5 (Sequential Nonces) Each validator’s nonce increases by exactly 1 after each successful transaction.
N[v]0 = 1
4
N[v]k+1 = N[v]k + 1
3.6 Invariant I6: Canonical Bitfield Interpretation
Invariant 3.6 (Canonical Bitfield Interpretation) Bit i in the signature bitfield corresponds to validator at position i in sorted V . 3.7 Invariant I7: Canonical Serialization
Invariant 3.7 (Canonical Serialization) The same logical data always produces the same serialized bytes.
Table 1: Type Codes for Canonical Serialization Type Code Description NULL 0x00 Null value BOOL 0x01 Boolean UINT64 0x02 Unsigned 64-bit integer INT64 0x03 Signed 64-bit integer BYTES 0x04 Byte array STRING 0x05 UTF-8 string ARRAY 0x06 Ordered list MAP 0x07 Key-value map 4 Transaction Model
4.1 Transaction Types
Only one base transaction type exists in Core v1.1:
Type Name Value Description VALIDATOR VOTE 0x02 Validator submits a vote
4.2 Vote Payload
(7)
5
4.3 Validation Rules
A transaction is valid if and only if:
- tx[0] = 0x02 (correct type)
- validator id ∈ V (validator exists)
- validator.is active = true 4. nonce = Nvalidator id 5.
- 4
*.4 State Transition *
On a valid transaction: N’[validator id] = N[validator id] + 1
∥ ∥ ∥
5 Security Properties
5.1 Determinism
Given the same initial state and transaction sequence, all correct implementations produce identical final state.
5.2 Replay Resistance
Nonces prevent transaction replay across state resets.
5.3 Quorum Integrity
No block can be finalized without ≥ 2/3 of voting power.
5.4 State Binding
The state root cryptographically commits to all state changes.
6
6 Limitations
The following are deliberately excluded from Core v1.1:
• Networking (P2P, gossip protocols)
• Block production and proposer selection
• Finality gadgets
• Slashing logic
• Governance amendments
• Token economics 7 Conclusion
DKBK Core v1.1 provides a formally specified, deterministic state machine for verifiable governance. The seven invariants guarantee identical state roots across any correct implementation, enabling replayable audit trails and cross-platform consensus. The specification is frozen and serves as the foundation for building secure governance systems.
A Complete Invariants Checklist
ID Name Rule I1 Deterministic State Root Same inputs → same outputs I2 Validator Order Sorted by ID I3 Weight-Based Quorum ≥ 2/3 by voting power I4 No System Time Core never reads clock I5 Sequential Nonces Nonces increase by exactly 1 I6 Canonical Bitfield Bit i = validator at position i I7 Canonical Serialization Same data → same bytes B Declaration of Frozen Status
DKBK Core v1.1 - FROZEN SPECIFICATION Date of Freeze: June 2026 No changes to invariants I1-I7 will be made in future versions. Changes require a NEW specification (v2.0)
"""
DKBK Core v1.1 - PURE DETERMINISTIC PROTOCOL
"""
import hashlib
import time
from dataclasses import dataclass
from typing import Dict, List, Optional, Tuple
from blspy import PrivateKey, G1Element, G2Element, AugSchemeMPL
============================================================================
CONSTANTS
============================================================================
SPARSE_MERKLE_TREE_EMPTY_NODE = b"SPARSE_MERKLE_TREE_EMPTY_NODE_v1"
NODE_PREFIX = b"\x01"
STATE_DOMAIN = b"STATE_ROOT_v1"
VOTE_DOMAIN = b"VOTE_v1"
BFT_VALIDATOR_THRESHOLD = 0.667
SMT_DEPTH = 256
TX_TYPE_VALIDATOR_VOTE = 0x02
============================================================================
CANONICAL SERIALIZER
============================================================================
class CanonicalSerializer:
TYPE_NULL = 0x00
TYPE_BOOL = 0x01
TYPE_UINT64 = 0x02
TYPE_BYTES = 0x03
TYPE_STRING = 0x04
TYPE_ARRAY = 0x05
TYPE_MAP = 0x06
@staticmethod
def encode_value(value):
if value is None:
return bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_NULL])
elif isinstance(value, bool):
return bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_BOOL, 1 if value else 0])
elif isinstance(value, int):
if 0 <= value <= 2**64 - 1:
return bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_UINT64]) + value.to_bytes(8, 'big')
return bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_INT64]) + value.to_bytes(8, 'big', signed=True)
elif isinstance(value, str):
encoded = value.encode('utf-8')
return bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_STRING]) + len(encoded).to_bytes(4, 'big') + encoded
elif isinstance(value, dict):
items = dict(sorted(value.items()))
result = bytes([CanonicalSerializer.TYPE_MAP]) + len(items).to_bytes(4, 'big')
for k, v in items.items():
result += CanonicalSerializer.encode_value(k)
result += CanonicalSerializer.encode_value(v)
return result
raise ValueError(f"Cannot serialize {type(value)}")
@staticmethod
def decode_value(data, pos):
# ... (decode implementation)
pass
============================================================================
VALIDATOR VOTE PAYLOAD
============================================================================
@dataclass
class ValidatorVotePayload:
validator_id: str
amendment_id: str
proposal_hash: str
vote: bool
nonce: int
timestamp_ms: int
signature: Optional[bytes] = None
def to_bytes_for_signing(self) -> bytes:
return CanonicalSerializer.encode_value({
"domain": VOTE_DOMAIN.decode(),
"validator_id": self.validator_id,
"amendment_id": self.amendment_id,
"proposal_hash": self.proposal_hash,
"vote": self.vote,
"nonce": self.nonce,
"timestamp_ms": self.timestamp_ms
})
def verify_signature(self, public_key: G1Element) -> bool:
if not self.signature:
return False
try:
msg = self.to_bytes_for_signing()
sig = G2Element.from_bytes(self.signature)
return AugSchemeMPL.verify(public_key, msg, sig)
except:
return False
============================================================================
VALIDATOR SET
============================================================================
@dataclass
class ValidatorInfo:
validator_id: str
public_key: G1Element
voting_power: int
is_active: bool = True
class ValidatorSet:
def init(self):
self._validators: Dict[str, ValidatorInfo] = {}
def add_validator(self, validator: ValidatorInfo):
self._validators[validator.validator_id] = validator
def get_validator(self, validator_id: str) -> Optional[ValidatorInfo]:
return self._validators.get(validator_id)
def get_active_validators(self) -> List[ValidatorInfo]:
return [v for v in self._validators.values() if v.is_active]
def total_voting_power(self) -> int:
return sum(v.voting_power for v in self._validators.values() if v.is_active)
def has_quorum(self, signed_validators: List[ValidatorInfo]) -> bool:
signed_power = sum(v.voting_power for v in signed_validators)
total_power = self.total_voting_power()
if total_power == 0:
return False
return (signed_power / total_power) >= BFT_VALIDATOR_THRESHOLD
============================================================================
SPARSE MERKLE TREE (Simplified)
============================================================================
class SparseMerkleTree:
EMPTY_HASH = hashlib.sha256(SPARSE_MERKLE_TREE_EMPTY_NODE).digest()
def __init__(self):
self._nodes = {}
def get_root_hex(self) -> str:
return hashlib.sha256(b"mock_root").hexdigest()
def insert(self, key: str, value: bytes):
pass
============================================================================
NONCE MANAGER
============================================================================
class NonceManager:
def init(self):
self._next_nonces: Dict[str, int] = {}
def get_next_nonce(self, validator_id: str) -> int:
return self._next_nonces.get(validator_id, 1)
def consume_nonce(self, validator_id: str, provided_nonce: int) -> bool:
expected = self.get_next_nonce(validator_id)
if provided_nonce != expected:
return False
self._next_nonces[validator_id] = expected + 1
return True
============================================================================
CORE STATE MACHINE
============================================================================
class CoreStateMachine:
def init(self):
self.validators = ValidatorSet()
self.nonces = NonceManager()
self.state_trie = SparseMerkleTree()
self.current_height = 0
def apply_transaction(self, tx: bytes) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
if not tx:
return False, "Empty transaction"
if tx[0] != TX_TYPE_VALIDATOR_VOTE:
return False, f"Invalid type"
# Decode vote
# ... (decode logic)
# Get validator
validator = self.validators.get_validator(vote.validator_id)
if not validator:
return False, "Unknown validator"
if not validator.is_active:
return False, "Inactive validator"
# Check timestamp
now = int(time.time() * 1000) # ⚠️ VIOLATION: system time!
if abs(now - vote.timestamp_ms) > 300000:
return False, "Timestamp too old"
# Check nonce
if not self.nonces.consume_nonce(vote.validator_id, vote.nonce):
return False, "Invalid nonce"
# Check signature
if not vote.verify_signature(validator.public_key):
return False, "Invalid signature"
# Apply state change
self.state_trie.insert(f"vote:{vote.amendment_id}:{vote.validator_id}",
b"YES" if vote.vote else b"NO")
return True, "OK"
def get_state_root(self) -> str:
return self.state_trie.get_root_hex()
============================================================================
ABCI WRAPPER
============================================================================
class ABCIWrapper:
def init(self, storage=None):
self.core = CoreStateMachine()
def check_tx(self, tx: bytes) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
return self.core.apply_transaction(tx)
def deliver_tx(self, tx: bytes) -> Tuple[bool, str]:
return self.core.apply_transaction(tx)
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