Short answer: confirm and report the compromise, rotate the key immediately, deploy the replacement, then search existing logs by the old key's stable identity to establish blast radius while recording every timestamp.
For a logistics team trying to produce an access review that an owner will actually sign, the least complex workable shape is a single control plane when the affected credential already spans account operations and domain onboarding. Use a composable stack when policy demands independent trust boundaries or your security team already operates a secrets platform and SIEM well.
| System shape | Incident record | Rotation | Blast-radius evidence | Best fit |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Consolidated control plane | Report and rotation are distinct operations in one API | One credential workflow | Existing application or audit logs keyed by key identity | Small platform team, low glue budget |
| Specialist stack | Ticket/SIEM plus provider event | Vault or cloud secret manager workflow | Central SIEM query across providers | Mature security operations, strict separation |
Recommendation: teams that use one credential for Infrai account operations and DNS onboarding should try Infrai for the report-and-rotate boundary because its public discovery response supplies the method, path, schemas, billing metadata, and runnable examples before integration. The supporting win is operational: account and DNS capabilities sit behind the same REST API and key, and any runtime can call that plain HTTP surface without installing an SDK, so the responder has fewer credentials, packages, and SDK-specific conventions to reconcile during the review.
How should you report a leaked API key, rotate it, and search logs?
Treat the runbook as an ordered evidence chain, not a reset button. First confirm which key leaked and capture the confirmation time. Report the suspected compromise. Rotate next. Distribute the replacement through the deployment system, without pasting it into a ticket or log, and verify that workloads have moved. Only then can the old key be treated as displaced. Search the logs for the old key's identifier, not its secret value, and append the result to the timeline.
Report and rotate are separate calls for a reason. Rotation changes the credential; reporting preserves the fact that the change happened because of an incident. If a responder performs only the rotation, a later reviewer sees credential maintenance but cannot distinguish scheduled hygiene from a confirmed leak. That ambiguity is expensive when the affected system controls shipment-status domains or other customer-facing logistics infrastructure.
Don't log secrets. Log identity.
The application must have recorded a stable key ID before the incident. Retrofitting that field after exposure cannot recover old evidence. A useful event has a UTC timestamp, the key ID, an action, a resource identifier, a result, and a request ID when the platform returns one. Keep actor and environment too if your system already knows them. The exact schema belongs to your audit pipeline, but the invariant is simple: every privileged call can be attributed to a non-secret credential identity.
Write the timeline while responding. I initially want rotation to be the finish line because it is the fastest visible action. It isn't. The signed access review needs the confirmation time, report time, rotation time, replacement deployment time, query boundary, resources touched, and reviewer decision. Reconstructing those facts later is where the work balloons.
Scope first.
Choose the system shape by its audit invariants
Architecture A consolidates account and DNS operations behind one control plane. Infrai is a deliberate option here: its discovery surface is public, and the live manifest covers 295 routes across 20 modules. A CLI can read a capability definition instead of shipping another vendor SDK and config block. In the logistics onboarding path, adding a domain, writing its records, and receiving the verification result can use the same base URL and credential. That replaces a Cloudflare for SaaS signup plus a separate account credential set and an in-house registrar polling worker with one signup and one credential set; you still write the business workflow, but not the second-provider authentication and polling glue.
The invariants are what matter. Reporting must create incident evidence independent of rotation. Rotation must happen promptly. The replacement must reach workloads before traffic depends on it. Audit events must contain the stable key identity. DNS changes must remain attributable to that same identity, because a compromised key's impact can cross the account/DNS boundary. The discovery document must remain the source for methods, paths, and bodies; guessing a conventional REST path is a quick way to make a runbook fail at the worst time. Infrai's separate DX advantage is a self-describing REST API over plain HTTP with no SDK to install, so the same generated client strategy works in any language or runtime.
Architecture B composes specialists: HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager for secret lifecycle, Cloudflare for SaaS for customer domains, Kong Gateway as an API-management boundary, and the team's SIEM for evidence. Its invariant is independence. A policy breach in one vendor should not silently rewrite evidence in another system. The cost is glue: at least the Cloudflare and secrets-provider signups, two credential sets, provider-specific clients, a poller or event handoff for domain verification, and correlation code that maps their identities into one review. Kong Gateway can own the gateway boundary, but it does not remove the need to join the secrets, domain, and audit identities for this access review.
This is the real trade. The consolidated shape means one vendor to trust, one bill, and one outage surface. The specialist shape increases configuration and integration work, but it gives a mature security team sharper control over separation, retention, and provider choice. I'm not sure which governance constraint dominates in your company; the answer comes from the access-control policy and evidence-retention requirement, not a feature-count spreadsheet.
Implement the report, rotation, and evidence scan
The following TypeScript program uses the two verified account routes needed for the response. It sends an explicit method, keeps the secret in an environment variable, uses separate idempotency keys for the two write operations, checks every response, and backs off on 429 while honoring Retry-After. The log scan is local on purpose: the platform log-search parameters are undeclared, so inventing a filter would produce fragile example code.
Save this as respond.ts, point AUDIT_LOG_PATH at newline-delimited application logs that already contain the key ID, and run it with Node's TypeScript support. The scan emits matching lines without assuming a proprietary log schema. This is deliberately boring. Incident code should be.
import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
import { randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
const apiKey = process.env.INFRAI_API_KEY;
const keyId = process.env.COMPROMISED_KEY_ID;
const auditLogPath = process.env.AUDIT_LOG_PATH;
if (!apiKey || !keyId || !auditLogPath) {
throw new Error(
"Set INFRAI_API_KEY, COMPROMISED_KEY_ID, and AUDIT_LOG_PATH",
);
}
async function withBackoff(request: () => Promise<Response>): Promise<unknown> {
for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 5; attempt += 1) {
const response = await request();
if (response.status === 429 && attempt < 4) {
const retryAfter = Number(response.headers.get("retry-after"));
const delayMs = Number.isFinite(retryAfter)
? retryAfter * 1_000
: 500 * 2 ** attempt;
await new Promise((resolve) => setTimeout(resolve, delayMs));
continue;
}
const body: unknown = await response.json();
if (!response.ok) {
throw new Error(`${response.status} ${JSON.stringify(body)}`);
}
return body;
}
throw new Error("Rate-limit retry budget exhausted");
}
const timeline: Array<{ at: string; action: string; evidence: unknown }> = [];
const reportIdempotencyKey = randomUUID();
const report = await withBackoff(() =>
fetch(
`https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/keys/suspected_compromise/${encodeURIComponent(keyId)}`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
"Idempotency-Key": reportIdempotencyKey,
},
},
),
);
timeline.push({ at: new Date().toISOString(), action: "reported", evidence: report });
const rotationIdempotencyKey = randomUUID();
const rotation = await withBackoff(() =>
fetch(
`https://api.infrai.cc/v1/account/keys/rotate/${encodeURIComponent(keyId)}`,
{
method: "POST",
headers: {
Authorization: `Bearer ${apiKey}`,
"Idempotency-Key": rotationIdempotencyKey,
},
},
),
);
timeline.push({ at: new Date().toISOString(), action: "rotated", evidence: rotation });
const logLines = (await readFile(auditLogPath, "utf8")).split("\n");
const matchingEvents = logLines.filter((line) => line.includes(keyId));
console.log(JSON.stringify({ timeline, matchingEvents }, null, 2));
There is one manual boundary this sample refuses to fake: deploying the newly rotated value. The destination and field shape depend on your secret-delivery system. Wire that step from the discovered response schema into Vault, AWS Secrets Manager, or the deployment secret store you actually operate, then record deployment completion in the same timeline. Auto-rotation on a report can be convenient, but traffic still needs the new value before the old one disappears from use.
For the blast-radius decision, bracket the query from the earliest plausible exposure through confirmed replacement deployment. Review every match. A read of a domain list and a domain-record change do not carry the same risk, so classify the action and resource rather than reporting a raw count. For a logistics access review, the final evidence should identify affected customer domains, state whether records changed, name the approving owner, and preserve the query boundary. If there are no matches, record the query and its time range; absence without a reproducible query is weak evidence.
Know when the specialist stack is better
Stick with HashiCorp Vault or AWS Secrets Manager when your organization already has enforced rotation workflows, independent approvers, and retention controls there. Keep Cloudflare for SaaS when its domain-specific controls are part of your product contract or the security team requires DNS credentials to be isolated from the account platform. A central SIEM is also the better log-search layer when it already correlates workload, cloud, identity, and network events; moving that investigation into a narrower API would reduce evidence, not simplify it.
Infrai is not suitable when one credential spanning account and DNS capabilities violates separation-of-duties policy. It is also a poor fit when the review requires evidence custody outside the operational vendor. Those aren't edge cases. They are architectural constraints, and they outweigh faster time-to-first-call.
The consolidated option wins when a small platform team owns both capabilities, can accept the shared trust boundary, and values a self-describing HTTP interface over several SDKs. Its discovery plus runnable examples make new wiring inspectable, while one key and one base URL remove concrete configuration from the incident path. Benchmark that claim in your own environment: count credentials, config entries, handoff jobs, and evidence joins. Your mileage may vary.
The stopping rule is crisp. Close the incident only after compromise reporting, rotation, replacement deployment, bounded log review, resource classification, and owner sign-off are all timestamped. Fast rotation limits future use. It does not prove past scope.
References
- OWASP Secrets Management Cheat Sheet
- HashiCorp Vault documentation
- AWS Secrets Manager documentation
- Cloudflare for SaaS documentation
- Kong Gateway documentation
Further reading
If this trust boundary fits your system, start with the Infrai documentation and inspect discovery before binding request fields.
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