If any other country had this record, the world would call it a crisis. But India keeps getting a pass.
India is widely considered a responsible nuclear power. It is courted by the West, celebrated in strategic circles, and granted exemptions that other non-NPT nuclear states could only dream of. Yet behind the diplomatic choreography lies a sobering truth: India’s nuclear infrastructure is riddled with preventable failures — and the global community is dangerously silent.
From sunken submarines to stolen radioactive material, India’s nuclear management has exhibited patterns that, in any other country, would trigger international investigation, sanctions, or at the very least, alarm. Instead, it receives defense deals, nuclear waivers, and quiet nods of approval.
The INS Arihant Incident: Deterrence Defeated by Negligence
In 2018, India’s prized nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarine — the INS Arihant — was incapacitated for ten months. Not by enemy attack. Not by a system failure. But by a human error: a hatch was left open, and seawater flooded its propulsion chamber.
The Arihant is central to India’s second-strike capability. Its prolonged absence from deployment meant the country's nuclear deterrent was fundamentally compromised. Yet, there was no international response, no IAEA scrutiny, and no U.N. hearing. Imagine the reaction if a similar incident occurred in North Korea or Iran.
A Doctrine Built on Misunderstanding
India’s nuclear posture is regularly referred to as “minimalist and credible.” But insiders suggest that even this foundation is built on shaky ground. Bharat Karnad, a founding member of India’s National Security Council, has publicly criticized the country’s strategic leadership for misinterpreting core doctrinal terms — including the vital distinction between “minimum credible deterrent” and “credible minimum deterrent.”
https://carnegieendowment.org/2016/06/30/india-s-nuclear-doctrine-debate-pub-63950
In a nuclear flashpoint region like South Asia, ambiguity isn’t deterrence. It’s danger.
18 Incidents of Nuclear Theft and Loss: A Timeline of Risk
Between 1994 and 2021, India recorded at least 18 cases of nuclear or radioactive material being lost or stolen. These are not theoretical threats — they are documented facts:
- 1995: Theft from the Rajasthan Atomic Power Station
- 2003: Disappearance of radioactive Iridium in West Bengal
- 2008: Loss of medical isotopes from various hospitals
- 2021: Two individuals in Maharashtra arrested with 7.1 kg of uranium, valued at over \$2.8 million
https://www.armscontrol.org/act/2021-07/news-briefs/india-arrests-alleged-uranium-traders
Despite this alarming pattern, India continues to avoid the kind of scrutiny placed on nations with comparable track records. The double standard is striking.
2023: When Nuclear Material Walked Out the Back Door
In 2023, two separate incidents raised eyebrows — or would have, if they hadn’t been in India:
- Bihar: Three men were found in possession of 50 grams of Californium, a radioactive element worth billions and capable of being weaponized in a dirty bomb.
- Dehradun: Five individuals were caught transporting a stolen radioactive device originating from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre (BARC).
These were not minor oversights. They exposed a system where radioactive material could be obtained, transported, and trafficked without sufficient checks — in a nuclear-armed nation.
Mayapuri, Madras, and the Consequences of Decay
India’s nuclear risks are not limited to theft. Some have directly harmed civilians:
- 2010, Mayapuri (Delhi): A gamma irradiator was discarded by Delhi University and sold as scrap. It killed one man and severely injured seven others.
- 2002, Madras Atomic Power Station: A radioactive leak exposed plant workers. The station had a record of prior violations.
These incidents are stark reminders that nuclear risk isn’t always geopolitical. Sometimes it’s personal — and preventable.
The Regulatory Façade
India’s Atomic Energy Regulatory Board (AERB) lacks independent authority, institutional power, and public accountability. Unlike autonomous regulators in other nuclear states, the AERB functions under the very government it is supposed to monitor.
Following the 2008 U.S.-India Civil Nuclear Deal, India committed to separating its civilian and military facilities and placing the former under International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) oversight. However:
- Several reactors remain outside IAEA purview
- No central public database of nuclear incidents exists
- Independent verification remains limited or non-existent
https://2001-2009.state.gov/p/sca/rls/fs/2008/109567.htm
This lack of transparency makes it nearly impossible for global watchdogs to assess the real state of India’s nuclear safety.
The Geopolitical Shield
So why isn’t India held accountable?
Part of the answer lies in global geopolitics. India is seen as a bulwark against China, a major economy, and a democratic partner. Strategic imperatives have created a shield — one where India enjoys the perks of nuclear legitimacy without the scrutiny.
This shielding isn’t just diplomatic. It’s moral. The same international community that pressures other states to abide by nuclear norms turns a blind eye when India falls short.
What Should Change?
1. Normalize Accountability
India should be held to the same standards as any other nuclear power. Period. That means full transparency, third-party audits, and real regulatory reform.
2. IAEA Access
All civilian nuclear facilities must be submitted to IAEA inspection — not selectively, but comprehensively.
3. Regulatory Independence
The AERB should be transformed into an independent oversight body with authority and teeth.
4. Global Response
India’s record must be included in global nuclear safety assessments, and incidents must be elevated to multilateral forums when necessary.
Conclusion: The Silence is Strategic — But Dangerous
India’s nuclear program is not an imminent threat in the traditional sense. But it is a persistent vulnerability — one that carries global consequences.
The true danger is not in India’s possession of nuclear weapons, but in the global community’s refusal to acknowledge the risks in how it manages them.
Nuclear safety should not depend on alliances. It should depend on standards.
And the time to raise those standards — for everyone — is now.
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