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Max Bayern
Max Bayern

Posted on Originally published at ot-cyber.de

OT Security DACH, October 2026: Cooling Controllers, Remote Access 0-Days

This article is an English adaptation of the German original monthly report.

October 2026 had two main themes for OT operators in DACH. One was a wave of attacks on internet-exposed refrigeration controllers. The other was a series of actively exploited flaws in remote access and edge products. In the BeyondTrust case patching was not enough: according to Mandiant, the attackers escalated to root, attempted to extract the credential vault and set up persistence, and patching does not remove that persistence. (Rapid7) This article summarizes the key points from the monthly OT security report for DACH.

What happened

Cooling controllers under attack (CERT-FR). CERT-FR published an alert on 12.10. about Danfoss AK-SM/AK-SC controllers. Updated versions followed on 13.10. and 16.10.; the alert also covers Copeland and Dixell xweb. The agency reports numerous compromised devices. For end-of-life devices without a security fix, a reset alone is not enough, because the device remains vulnerable afterwards. For compromised devices, CERT-FR recommends removing them from the internet, restarting the Danfoss device or restoring factory settings, reconfiguring it, and applying vendor hardening such as firmware updates. (CERT-FR) These controllers transmit data to the refrigeration service provider. CERT-FR recommends checking the entire configuration, in particular the defrost schedules. (CERTFR-2026-ALE-012)

BeyondTrust Remote Support (CVE-2026-102764). This authentication bypass (CVSS v4 9.3) was exploited as a zero-day, before disclosure: BeyondTrust dates the two known compromises to 29 August 2026. Mandiant attributes the activity to ARMORY CASTLE, a suspected PRC-nexus espionage actor formerly tracked as UNC5221. The attackers deployed the SAWFLY PHP webshell and the BARECLAW tunneler. Mandiant also describes root escalation, an attempt to extract the credential vault, persistence and log deletion. (Rapid7) CISA added the flaw to its KEV catalog on 16.10.2026. Rapid7 advises rotating stored or brokered credentials after patching or rebuilding. In our assessment these can include credentials for OT jump hosts, and a patch alone does not change them. (Rapid7)

Ivanti Connect Secure. On 30.10. CISA added CVE-2026-111357 and CVE-2026-118527 to the KEV catalog. (CISA)

PHP2Shell (CVE-2026-109618/-109619). CISA added both flaws to KEV on 26.10. The PHP project released fixes on 21.10. (CISA, BleepingComputer, The Hacker News)

SafePay ransomware (AA26-293A). CISA, FBI and the LKA Rheinland-Pfalz, among others, jointly warn about SafePay. According to the advisory, SafePay has been highly active since August 2024 and has impacted at least 600 victims from multiple critical infrastructure sectors. Initial access comes through stolen or guessed passwords, phished accounts and known flaws, including CVE-2023-27532 and CVE-2024-40711 (both Veeam) and CVE-2024-40766 (SonicWall). The advisory names no vendors for the CVEs, so the mapping comes from the CVE numbers. (Advisory)

Exposure. Forescout reports exposed refrigeration services worldwide (Hackread). According to heise, Modat finds solar and wind farm systems in Germany openly reachable (heise).

What it means for engineers and OT teams

  • Remote access is the main entry point. BeyondTrust and Ivanti both saw active exploitation, in BeyondTrust's case before a patch existed. These devices sit at the boundary to the control network.
  • Patching is no longer enough. At BeyondTrust, attackers went after stored credentials and set up persistence that a patch does not remove. After patching, check for compromise and rotate the credentials stored on or brokered by the device.
  • Directly exposed OT devices are being manipulated at scale. Numerous compromises are confirmed for cooling controllers; for renewable energy systems, the sources so far report only open exposure on the internet. (CERT-FR)
  • End-of-life products are a growing risk. Devices that no longer receive security fixes can only be handled through replacement and isolation.
  • The supply chain is a target. Data and access held by vendors and service providers can be used to reach operators.
  • Trust between IT and OT matters. If OT systems trust accounts from the IT domain, stolen domain credentials can reach the control network.

Practical checklist

  1. Take every refrigeration controller with a public IP off the internet and allow access only via VPN. Check the configuration, including defrost times, against the intended state, and plan replacement for EoL devices.
  2. Patch self-hosted BeyondTrust appliances (BT26-05-RS) and review logs from 29 August 2026 onward. Rebuild the appliance if a compromise is confirmed or cannot be ruled out. Reset all credentials stored on it.
  3. Patch Ivanti Connect Secure, review gateway logs since 01.10., and reset accounts that have access to OT. Check whether OT systems trust accounts from the IT domain.
  4. Use your asset inventory to find devices with a PHP-based web interface and ask vendors for their patch status. Allow management access only from an admin network or via a jump host.
  5. Check the patch status of the five CVEs named in the SafePay advisory, enforce MFA for VPN and webmail, and test immutable offline backups. Practice restarting the control system without IT backups.
  6. Disable PLC web servers where they are not needed. Otherwise restrict access to engineering networks.
  7. Use the asset inventory to find end-of-life firmware and plan replacement and segmentation.

Full report

The full monthly report is available in German, with verified sources, on OT-Cyber.de.

Max Gilg is an OT cybersecurity consultant based in Rosenheim, Germany (OT-Cyber.de).

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