After a ransomware exercise in 2024 we added a second copy of our nightly backups, held with a different provider from the rest of our estate. Our servers and accounts are mostly Microsoft, so the copy went to Amazon S3, in an account with its own sign in, and we switched on a feature called Object Lock in compliance mode. While a copy is locked, nobody can delete it, overwrite it or shorten its lock, including the account's own administrators. An attacker holding every password we own still could not destroy it. That was the point.
The engineer setting it up had to choose how long each copy stayed locked. He took seven years from our records retention policy, which is the figure finance uses for its own records. Each night's copy was about one point eight terabytes.
Six weeks later the first full bill arrived and our finance controller asked why storage had grown by seventy five terabytes. At seven years per night, we were on course to hold well over four thousand terabytes before the first copy could be removed. We asked Amazon what could be done. Compliance mode works exactly as described, and its documentation says the only way to remove locked copies early is to close the whole account.
We changed the bucket's default to thirty five days, which applies to every copy made from then on. The forty two copies already made stay locked until 2031. We could still move them to Amazon's cheapest archive tier, so they now cost under a hundred pounds a month, and will for seven years. They also contain HR records that our policy says we delete sooner. We have written that down for our data protection officer, with the reason, because we cannot change it.
The lock did what we bought it for. If an attacker had done this, we would have been glad of it. What we had not done was treat it as a decision that could not be reversed. Any setting a supplier describes as irreversible now needs a second engineer to check it, and is tried first on an empty bucket with a lock of one day, so we see what it does before it applies to anything real.
A control strong enough to stop an attacker undoing it will stop you as well. Choose its settings as carefully as you would sign a contract that has no exit.
– Serguey Shinder
Top comments (1)
This is a useful cautionary tale, and the detail that stood out was borrowing the seven year retention figure from finance records and applying it to nightly 1.8 TB copies. That mismatch turned a sound ransomware control into more than 4,000 TB of locked storage before the first copy could be removed. I also liked the practical fix you landed on: a 35 day default, a second engineer checking any irreversible setting, and a one day trial on an empty bucket first. The HR records point is a good reminder too, since a lock that protects data can also prevent the deletion a policy requires.