A common infrastructure mistake is assuming that deploying two firewalls automatically creates high availability.
It doesn't.
Consider:
ISP
↓
Firewall A / Firewall B
↓
Single Core Switch
↓
Servers
The firewall layer is redundant.
The network is not.
The core switch is now the single point of failure.
A proper HA assessment should identify failure domains across:
WAN connectivity
firewalls
heartbeat links
switching
power
routing
applications
monitoring
FortiGate FGCP is a good practical example.
It supports HA clustering and synchronization between members, while session pickup can help preserve TCP sessions after failover.
But the broader engineering principle is vendor-neutral:
Availability is an end-to-end property.
Do not ask only whether a component is redundant.
Ask:
What happens to the service when this component fails?
Spanish FortiGate HA architecture example:
https://sistro.net/fortigate-high-availability-ha-cuando-conviene
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