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The Rent Was $1,150

Brian Chesky had quit his job in Los Angeles and moved to San Francisco with no savings and no plan beyond living with his friend Joe Gebbia. Then he found out what an apartment in the city cost. By his own telling, the rent was $1,150 a month and he did not have it.

It was October 2007. An international design conference was about to land in town, and the hotels recommended on its website were sold out. Gebbia mentioned that he owned some air mattresses. They dragged them out of a closet, inflated them, and decided that this was not a bed and breakfast, it was an air bed and breakfast. Chesky says the two of them built a basic website in about three days. Three strangers booked. 🛏️

That is the version printed on the poster, and it is true enough. Airbnb's own company timeline dates its first guests to October 2007, and its site launch to 2008, which is why you will see both years on different corporate summaries.

But the air mattress weekend is the least interesting part of the story. It paid one month of rent. What came after is the real plot: a launch that got two bookings, a political convention, a box of cereal sold at $40, an investor who walked out of a meeting and left his smoothie behind, a rented camera, a clever and slightly sketchy trick involving Craigslist, a ransacked apartment that nearly sank the company, a clone factory in Berlin, a pandemic that erased most of the business in about two months, and a stock that opened at more than double its IPO price.

It also ends, as of this month, somewhere stranger than anyone would have predicted in 2007. Airbnb is now a public company with car rentals, grocery delivery, and boutique hotels on the same app that once sold air mattress floor space. Whether that last chapter works out is genuinely unsettled, and I will say so when we get there.

A note on how to read this. I built this timeline from company documents, SEC filings, founder interviews, investor emails, and contemporary news coverage rather than from other people's summaries. Founders' stories get better with every retelling, so where a detail comes only from a founder's memory, I say that. Where sources disagree on a number, I show the disagreement instead of picking a winner. A table near the end sorts the solid facts from the folklore.


Three Strangers and a Spare Bedroom

To understand why this idea occurred to these two people in particular, it helps to know that neither was supposed to be a founder.

Chesky studied at the Rhode Island School of Design and wanted to be an artist. After graduating, he took a job at a small industrial design firm in Los Angeles. He has said that the only entrepreneur he knew while growing up ran a local pizza place. What changed his mind, according to his account on Sequoia's podcast, was a package in the mail: a seat cushion that his RISD friend Gebbia had designed, manufactured, and sold. Gebbia had made a real thing and people had bought it. Chesky wanted that, so he quit and moved north.

The idea they landed on that October was modest. Rent out some floor to designers who could not find a hotel, feed them breakfast, and play tour guide. The first listing was on Rausch Street, a few blocks from where Airbnb would one day build its headquarters. A figure you will see repeated in nearly every retelling is $80 a night. I could not find a document that confirms it. It appears to come from the founders' own recollections, so treat it as a good-faith memory rather than a receipt.

What the first weekend actually proved

Here is the part that matters more than the money. According to Chesky, the three guests did not just tolerate the arrangement. They stayed about a week, and he describes it as compressing a multi-year relationship into a few days. He kept in touch with them. Watching them leave, he and Gebbia decided that ordinary people like themselves might want to make some extra money meeting interesting strangers.

Paul Graham, the Y Combinator co-founder who would later fund them, wrote in 2020 that this experience is exactly why they did not quit during the long, ugly stretch that followed. They had seen a glimpse of something new, for both hosts and guests, and they could not unsee it.

Their circle was less convinced. Chesky remembers the first person he pitched looking at him and hoping aloud that this was not the only idea he was working on. It was, at the time, a perfectly reasonable thing to say. His mother, by his later account at Stanford, had her own view of his new career: she described him not as an entrepreneur but as unemployed.


The Roommate Who Moved Out

The third founder arrived through a rent increase.

Nathan Blecharczyk, a Harvard computer science graduate, had lived with Chesky and Gebbia in San Francisco. In an interview with John Battelle, he recalled that one month the rent went up 25 percent and he decided that was too expensive and left. The vacant bedroom, in his telling, is what Chesky and Gebbia rented out to visitors. The writer of that interview put it bluntly: without that move-out, Airbnb might never have existed.

A caveat worth keeping in mind: Nathan's version, with a vacant bedroom, and Chesky's version, with airbeds in the living room, do not match perfectly. They can both be true, but nobody has produced a single authoritative account of that weekend.

What is better documented is what came next. In February 2008, Blecharczyk joined as chief technology officer and third co-founder. The first site had been a quick HTML job. The two designers needed an engineer who could turn it into something that could take bookings and survive traffic, and Blecharczyk is the reason it did.


Launch Number One Gets Two Bookings

The team's first real attempt at a public launch was at South by Southwest in Austin in March 2008. Airbnb's own timeline records the result with a cheerfulness that borders on self-deprecation: two bookings, one of which was made by Chesky.


Yes, one of the two customers at the launch of a company now worth tens of billions of dollars was the CEO.

That launch has a reputation as a flop, and it was. But it also set the template for what the founders did next. A single conference had produced the original demand. A different, bigger conference might produce more.


A Convention, a Hotel Shortage, and a Crash

In August 2008, the Democratic National Convention was coming to Denver, and the city had a math problem.

Chesky has said he came across an article asking how Denver, with roughly 28,000 hotel rooms, planned to host around 80,000 convention-goers. When the party moved Barack Obama's nomination speech to a much larger stadium, the shortage looked even worse. One retelling says the city's mayor even considered opening parks to campers.

The site was relaunched on August 11, 2008, this time properly built for travel rather than for a single conference, with online payments added. Airbnb counts 80 bookings from the Denver launch. Other accounts give a slightly different number. A New Zealand Herald retelling says about 100 bookings and 800 homes added within four weeks, and adds that Chesky and Gebbia did a live CNN interview from their living room. I would treat the exact count as roughly 80 to 100.

TechCrunch's early coverage, later quoted in a retrospective, noted that more than 600 people had found alternative lodging through the site, with 50 to 100 new listings appearing daily and prices ranging from $20 for an airbed to $3,000 for an entire house. Good numbers for a tiny startup. Not enough to pay for a company.

Then the convention ended and the bookings went with it. The founders had proved that a big event creates demand. They had not proved that anyone would use the site on an ordinary Tuesday. Credit card balances kept growing.

They needed money, fast, and they were about to try a very strange way of getting it.


The Cereal Side Hustle

It was an election year, and the founders were designers. They did what designers do and made packaging.

They created two limited-edition cereals: Obama O's and Cap'n McCain's. TechCrunch's October 2008 write-up is the best contemporary record. The Obama box billed itself as the "Breakfast of Change." The McCain box, whose copy could have come from the campaign itself, praised the virtues of squares over circles. Each cereal came with its own jingle and a web page where visitors could vote for their favorite. The pitch to travelers was that hosts could serve the cereal to out-of-town volunteers who had come to work on the campaigns.

The boxes sold for about $39 or $40 each, and five percent of each sale went to the respective campaigns. The writer Dan Pink noticed the whole thing and observed, with some amusement, that Gebbia had become a cereal entrepreneur.

One detail the posters leave out: according to TechCrunch, the Obama O's were repackaged Honey O's, and the McCain cereal was repackaged Quaker Puffs. These were not manufactured cereals. They were boxes of ordinary cereal with a political costume on.

Chesky has said the haul was roughly $30,000, and he told Fortune the stunt changed the company's course. He has also described the production as manual labor. A print shop shipped the box designs and the founders assembled them by hand, a process he later called origami in his apartment. 🥣

Counting the cereal

The details drift depending on who is telling the story. Here is how the numbers shake out:

  • How many boxes: TechCrunch said the company made 500 of each design. Wikipedia's timeline says 800 boxes in total. Chesky later said a print shop sent 1,000.
  • Price: $39 in the 2008 coverage, $40 in later retellings.
  • Money raised: Around $30,000 is Chesky's own figure, and it is the one everyone repeats. I found no independent accounting.

The most honest summary is that the cereal was part fundraising and part marketing, and that its biggest payoff was not the cash. It was the story. Hold that thought, because it comes back in the next section.


A Binder Full of Maxed-Out Cards

By late 2008, the founders had been funding the company with credit cards for the better part of a year. Graham later wrote that they had a binder full of cards they had maxed out.

Investors were not rescuing them. Graham's essay recounts one meeting in which an investor stood up partway through and simply never came back. The founders assumed he had gone to the bathroom. He left his smoothie unfinished and was not seen again.

The timing could hardly have been worse. This was the autumn of 2008, the stock market was in free fall, and the worst recession in decades was underway. Chesky has said many investors struggled to see why anyone would sleep in a stranger's home. A reasonable person in that position would have found a job. The founders, for reasons Graham thought were revealing, did not.


Y Combinator: The Last Shot

According to Blecharczyk, the three of them reached a decision point after about a year of working on the company. They made a pact: they would give it three more months, join Y Combinator, focus entirely on Airbnb, and quit if things did not improve. He tells it in the Battelle interview.

The deal, per Chesky's later account, was $20,000 for 6 percent of the company.

What happened in the interview

There are two versions, and they are worth comparing.

Graham's own account is plain. He and his partners did not especially like the idea, and the users had no growth. But the founders had so much energy that it was hard not to like them. He says they were earnest and did nothing halfway. During the batch, the partners nicknamed Chesky after the cartoon Tasmanian Devil, because he seemed like a tornado.

Chesky's version, as told to Fortune, is more theatrical. Graham pushed on why people would stay with strangers, the pitch landed badly, and as the founders were leaving they showed him the cereal box. In Chesky's retelling, Graham's reaction was that anyone who could get people to pay $40 for a $4 box of cereal might just be able to get strangers to share homes.

A related quote circulates widely: that Graham called them "cockroaches" who would not die. It appears in Mixergy's coverage as Chesky's recollection. It does not appear in Graham's own essay, so I would file it under founder lore, not under verified fact.

The goal on the bathroom mirror

Graham's essay gives the most concrete detail of the whole Y Combinator period. The target was what the startup world calls ramen profitability: enough income to cover the founders' living costs. For the Airbnb team that meant $4,000 a month, split between $3,500 for rent and $500 for food. They taped the number to the bathroom mirror. 🍜


The Camera Trip to New York

The advice that changed the company was, by startup standards, almost insultingly simple. Where is the demand? Graham asked. The founders knew from search data: New York City. So go there.

One retelling has Graham pointing out that their users were in New York while they were sitting in Mountain View, and asking what they were still doing there. They went. Graham's own essay says they visited hosts in person to help improve their listings, and that a big part of that was better photos, so Chesky and Gebbia rented a professional camera and took the pictures themselves. 📸

They also stayed with hosts, wrote reviews, and learned something that surprised them. Graham says the biggest revelation was how many hosts were in the same position as the founders: they needed the money to pay rent.

Did the photos double revenue?

You will see this claim everywhere. The most specific version comes from a First Round Review profile, which attributes to Gebbia the story that weekly revenue had flatlined around $200 and then roughly doubled to $400 within a week of the new photos. That was the first financial improvement in over eight months, as the profile tells it.

Two cautions. Graham confirms the trip and the camera but does not give those revenue numbers. And the price of the camera varies between retellings from $500 to $5,000, which tells you something about how these stories travel. The direction of the result is clear. The precise figures are Gebbia's recollection.

The numbers Graham actually kept

Graham, a careful record keeper, preserved real weekly figures from February 2009. The company made $460 in fees in the first week of the month, $897 in the second, and $1,428 in the third. On February 22, Chesky emailed him that they had reached ramen profitability. Graham warned him about the expectations he had just set for himself. Chesky's whole reply was seven words: "We are not going to slow down."

Blecharczyk adds that the team's goal for the three months was $1,000 a week and that they ended at about $4,500 a week. Sequoia's Roelof Botha, recalling meeting the founders in early 2009, put the revenue at around $5,000 a week. These figures measure slightly different things (fees, bookings, revenue) and none line up perfectly, so read them as a trajectory rather than an audit.


Airbed Becomes Airbnb

In March 2009, the company shortened its name to Airbnb and widened its scope. It was no longer only air beds and shared rooms. It now offered apartments, whole homes, and vacation rentals.

The money followed. Sequoia Capital put in a seed round of roughly $600,000 in the spring of 2009. Sources split on the month (March or April). Wikipedia's timeline reports $585,000 from Sequoia plus $30,000 from the angel trio Youniversity Ventures, and a $2.4 million valuation, a figure I only found in that one place. Chesky has described the shift as going from eating leftover cereal to being ramen profitable.

The investor who passed

Not everyone was won over, and the paper trail is unusually good. Graham published his 2009 email exchange with Fred Wilson of Union Square Ventures after Wilson wrote a blog post in March 2011 admitting he had missed Airbnb.

The emails are a small masterpiece of venture capital skepticism. In January 2009, Graham introduced the founders, who happened to be in New York. Wilson replied that his firm was still deeply doubtful about the idea. A few weeks later he met the team, called the business interesting, and said he was unsure how big it could get. Graham's reply to the doubt was blunt: once something becomes a big marketplace, you ignore it "at your peril."

In his later post, Wilson explained that his firm had not been able to picture air mattresses on living room floors as the next hotel room. His broader lesson was that investors tend to focus on what a company is doing today, not on what it might become.


The Craigslist Trick

Airbnb's most famous growth tactic involved a website that never invited it.

Craigslist was where people with spare rooms already advertised. It had no public API for outside services to post to it. According to growth writer Andrew Chen, who reverse-engineered and described the mechanism in 2012, Airbnb let hosts push a listing to Craigslist with one click. The post carried a link back to Airbnb, so curious Craigslist users hopped over. Chen's point was that this was not something a traditional marketer could have imagined, because it required engineering skill to make Craigslist's posting flow work from outside.

Several caveats apply. First, the mechanics come from outside analysis. I found no detailed account of the integration from Airbnb itself. Second, a Boston University publication notes that the approach violated Craigslist's terms of service, which is why the story is told both as a growth masterpiece and as a cautionary tale about ethical gray areas. Third, one retelling says the founders also reached out to people who had posted rentals on Craigslist and invited them to list on Airbnb as well. That is plausible but secondhand.

The lesson most people draw is that Airbnb went where its supply already lived. The lesson I would add is that nobody seems to have done it permanently. As far as I can tell, Airbnb no longer works that way, and growth hacks of this kind tend to have short lives.


From Unknown to a Billion-Dollar Question

The next two years moved quickly. In November 2010, Airbnb launched its iPhone app and the Instant Book feature, according to its own timeline. Around the same time it raised a Series A led by Greylock and Sequoia. The amount depends on the source: Wikipedia's timeline says $7.2 million, while TechCrunch later reported $7.8 million and listed Ashton Kutcher among the earlier backers.

In February 2011 came the one millionth booking. By July, Airbnb said it had passed two million nights booked, with a million of them in the previous four months alone.

That month, Airbnb announced a $112 million Series B led by Andreessen Horowitz, with DST Global and General Catalyst participating. Reports put the valuation above $1 billion. Andreessen Horowitz partner Jeff Jordan wrote that Airbnb reminded him of eBay in its early days and said his firm put in $60 million of the round. At the time, Airbnb listed properties in 186 countries and charged hosts around 3 percent and guests between 6 and 12 percent, according to Xconomy's coverage.

Chesky would later point out the timing. Airbnb had been declared a billion-dollar company only weeks before the worst week of its young life.


Ransackgate

In late June 2011, a San Francisco host known only as EJ blogged about returning to find her home ransacked after renting it to a guest through Airbnb. At first the story moved slowly. Then it went viral.

By Chesky's account on Sequoia's podcast, the hashtag #ransackgate trended on Twitter for several days until it was replaced by another one, #RIPAirbnb. People were predicting the company's death. Chesky says he did not blame them. Airbnb had no good answer to the obvious question of what happens when a stranger trashes your home.

The company's first response, by his own admission, was inadequate. Critics felt Airbnb was not acknowledging a basic weakness in its model. Part of why the reaction was so harsh, Chesky argues, was the timing: the billion-dollar headlines had landed weeks earlier, so people expected a mature multinational. In reality, the company had until recently been running out of a three-bedroom apartment.

The apology and the guarantee

On August 1, 2011, Chesky published a letter. TechCrunch's coverage captures the substance. Airbnb apologized to EJ, admitted it had not been prepared for the crisis, and launched a $50,000 Host Guarantee against property damage. The letter also said a suspect was in custody.

Chesky has described how he approached the decision. He set aside the usual crisis playbook, which tells executives to avoid apologizing because of liability, and asked what the principled thing to do was. The guarantee was meant to restore confidence, and he decided to make it retroactive.

Here is the part you should read with a raised eyebrow. Chesky says the original plan was a $5,000 guarantee, and that Marc Andreessen, who had just led the funding round, read the draft and suggested adding a zero. It is a wonderful story. It is also a single-source story, told by Chesky. What is documented is the $50,000 figure. In May 2012, Airbnb expanded the protection into a $1 million Host Guarantee.

Chesky is also candid that he cannot say whether the guarantee drove growth or merely coincided with it. In a 2026 interview, he called the episode the moment that turned him into a real CEO.


The Berlin Clone and the Missionary Speech

Almost at the same moment, a different threat arrived from Europe.

Chesky's telling, again from the Sequoia podcast, goes like this. Investors had warned him about the Samwer brothers, a pair of German entrepreneurs known for cloning successful American startups. Their Citydeal had copied Groupon so effectively that Groupon ended up buying it. One day Airbnb noticed unusual scraping of its data and odd messages going to its hosts, inviting them to list on a site called Wimdu. Wimdu, based in Berlin, was a clone of Airbnb.

The funding was real. In June 2011, Wimdu raised $90 million from Kinnevik and Rocket Internet, the Samwers' company. (Chesky recalls the figure as around $100 million, and says Wimdu hired about 400 people in 30 days. Those details are his memory, so I would not lean on them.)

Then the Samwers invited the founders to Berlin. Greg McAdoo of Sequoia traveled with Chesky, Gebbia, and Blecharczyk. Chesky says the office was a converted factory with hundreds of people sitting elbow to elbow, many with two monitors, Airbnb on one screen and Wimdu on the other. He recalls Oliver Samwer telling them the Americans were the innovators and the Germans were the executors, and that they were going to copy Airbnb and out-execute it.

The implicit offer was to buy them or be crushed.

Why they said no

Chesky decided against an acquisition. He worried it would import a mercenary culture into a mission-driven company. He told his team the contest was a war, and that in a fight between missionaries and mercenaries, the missionaries always win.

Then he did something unusual for a CEO: he made himself head of international. Airbnb hired around a dozen country managers, built a playbook for each market, localized the product, and held community meetups. Chesky has called the localization effort probably the biggest return on investment the company ever made. Airbnb's own timeline notes that it opened a German office in summer 2011, and Wikipedia lists London as its first international office, in October 2011.

The outcome supports his bet. Wimdu pulled back from its international offices in 2012, and Rocket Internet reportedly explored selling it the following year. In late 2018, after about seven years, Wimdu shut down, affecting roughly 100 employees in Berlin and Lisbon. Its own statement cited "significant financial and business challenges."

Sequoia's Alfred Lin recalls a day when the team realized most of the business was now coming from Europe, a long way from a three-person company in San Francisco.


A Logo Everyone Hated (For a While)

In July 2014, Airbnb replaced its blue, bubbly wordmark with something new. The London agency DesignStudio had built the identity, and the centerpiece was a symbol the company called the Bélo, pitched as a universal symbol of belonging. The design is meant to read as a heart, a location pin, a person with arms raised, and the letter A at once.

The internet reacted instantly and unkindly. Designers pointed out that it resembled the logo of another company, and social media compared it to just about everything that a family-friendly travel brand would prefer not to be compared to. Dezeen's coverage shows how heated it got.

Airbnb stuck with it and launched a campaign that invited users to draw their own versions. More than a decade on, Creative Bloq notes that the Bélo is still in use, still looks contemporary, and survived a 2025 app redesign untouched. The old blue wordmark, by comparison, now looks like an early-internet artifact.


Beyond the Spare Room, 2013 to 2019

The middle years are where Airbnb stopped being a clever website and started becoming an institution, with all the complications that implies. A few milestones from the company's own records:

  • June 2013: Airbnb opens its 888 Brannan Street headquarters, a few blocks from its first Rausch Street listing.
  • June 2014: During the Rio World Cup, hosts welcome more than 100,000 guests in three weeks.
  • 2016: After reports that some hosts rejected guests with distinctively Black names, Airbnb hired former Attorney General Eric Holder to help craft an anti-discrimination policy. In November, it launched Trips (later Experiences), starting with 500 experiences in 12 cities.
  • February 2017: Airbnb aired its #weaccept Super Bowl ad in protest of the US travel ban, and bought the luxury villa company Luxury Retreats.
  • March 2019: It agreed to buy HotelTonight, reportedly for about $400 million.
  • November 2019: A nine-year partnership with the International Olympic Committee.

By early 2019, the company projected more than 500 million guest arrivals since its founding. AP described it as valued at $31 billion heading into 2020.

The hike in Bolinas

Success had a cost, and Chesky says he noticed it before the pandemic. In late 2019 he went on a hike in Bolinas, California, with Gebbia and Blecharczyk and told them the company was successful but was not the company he had meant to build. As he recounts it, growth was slowing, costs were rising, bureaucracy was growing, and the company was spending about a billion dollars on fairly soulless performance marketing while drifting toward hotels and property managers, away from the original idea. He met with his executive team just after New Year's 2020 to say big changes were needed, though he did not know how to do them with an IPO looming.

Then the world gave him a reason.


Eight Weeks That Deleted the Plan

Chesky says that within about eight weeks of the pandemic taking hold in early 2020, Airbnb lost 80 percent of its business. The IPO that bankers had been polishing was suddenly a fantasy. Headlines were asking whether this was the end of Airbnb.

The company moved on several fronts at once. Marketing stopped overnight. Executive pay was cut. Projects were punted. And then came the problem unique to a two-sided marketplace: guests wanted refunds for trips they could not take, and hosts wanted to be paid.

Airbnb overrode its hosts' cancellation policies and refunded guests. AP reported that the decision angered many hosts, who were hurting too. The company later set aside $250 million to compensate them for some of those losses.

Borrowing at a hard price

Cash was the next problem. On April 6, 2020, Airbnb announced a $1 billion investment in debt and equity from Silver Lake and Sixth Street Partners. Reporting at the time put the effective valuation at $18 billion, well below the $31 billion of its previous round. A week later, it raised a second billion at around 9 percent interest.

The first loan was the expensive one, with an interest rate of at least 11 percent, according to Bloomberg. Ellie Mertz, then a vice president of finance and now Airbnb's CFO, has described the cost as the price of solvency during a moment when the company could see insolvency ahead.

Attached to that loan were warrants to buy about 7.9 million shares at an initial price of $28.355, according to Airbnb's 10-K for 2020. Hold onto that number.

May 5

On May 5, 2020, Chesky sent employees a letter. He wrote that the company was living through "the most harrowing crisis of our lifetime" and confirmed that nearly 1,900 of Airbnb's 7,500 employees, about a quarter, would be let go.

The letter did something rare. It laid out the logic and the terms in detail: 14 weeks of base pay plus a week per year of tenure for US employees, a year of health coverage, equity vesting for even the newest hires, and an internal alumni placement team that would draw on the recruiting group. It also paused Transportation and Airbnb Studios and scaled back investment in Hotels and Luxe.

File that last detail away, too. It becomes funnier in 2026.

By the second quarter, revenue had fallen 72 percent to about $335 million, with a loss of $575.6 million.

The Memorial Day surprise

Then something odd happened. Around Memorial Day weekend, Chesky says, people started booking again. They were not flying to cities. They were driving a tank of gas away from home to rent houses in small towns and rural areas. Airbnb pivoted toward longer stays and non-urban destinations, and before long nearly a quarter of nights booked were for stays of a month or more.

It was not a full recovery. It was enough to restart the IPO conversation.


The Zoom IPO

The bankers who had told Chesky to forget about the filing now suggested dusting it off. There was one problem, as he tells it: the document described a business that no longer existed, so it had to be rewritten almost from scratch in a matter of weeks. Chesky says he wrote about 14,000 words of it himself. That is his own count, and he says a banker told him he was unusually hands-on for a CEO.

Airbnb filed publicly on November 16. Its S-1 amendment went in on December 7. The roadshow took place over video, and Chesky says the early reception was tepid, because the narrative that Airbnb was going under was out of date. Showing investors the rebound data changed the conversation.

On December 9, Airbnb priced 50 million shares at $68, above its already raised range of $56 to $60, valuing it at about $47 billion. The next morning, the stock opened at $148 and climbed toward $160. Mertz recalled that her team had expected a good day, with the range already roughly double the price of the spring warrants. When the first trade crossed the wire above $140, she said, the entire call was dumbfounded.

Chesky heard the news live on Bloomberg, when the interviewer told him the company's value had just doubled. By his account, his eyebrows went to the back of his head. 🔔

The twist with the warrants

Remember those expensive loan warrants with the $28.355 strike price? By the end of 2020, the 10-K says they were worth about $985 million, an increase of $868.5 million since April. Bloomberg reported the two lenders had roughly doubled their money within days.

The IPO also produced an odd accounting result. Airbnb's fourth-quarter results show revenue of $859 million, down 22 percent, and a $2.8 billion non-cash stock compensation charge triggered by going public. The first quarter of Airbnb's public life was, on paper, a very large loss.

One more governance detail: public shareholders got Class A shares with one vote each, while the founders and some officials kept Class B shares with 20 votes each.


After the Bell, 2021 to 2024

The post-IPO years were less cinematic and more complicated.

Airbnb launched Airbnb.org as a nonprofit for housing people in crisis in December 2020. In 2022, it adopted a policy letting employees live and work anywhere, and its May 2022 release was billed as the biggest change to Airbnb in a decade, with categories, split stays, and AirCover for guests.

Ukraine

On February 28, 2022, Airbnb and Airbnb.org announced free short-term housing for up to 100,000 refugees fleeing Ukraine. The three founders personally pledged to match up to $10 million in donations. Days later, Chesky announced that Airbnb was suspending operations in Russia and Belarus.

A founder steps back

In July 2022, Gebbia announced he was stepping back from his full-time operating role while staying on the board. He had led the in-house design studio Samara and chaired Airbnb.org, and he was the first of the three founders to step away. TechCrunch noted that he had helped originate the idea of offering free professional photography to hosts.

The story of the three-person founding team has taken a different path since. In April 2025, Skift reported that Gebbia left the Airbnb.org board. In August 2025, he became the first Chief Design Officer of the United States, leading the National Design Studio. Airbnb said he joined the government effort in his personal capacity and has had no operating role at the company since July 2022. He remains a shareholder and board member.

The regulation problem

Cities had always had opinions about Airbnb, and in 2023 New York City delivered the sharpest one. Local Law 18, passed in January 2022, requires hosts to register and prevents platforms from processing bookings for unregistered listings. Enforcement began on September 5, 2023. Airbnb and some hosts sued to stop it, and those suits were dismissed. Listings fell from more than 22,000 in August 2023 to below 5,000 by the following spring.

It is a long way from the Craigslist era, when the system tolerated whatever worked.


2025 to 2026: Airbnb Tries to Become the Whole Trip

On May 13, 2025, Chesky stood on a stage in Los Angeles and announced Airbnb Services, a relaunch of Experiences, and a rebuilt app. Services launched with ten categories in 260 cities, including private chefs and photographers. Chesky said that more than two billion guests later, Airbnb had become synonymous with a place to stay, and that it was now changing travel again. The app, the company said, had been designed since 2010 to do one thing: book a home. Now it would book much more.

The financial backdrop was solid rather than spectacular. For all of 2025, Airbnb reported $12.2 billion in revenue, up 10 percent, and $2.5 billion in net income, with 533 million nights and seats booked. Compare that with the $674 million loss in 2019, as reported by Fortune when the IPO filing went public.

May 20, 2026

A year later came the sequel. On May 20, 2026, Chesky unveiled the company's 2026 Summer Release in San Francisco: more than 220 updates, including car rentals, grocery delivery, airport pickups, luggage storage, boutique hotels in 20 destinations, and World Cup experiences.

Remember the hotels that Chesky scaled back in the May 2020 layoff letter? They are back. Chesky told CNBC he envisions Airbnb becoming an "Amazon for services" for travel and living, with potentially hundreds of categories. Skift's verdict was that Airbnb increasingly looks like a full-service online travel agency.

The latest numbers

The results so far have been encouraging. First-quarter 2026 revenue rose 18 percent to $2.7 billion. On November 5, Airbnb reported third-quarter revenue of $4.87 billion, up 19 percent, its fastest growth in more than three years, along with net income of about $1.89 billion and 155 million nights and seats booked. It also authorized a new $12 billion share buyback and said it plans to launch its own AI travel agent in the first half of 2027, according to coverage of the call.

What is still unproven

Two honest caveats. Analysts reading the letter noted that hotels remain only a single-digit percentage of total nights booked, and the company still gives no revenue figures for its new service lines. And the central strategic question is open: can Airbnb become a broad travel platform without losing what made it distinctive? Chesky resisted exactly this temptation early on, saying he did not want to spend his life building a hotel booking site. He has now changed his mind, with a reason: sometimes, he says, a hotel really is the better option.

Whether that is evolution or drift is the question the next few years will answer.


What the Story Teaches

Most startup lessons from Airbnb are recycled so heavily that they have gone smooth. Here are the ones that survive contact with the evidence.

The first weekend proved the experience, not the market

The air mattress weekend showed that hosting could be delightful. It did not show that anyone would use a website to do it. Graham makes this point himself: the founders kept going because they had glimpsed something new, but they also knew people would only see it if they tried it. The next two years were spent getting people to try it.

The "unscalable" work taught them more than it earned

The New York trip is usually told as a photography hack. Graham's version emphasizes something else: it taught the founders who their hosts were, and that many were in the same financial spot they had been. A tactic that cannot scale can still be a research method.

Investors miss categories, not just companies

Wilson's own post-mortem is the most useful artifact in the whole story. He was not wrong about the team. He could not picture the category. Founders in new categories should expect to be understood last by the people who invest in the old ones.

A crisis response is only as good as the capital behind it

Chesky's principled-apology story is a good one, and I believe the broad outline. But note that the $50,000 guarantee came about a week after a $112 million round. A promise that large is easier to make with fresh money, and the same logic held in 2020, when raising billions let Airbnb pay hosts and guests.

The founding story is also a branding asset

The cereal box worked twice: once as cash, and again as the story that got the founders into Y Combinator. Airbnb has been telling the air mattress story ever since, and it is part of why the brand feels human. It is also why a careful reader should check which parts come from documents and which from memory.

Strategy can reverse

In 2020, Chesky cut hotels and returned to the home-sharing core. In 2026, he is adding boutique hotels and car rentals. Both decisions were presented as obvious. The lesson is not that one was wrong. It is that strategic clarity often looks different from the outside than from the inside, and that it expires.


How Solid Is the Legend?

Here is a quick guide to how well the best-known claims hold up. 🧐

Claim How solid Where it comes from
First guests in October 2007 Solid Airbnb's own timeline
$80 a night Founders' memory Retellings, no document found
SXSW 2008: two bookings, one by Chesky Solid Airbnb's official timeline
DNC 2008: 80 bookings Company figure, others say about 100 Airbnb timeline, other retellings
Cereal raised about $30,000 Chesky's own figure Fortune, Stanford interview
Number of cereal boxes Disputed (500, 800, or 1,000) TechCrunch, Wikipedia, Chesky
Graham called them "cockroaches" Founder lore Chesky's retellings
Photos doubled revenue ($200 to $400 a week) Gebbia's recollection First Round Review
Craigslist integration mechanics Outside analysis Andrew Chen, 2012
Fred Wilson passed on the deal Solid Published emails and his own post
Andreessen added a zero to the guarantee Single-source Chesky
$50,000 Host Guarantee in August 2011 Solid TechCrunch, Airbnb letter
IPO priced at $68, opened above $140 Solid SEC filings, Fortune, Bloomberg

The Part Nobody Plans

Airbnb's own timeline contains a small, perfect detail. In 2013, the company opened its new headquarters at 888 Brannan Street. The company notes that it is only a few blocks from the first listing on Rausch Street. 🏠

That is the odd shape of the whole story. A $1,150 rent problem and a company with more than $12 billion in annual revenue sit a short walk apart on the same San Francisco map. Everything between is a series of decisions that looked either brilliant or stupid and were usually both: shipping a site that got two bookings, selling cereal for rent money, photographing strangers' apartments, hacking Craigslist, apologizing instead of lawyering, refusing to buy a clone, borrowing at 11 percent, and then, in 2026, reversing earlier choices because the situation had changed.

What stands out most is not the genius, which is overstated, but the stubbornness. The founders were not sure they were right. They had a binder of maxed-out credit cards that said they might be wrong. What they had was a weekend with three guests, a sense that it meant something, and a willingness to keep checking.

The unfinished part is the current bet. If Airbnb really can become the place you go for the home, the car, the dinner, and the guide, it will have done something bigger than any air mattress. If it cannot, the 2007 idea will still be the one people remember. For now, the company is growing and profitable. The story is still being written, and given this company's track record, the next surprise is probably not the one anyone is predicting.


The hardest part of this post? Making all those GIFs. 😭

Haaaaaaaa, bro, I'm finally going to sleep! The Airbnb story itself took quite some time to put together, but creating all those GIFs was a whole different challenge.

Turns out, telling the Airbnb story was easier than animating it. 😂























Top comments (3)

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pjdeveloper896 profile image
Prasoon Jadon The Startup Café •

Bro, maybe our minds are connected because I was literally thinking about Airbnb too 😂

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hanzla profile image
Hanzla Baig The Startup Café •

I think the same too 😂

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pjdeveloper896 profile image
Prasoon Jadon The Startup Café •

😂😂