Threat intel firm Hunt.io uncovered a campaign that compromised 3,562 internet-exposed Redis servers — and the attackers didn't need an exploit, a CVE, or a zero-day. They just found servers with no password set.
The Attack Chain
This abuses a completely legitimate Redis feature: master-replica replication.
-
Scan for Redis instances with no
requirepassandprotected-modedisabled -
Redirect the working directory and filename using
CONFIG SET -
Force a rogue sync via
SLAVEOF/REPLICAOF, pulling a crafted RDB file from an attacker-controlled host -
Persistence: that RDB file lands as a valid cron entry (commonly
/etc/cron.d/redis-miner) - Deploy: cron fetches XMRig and starts mining Monero over port 443, disguised as normal TLS traffic
Affected servers ran versions 2.8.17 to 7.2.0 — an 8-year spread confirming this is a configuration issue, not a patching one.
Why It's More Than "Just a Miner"
- Data integrity risk — the same file-write mechanism can corrupt RDB backups
- Foothold potential — any technique that writes arbitrary files via replication could drop SSH keys or a web shell instead
Check Yourself Right Now
redis-cli -h <host> CONFIG GET requirepass
An empty result means you're exposed.
Quick Hardening Checklist
- Never expose Redis directly to the internet — bind to localhost/private VPC
- Set
requirepassor use Redis 6+ ACLs - Keep
protected-modeenabled - Rename/disable
SLAVEOF/REPLICAOFif replication isn't used - Restrict
CONFIGcommand access to admin accounts only - Audit cron directories on a schedule, not just during IR
Full breakdown, IOCs, and detection commands for SOC teams:
🔗 https://www.xpert4cyber.com/2026/09/redis-servers-hacked-crypto-mining.html
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