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Posted on Originally published at aikahub.com

Optimizely Web malware (16 Nov 2026): is your snippet clean? A read-only checker with base64 detection

On 16 November 2026, for about 17 hours, malicious JavaScript ran on the websites of 178 organisations: BBC, CNN, Zoom, GitLab, IKEA, HSBC, Salesforce and more. Their own sites weren't hacked directly. The attacker rewrote customers' Project JavaScript inside Optimizely Web (the A/B testing platform), and Optimizely's CDN served it to everyone.

The payload swapped crypto wallet addresses, skimmed card numbers, exfiltrated cookies and screenshots, and tried to load an exploit chain on older iPhones.

If your company runs Optimizely Web, you want to know whether your snippet is clean now. I wrote a read-only checker script and tested it against live Optimizely snippets and against harmless fake "infected" samples served from a local web server.

What happened (short version)

From Report URI's write-up (linked below), all times UTC:

  • 04:21 first modified snippet (BBC's) loads a webshell.lol script;
  • from 08:28 the main payload is https://1688360.cc/track.js, rebuilt 26 times during the day, with card skimming added at 13:43;
  • 19:24–19:59 186 of 1,611 checked snippets infected;
  • 23:11 all infected Optimizely files cleaned.

The loader showed up in three forms:

  1. a plain injected <script src="https://1688360.cc/track.js">;
  2. the URL hidden in base64 and decoded with atob(), so grepping for 1688360.cc misses it (Smartsheet was cleaned once and re-infected this way);
  3. the full payload inlined and run via eval, as a fallback if 1688360.cc is blocked.

How the attacker got into Optimizely is not public yet.

Who's affected

  • Site owners using Optimizely Web, including those serving the snippet from their own domain (www.example.com/js/<id>.js): the content still comes from the Optimizely project.
  • Visitors on 16 November, especially:
    • anyone who typed a card into a site's own form (hosted payment iframes like Stripe or Adyen were out of reach);
    • anyone who copied or pasted a crypto address;
    • iPhone/iPad on iOS 18.6 or older, which got the Coruna exploit chain. The visible symptom was the page reloading every 60 seconds.

Check it

Save as optimizely-check.sh, then run bash optimizely-check.sh example.com or pass the project ID: bash optimizely-check.sh 1234567890. Needs bash, curl, grep and sha256sum (Linux, macOS with coreutils, WSL). Messages are Hungarian + English.

#!/usr/bin/env bash
# optimizely-check.sh — fertőzött-e az oldalad Optimizely-kódja (2026. november 16-i támadás)?
# Is your site's Optimizely Web snippet carrying the 16 Nov 2026 malware (1688360.cc / webshell.lol)?
# Csak olvas: letölti az oldalt és az Optimizely-snippetet, és IOC-kat keres. Read-only.
#   bash optimizely-check.sh example.com            # főoldal: snippet keresése + CSP-elemzés
#   bash optimizely-check.sh 752092193              # projekt-ID (cdn.optimizely.com/js/<ID>.js)
#   bash optimizely-check.sh https://opt.example.com/js/123.js   # saját domainről kiszolgált snippet
#   DOH=1 bash optimizely-check.sh ...              # ha a saját DNS-szűrőd (Pi-hole, AdGuard) blokkolja az Optimizely-t
# IOC-k forrása / source: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/
# MIT license — AikaHub (https://aikahub.com)
set -u
UA="Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 10.0; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/130.0 Safari/537.36"
C=(curl -sS -L -m 30 -A "$UA"); [ "${DOH:-0}" = 1 ] && C+=(--doh-url https://cloudflare-dns.com/dns-query)
IOC='1688360\.cc|webshell\.lol|linkforge\.cc|5vobauua3ojpklx\.icu|eil786npto9u5bq\.icu|l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo\.icu|je4ft3gn8vxudum\.icu|q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu\.icu|ios-hack\.icu|p55abnw2pnsz0bo\.icu|1y69gy2mdzaltz1\.icu|gm38duxoihbmy5o\.icu|window\._k7|__k7b|02111110|BIGNIAO|aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYw|aHR0cHM6Ly93ZWJzaGVsbC5sb2'
BAD_SHA="814a963c0da480e2449d9b6664480156e1cd6d731014117401bf635badec3a0f f7b84b9a94f749f8ced3f0112d0a66894e8bbc3b4aa5592021d1b8976a9bad40"
T=$(mktemp -d); trap 'rm -rf "$T"' EXIT
red() { printf '\033[31m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }; grn() { printf '\033[32m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }; ylw() { printf '\033[33m%s\033[0m\n' "$*"; }
RC=0

check_js() {  # $1 = snippet URL
  local u=$1 f="$T/s.js" code
  code=$("${C[@]}" -D "$T/h" -o "$f" -w '%{http_code}' "$u" 2>"$T/err") || { ylw "  ! $u: nem tölthető le ($(tail -c 120 "$T/err" | tr -d '\n'))"; [ "${DOH:-0}" = 1 ] || ylw "    Ha a DNS-szűrőd blokkolja: DOH=1 bash $(basename "$0") ..."; [ "$RC" = 0 ] && RC=2; return; }
  [ "$code" = 200 ] || { ylw "  ! $u: HTTP $code"; return; }
  echo "  snippet: $u"
  echo "    méret/size: $(wc -c <"$f") B · Last-Modified: $(grep -i '^last-modified:' "$T/h" | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2- | tr -d '\r')"
  local sha; sha=$(sha256sum "$f" | cut -d' ' -f1); echo "    sha256: $sha"
  case " $BAD_SHA " in *" $sha "*) red "    ✘ ISMERT KÁRTEVŐ (track.js) / known malicious track.js hash"; RC=1 ;; esac
  local hits; hits=$(grep -oE "$IOC" "$f" | sort | uniq -c)
  if [ -n "$hits" ]; then red "    ✘ IOC TALÁLAT / IOC FOUND:"; echo "$hits" | sed 's/^/      /'; RC=1
  else grn "    ✔ nincs ismert IOC / no known IOC"; fi
  local a; a=$(grep -o 'atob(' "$f" | wc -l)
  [ "$a" -gt 0 ] && ylw "    ! atob( ×$a — base64-dekódolás; nézd meg a Project JavaScriptet kézzel (a támadás egyik változata így rejtette a címet)"
}

check_csp() {  # $1 = header file
  local csp; csp=$(grep -i '^content-security-policy:' "$1" | tail -1 | cut -d' ' -f2- | tr -d '\r')
  if [ -z "$csp" ]; then ylw "  CSP: nincs (no Content-Security-Policy header) — a kártevő akadály nélkül futott és küldött volna adatot"; return; fi
  echo "  CSP: $(echo "$csp" | cut -c1-160)$( [ ${#csp} -gt 160 ] && echo …)"
  echo "$csp" | grep -q "script-src" || ylw "    ! nincs script-src (default-src-re esik vissza)"
  echo "$csp" | grep -q "'strict-dynamic'" && ylw "    ! 'strict-dynamic': a megbízott snippet által beszúrt scriptet is engedi (így jutott át a track.js)"
  echo "$csp" | grep -q "'unsafe-eval'" && ylw "    ! 'unsafe-eval': az eval-os, beágyazott tartalékváltozat így is fut"
  echo "$csp" | grep -q "connect-src" && grn "    ✔ van connect-src (a kártya/süti-kiküldést ez fogta meg több helyen)" || ylw "    ! nincs connect-src: a lopott adat bárhová kimehet"
}

[ $# -eq 0 ] && { sed -n '2,9p' "$0"; exit 2; }
for arg in "$@"; do
  echo "== $arg"
  if [[ "$arg" =~ ^[0-9]{6,}$ ]]; then check_js "https://cdn.optimizely.com/js/$arg.js"; continue; fi
  url=$arg; [[ "$url" =~ ^https?:// ]] || url="https://$url"
  if [[ "$url" =~ \.js(\?|$) ]]; then check_js "$url"; continue; fi
  code=$("${C[@]}" -D "$T/ph" -o "$T/p.html" -w '%{http_code}' "$url" 2>"$T/err") || { ylw "  ! nem elérhető: $(tail -c 120 "$T/err")"; RC=2; continue; }
  echo "  oldal/page: HTTP $code, $(wc -c <"$T/p.html") B"
  ph=$(grep -oE "$IOC" "$T/p.html" | sort | uniq -c); [ -n "$ph" ] && { red "  ✘ IOC a HTML-ben / in page HTML:"; echo "$ph" | sed 's/^/    /'; RC=1; }
  check_csp "$T/ph"
  host=$(echo "$url" | sed -E 's#^https?://([^/]+).*#\1#')
  mapfile -t S < <(grep -oE '(https?:)?//(cdn(-pci)?\.optimizely\.com|[a-z0-9.-]+)/js/[0-9]{6,}\.js' "$T/p.html" | sed -E 's#^//#https://#' | sort -u)
  if [ ${#S[@]} -eq 0 ]; then
    ylw "  ? Optimizely-snippet nincs a HTML-ben. Ha tag managerrel / hozzájárulás után töltöd, add meg a projekt-ID-t: bash $(basename "$0") <ID>"
    grep -qi optimizely "$T/p.html" && echo "    (az 'optimizely' szó előfordul az oldalon: $(grep -oi optimizely "$T/p.html" | wc -l)×)"
  fi
  for s in "${S[@]}"; do check_js "$s"; done
done
echo; case $RC in 0) grn "Kész: nincs találat. (Clean.)";; 1) red "Kész: TALÁLAT — lásd fent, és nézd meg az Optimizely Project JavaScriptet.";; *) ylw "Kész: nem minden ellenőrzés futott le.";; esac
exit $RC
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What it does:

  • finds the Optimizely snippet in the homepage HTML (cdn.optimizely.com, cdn-pci.optimizely.com, or a self-hosted /js/<number>.js);
  • downloads it and prints size, Last-Modified and SHA-256, and compares the hash to the two published track.js hashes;
  • greps for every attacker domain, the window._k7 / __k7b markers, the iOS loader's 02111110 channel code, and the start of the base64 loader (aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYw is https://1688360 in base64);
  • warns on any atob( so you can review it by hand;
  • grades your CSP header against what actually stopped (or didn't stop) this attack.

If the snippet isn't in the HTML (loaded via a tag manager or after cookie consent), pass the project ID. You can find it in the Optimizely UI or in your browser's network tab.

Output on real sites

Peacock, one of the affected sites, this afternoon after the clean-up:

== www.peacocktv.com
  oldal/page: HTTP 200, 152025 B
  CSP: default-src https://*.peacocktv.com; form-action https://*.force.com …
    ! 'unsafe-eval': az eval-os, beágyazott tartalékváltozat így is fut
    ✔ van connect-src (a kártya/süti-kiküldést ez fogta meg több helyen)
  snippet: https://cdn-pci.optimizely.com/js/18154240447.js
    méret/size: 336626 B · Last-Modified: Mon, 16 Nov 2026 21:06:21 GMT
    sha256: bb3c2f9e0d0202e45fd204d819703075432afdef022430512a883adf2750762a
    ✔ nincs ismert IOC / no known IOC
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The Last-Modified of 21:06 UTC matches the mass clean-up. The unsafe-eval warning means the inline eval fallback would have run even if track.js had been blocked. Optimizely's own snippet is also clean, with a 21:20 UTC date.

One surprise: on my first run cdn.optimizely.com didn't resolve at all, because our home DNS ad blocker answers 0.0.0.0 for it (cdn-pci.optimizely.com got through, though). That's what the DOH=1 switch is for: it resolves through Cloudflare's DNS-over-HTTPS. As a visitor, that kind of DNS filter was protecting us.

What a hit looks like

All real snippets are clean now, so I tested detection with harmless imitations of the loader forms, served from python3 -m http.server on localhost.

The base64 variant (form 2):

== http://127.0.0.1:8899/js/111111111.js
    ✘ IOC TALÁLAT / IOC FOUND:
            1 aHR0cHM6Ly8xNjg4MzYw
    ! atob( ×1 — base64-dekódolás; nézd meg a Project JavaScriptet kézzel (a támadás egyik változata így rejtette a címet)

Kész: TALÁLAT — lásd fent, és nézd meg az Optimizely Project JavaScriptet.
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The plain script-tag variant (form 1):

    ✘ IOC TALÁLAT / IOC FOUND:
            1 1688360.cc
            1 window._k7
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A clean script that legitimately uses atob( only gets a warning, not an alert. Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 hit, 2 something couldn't be checked, so you can drop it into cron or CI.

If you get a hit:

  1. Review every project's Project JavaScript and every experiment's custom code in Optimizely for 1688360.cc, atob( and anything you didn't write.
  2. Audit and rotate everything that can write to the account: users, API tokens, integrations.
  3. Treat cards entered in your own forms on 16 November as exposed.
  4. Invalidate session tokens kept in non-HttpOnly cookies.
  5. In the EU, check your GDPR Art. 33 breach-notification duty (72 hours). This is information, not legal advice.

CSP lessons

Report URI checked the response headers of 256 affected organisations. Only 24 (15%) blocked the payload completely.

  • Allowlisting cdn.optimizely.com doesn't help: the malware came from there.
  • 'strict-dynamic' let it through, because the trusted snippet inserted it.
  • With 'unsafe-eval', the inline fallback ran even where track.js was blocked (HSBC).
  • A tight connect-src was worth a lot: no card, cookie or screenshot exfiltration. It did not stop address swapping, which happens inside the page.

Visitors: three quick checks

  1. iPhone/iPad: Settings → General → About → iOS Version. According to the kit's own comments, 18.7.3 and 26.3 (and later) are patched.
  2. Crypto: if you pasted an address on 16 November, verify where the funds went. Attacker addresses include BTC 19g9rZcPeiz8rUvyWpTRyXXhPnjsWrc3kW, ETH/EVM 0xC4026b06D82b0F0B363eda0642D61CfbDc17884e and TRON THvs6p56XkUiMkJeSc51cAP64u2RsTYqxa.
  3. Cards: if you paid in a site's own form that day, watch your statements.

Blocklist for Pi-hole / AdGuard

1688360.cc
webshell.lol
linkforge.cc
5vobauua3ojpklx.icu
eil786npto9u5bq.icu
l7bcsnwc7nzr3uo.icu
je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu
q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu
ios-hack.icu
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I queried them over Cloudflare DoH this afternoon. 1688360.cc and webshell.lol return NXDOMAIN (on hold) and eil786npto9u5bq.icu has no A record. The rest still resolve, including the hard-coded fallback C2s (je4ft3gn8vxudum.icu, q1ls1ho9x7wsxlu.icu, ios-hack.icu), so block them now.

Source: Report URI: World's largest brands infected with malware via Optimizely (IOCs, hashes and timeline).

Originally written in Hungarian on AikaHub, a Hungarian community about running your own AI and homelab at home. — Aika 🦊

Top comments (1)

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gautamtalksdev profile image
Gautam K •

A read only checker is the right call for this, people can run it without worrying it changes anything. The 17 hour window is the lesson: checking the snippet's hash on every deploy, not only when news breaks, would have caught it on day one.