The extension half of us install on every relative's laptop "for safety" had a universal XSS. A website you visited could drive uBlock Origin's element picker, add a trusted filter of its own, and get JavaScript running on other sites, like your webmail or your GitHub session. One click anywhere on the attacker's page was enough.
The bug is fixed in uBlock Origin 1.75.4 and hardened further through 1.76.4. Whether your copy is fixed is a different question. In the Hacker News thread, several people found their uBO hadn't auto-updated. So here are the affected versions, where to check yours, how to force the update in Firefox, Chrome and Edge, and how the attack worked.
Which uBlock Origin and uBO Lite versions are vulnerable
From the GitHub security advisory GHSA-cmqw-9r2w-6wv2 (rated High, no CVE, published Nov 15, 2026) and the release notes:
| Product | Vulnerable | First fix | What I'd actually run |
|---|---|---|---|
| uBlock Origin (MV2: Firefox, and Chromium where you still have it) | 1.75.2 and lower | 1.75.4 (Nov 3) | 1.76.4 or later |
| uBO Lite (MV3: Chrome, Edge, etc.) | builds older than 2026.1110.1816 | 2026.1110.1816 (Nov 10) | 2026.1116.1650 or later |
I wouldn't stop at 1.75.4, because the fix came in layers. Per the uBO releases page:
-
1.75.2(Nov 2): stopped scriptlets from using potentially tainted XHR methods -
1.75.4(Nov 3): the picker only launches with a verified secret token -
1.76.0(Nov 8): validates the filter the picker is about to create, and blockswar:-related filters for now -
1.76.2(Nov 13): "Use canonical patch URL to prevent duplicate fetches" -
1.76.4(Nov 15): "Address remaining reported security issues", plus removal of the no-longer-usedwarOrigin/warSecret
The advisory says 1.75.4 closes the reported hole. The author kept shipping hardening for another twelve days after that, and the reporter speculated in the advisory that a page might win a race when uBO injects into a late-loading iframe, though they couldn't reproduce it consistently. The advisory may well be right about 1.75.4, but I still wouldn't sit on it when 1.76.4 is one click away. The 1.76.5 betas (Nov 16 and 17) go further and hide the DOM of overlay tools like the picker inside a shadow DOM.
uBO Lite had a "similar but less problematic issue", according to the researcher's writeup. Its fix shipped as "Valid secret required to launch interactive tool overlays" in 2026.1110.1816. The advisory itself only covers uBlock Origin, so that Lite version number comes from the release notes and HN commenters, not from the advisory.
How to check your uBlock Origin version
The quickest place to look, in every browser: open the uBO dashboard (click the uBO icon, then the gear) and go to the About tab. The version is right there.
Or from the browser's extension page:
- Firefox:
about:addons, then click uBlock Origin. The version is listed in the details. - Chrome:
chrome://extensions, find uBO / uBO Lite, click Details. - Edge:
edge://extensions, then Details under the extension.
How to force the update in Firefox, Chrome and Edge
Browsers update extensions on their own schedule, and in the HN thread more than one person was still on an old build after the fix was out.
Firefox desktop
about:addons, gear icon at the top, Check for Updates. One commenter said they had to update twice to get to 1.76.4, so check the version again afterwards. Another was still on 1.76.2 on Firefox Developer Edition after updating, which isn't vulnerable but isn't current either.
Chrome and Edge
Go to chrome://extensions or edge://extensions, switch on Developer mode (top right on Chrome, left sidebar on Edge), then click Update. That forces a check for every installed extension.
Firefox for Android
According to commenters, there's no manual update button. The workaround is to remove and reinstall uBO, which gets you the latest version but may wipe your custom settings. Back up first: Dashboard → Settings → Back up to file.
Check your custom filters if you were on a vulnerable build
An attack would leave a filter behind, so look at what's sitting in yours:
- Open the dashboard and go to My filters.
- Look for anything you don't remember adding, especially lines containing
##+js(and above alltrusted-scriptlets liketrusted-rpnt. - Delete anything suspicious and click Apply changes.
Per the researcher, changing your custom filters also triggers a recompile, which clears the "trusted" status that picker-created filters get. If you can't update right now, disable uBO on sites you don't trust, or don't use it on that machine until the store catches up. An afternoon without an ad blocker is less risky than running a vulnerable one.
How the uBlock Origin XSS worked
The writeup by Smitty van Bodegom (iter.ca/post/ubo-uxss) is short and worth reading in full. The chain, simplified:
1. Leak the extension's secret URL
On Firefox, extension pages live at moz-extension://<random-per-install-UUID>/.... That UUID is supposed to stay secret. But one of uBO's default filters, lootdest.*##+js(no-fetch-if, adsbygoogle, war:googlesyndication_adsbygoogle.js), answers a blocked fetch by pulling a replacement script from the extension over XHR, and that XHR runs through the page's own XMLHttpRequest. So the attacker hooks XMLHttpRequest.prototype.open, calls fetch('/adsbygoogle.js') to trip the filter, and reads the UUID straight out of the URL. On MV2 Chromium the same hook also exposed the long WAR secret, per the advisory.
I find it a little funny that an anti-adblock countermeasure handed over the key. The researcher notes this one filter isn't the only way the UUID could leak.
2. Iframe the picker
With the UUID in hand, the page embeds moz-extension://<UUID>/web_accessible_resources/epicker-ui.html in an iframe.
3. Talk to it
The picker accepted messages from any page, not just from uBO's own content script. That's the root cause. Over a MessageChannel, the attacker sends epickerStart, gets a start reply, then sends showDialog and resultsetDetails, which enables the Create button and sets opt.
4. Smuggle in a scriptlet with a newline
The opt field normally carries a request type such as image, which gets appended to the filter after a $. Nobody stripped newlines. So the attacker sends something like:
"image\ngoogle.com##+js(trusted-rpnt, script, ...)"
That newline turns one harmless network filter into two lines, and the second one is a trusted scriptlet that rewrites script content on google.com.
5. Get one click
Filters created through the picker are treated as trusted until the next recompile. The researcher points out the page could set the picker iframe to opacity: 0 or overlay content on it so the victim's click lands on "Create". They didn't build that part, but the advisory quotes the report: the site only needs the user "to click anywhere".
The fix in 1.75.4 is the obvious one in hindsight: the real content script hands the picker a secret, and the picker refuses to start without it.
My take
This was a nasty bug that got handled well. The token fix shipped on Nov 3, the hardening kept coming for two weeks, and the advisory went out the same day as 1.76.4. gorhill doesn't owe anyone that turnaround for a free project, and it's faster than plenty of companies with a security team manage.
The architecture bothers me more. The picker lives inside the page, so a privileged UI sits in hostile territory and relies on secrets the page has more than one way to sniff. On HN people argued about moving it into browser chrome or the sidebar, or hiding it behind a closed shadow DOM the way password managers do, with others replying that shadow DOM isn't a security boundary. uBO's own 1.76.5 betas went the shadow DOM route. I expect more bugs like this from other extensions with in-page UI. AdNauseam, a uBO fork, was affected too and has picked up the fix in its latest release, according to a commenter who compared the commits.
The other fight in the thread: the researcher openly wrote that GPT-5.6 Sol did most of the work of finding the issue and Claude wrote most of the PoC, while they verified it and wrote the post. At least one reader flagged the submission for that. I'd rather see this kind of bug found by someone who reports it to gorhill than by someone who doesn't.
So, how many extensions have you granted "read and change all your data on all websites"? Could you name the developer behind each one without looking it up? Did this one change how you think about that list, or is uBO still the one extension you'd never uninstall?
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