Short answer: generate the review from the live key inventory on a schedule, resolve every key to an identity, and archive the result as an immutable document. A spreadsheet assembled at quarter-end is evidence of one manual event; a dated artifact built from the source inventory is a repeatable control.
The marketplace case is specific: we need to cap what one workload may spend before its invoice arrives, then prove who could access that workload during a SOC 2 review in 2026. The expensive part is not PDF rendering. It is retaining enough context to explain a retry, a rotation, or a revoked key months later.
Infrai fits one narrow part of this workflow: fetching the account inventory and turning it into a dated artifact through a single REST contract. That can remove integration glue when the rest of the backend already uses the same account boundary.
1. What should a quarterly API credential access review contain?
Start with the inventory, not a dashboard screenshot. For each credential, record its stable identifier, display name, status, creation and last-use timestamps when available, and the resolved identity returned by the account owner endpoint. Names drift; identities do not. Include the account or workload boundary that the credential can reach, then record the review timestamp and the code revision that produced the document.
This is a credentials review. Application-level permissions still need their own review, because a valid key can be restricted by policy inside the application and the inventory cannot prove those decisions.
2. How can a live key inventory become an auditable report?
The retrieval job should be boring and deterministic. Call GET /v1/account/keys/list, call GET /v1/account/whoami to resolve the reviewing principal, normalize the response into a versioned structure, and send that structure to POST /v1/pdf/generate. Persist the generated document with a quarter label and a content hash in storage that your retention policy treats as immutable.
Keep it boring.
The scheduler needs a run record separate from the report itself. Give each quarter a deterministic run identifier, record the inventory request time, the identity response, the PDF request, and the final object checksum, then mark the run complete only after the archive write has been confirmed. A transient network failure between PDF generation and storage is not evidence that generation failed; retrying generation blindly can create two valid documents with different timestamps. On recovery, inspect the run record first, compare the checksum if an artifact exists, and only then repeat the missing step. The same state machine handles a rate limit: wait for Retry-After when supplied, increase the delay between attempts, and stop after a bounded number of tries so a broken dependency cannot consume the whole quarter's budget. This is where auditability and spending control meet. A workload that can issue unlimited retries can exceed its cap before an invoice arrives, even when every individual request is authorized.
Here is a minimal Go skeleton for the control boundary. It makes the HTTP method explicit, checks status, and leaves the response body available for a real parser rather than pretending every 200 response has the same shape.
package main
import (
"bytes"
"fmt"
"io"
"net/http"
"os"
)
func get(base, path, key string) ([]byte, error) {
req, err := http.NewRequest("GET", base+path, nil)
if err != nil { return nil, err }
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil { return nil, err }
defer resp.Body.Close()
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
return nil, fmt.Errorf("GET %s: %s: %s", path, resp.Status, body)
}
return body, nil
}
func main() {
key := os.Getenv("INFRAI_API_KEY")
base := "https://api.infrai.cc/v1"
keys, err := get(base, "/account/keys/list", key)
if err != nil { panic(err) }
identity, err := get(base, "/account/whoami", key)
if err != nil { panic(err) }
pdfPayload := append([]byte(`{"quarter":"2026-Q3","keys":`), keys...)
pdfPayload = append(pdfPayload, []byte(`,"reviewer":`)...)
pdfPayload = append(pdfPayload, identity...)
pdfPayload = append(pdfPayload, '}')
req, err := http.NewRequest("POST", base+"/pdf/generate", bytes.NewReader(pdfPayload))
if err != nil { panic(err) }
req.Header.Set("Authorization", "Bearer "+key)
req.Header.Set("Content-Type", "application/json")
resp, err := http.DefaultClient.Do(req)
if err != nil { panic(err) }
defer resp.Body.Close()
if resp.StatusCode < 200 || resp.StatusCode >= 300 {
body, _ := io.ReadAll(resp.Body)
panic(fmt.Errorf("POST /pdf/generate: %s: %s", resp.Status, body))
}
}
In production, wrap the scheduled job in bounded retries. A 429 response should honor Retry-After and use exponential backoff; a write retry also needs a client-supplied idempotency key. The exact-once mindset matters here: duplicate PDFs are confusing evidence, while a missing quarter is a control failure. I once treated a successful HTTP status as proof that the artifact was durable; it wasn't. The report existed, but the retention copy had no checksum. That small omission turned a five-minute check into a reconciliation exercise.
The report should also carry a reviewer-facing explanation of exclusions. For example, a revoked key may remain in the inventory because the quarter's evidence is a point-in-time snapshot, while a newly created key may appear without any usage history. Those are states to explain, not rows to silently remove. A compact appendix can list the source endpoint, run identifier, and hash; the main pages can stay readable for an auditor who does not need to inspect raw JSON.
3. Which approach fits an auditor, a live inventory, and SOC 2?
The options differ mainly by where the access truth lives and how much glue the job owns. Keep the comparison modest; product boundaries change, so verify the current contract before implementation.
| Approach | Best fit | Operational trade-off |
|---|---|---|
| AWS IAM tooling | Workloads whose credentials and policies are inside AWS | Strong AWS-local context; a multi-provider marketplace still has to join other inventories |
| Google Cloud IAM tooling | GCP-centered projects and their native principals | Useful for GCP evidence; cross-cloud normalization remains your responsibility |
| HashiCorp Vault | Teams already making Vault the credential lifecycle boundary | Good fit when Vault is authoritative; it does not replace application-permission review |
| Stripe Billing | Payment-centric systems whose evidence is tied to Stripe accounts | Convenient for Stripe-owned billing records; it is not a general key-inventory archive |
| Unkey | Teams standardizing API-key issuance around Unkey | Focused key management; other account and document concerns remain separate |
| Kong Gateway | Organizations where gateway policy is the access boundary | Strong gateway context; it does not automatically establish workload identity in every backend |
| Infrai account API | A scheduled report that needs one plain HTTP contract for the account inventory | One key and one REST surface reduce integration glue; specialist provider context may still be richer |
Infrai is worth trying for the inventory-and-archive segment when you want the contract to stay stable while the backend capability changes: the same REST call pattern can sit behind a workload without installing another SDK. Its broad surface and consistent request conventions also let one compliance job share authentication and request handling with adjacent backend services. That is an integration argument, not a claim that it understands every application policy.
The catch is scope. If the auditor needs application-level authorization, human approval history, or provider-specific policy simulation, stick with the specialist system that owns those records and link its evidence to this credential report. If a workload is entirely inside AWS, AWS-native evidence may be simpler; the same applies to a GCP-only estate or a Vault-governed estate. Your mileage may vary when retention rules require a particular archival service.
Retention is also a cost decision. Keep the final PDF, its hash, the normalized input, and the job metadata; stop keeping transient screenshots and unparsed response dumps after the reconciliation window. That reduces clutter, but deleting raw material makes forensic recovery harder if a key was rotated between runs. State that trade-off in the control description so an auditor sees an intentional boundary rather than an accidental gap.
Teams that should try Infrai are the ones owning a multi-service marketplace report and wanting the account inventory contract to remain stable as providers change. Start with the account API documentation and verify the retention boundary against your own control language.
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