An invoice arrives. Same supplier, same amount pattern, but the IBAN is different. If an AI agent prepares your payments, what should it do?
Bank-detail changes are a classic invoice-fraud pattern, and agents make it more interesting: they read every PDF, never get tired and will happily "fix" vendor master data if the instructions say so. So I tested what an IBAN check actually catches.
Disclosure: I built the IBAN Validator & Bank Lookup on Apify, which I use below. The lesson applies to any validator.
The test
Nine inputs: a known-good German IBAN, the same IBAN with one typo, three IBANs where I changed the account number and recomputed the two check digits (what a fraudster would do), plus Dutch, French, Austrian and a truncated one.
import os, requests
URL = ("https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/fast_data_asap~iban-validator-bank-lookup"
"/run-sync-get-dataset-items")
HEADERS = {"Authorization": f"Bearer {os.environ['APIFY_TOKEN']}"}
ibans = [
"DE89370400440532013000", # original
"DE89 3704 0044 0532 0130 01", # one digit typo
"DE62370400440532013001", # changed account + recomputed check digits
"DE40370400440532013009",
"DE18370400440532013017",
"NL91ABNA0417164300", "FR1420041010050500013M02606", "AT611904300234573201",
"DE12345",
]
resp = requests.post(URL, headers=HEADERS, timeout=120,
json={"ibans": ibans, "includeBankInfo": True})
resp.raise_for_status()
for r in resp.json():
print(r["input"], r["valid"], r["checksumValid"], r["nationalChecksumValid"], r["bankName"], r["error"])
The result
| Input | Valid | MOD-97 | National check | Bank |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| DE89 …013000 (original) | yes | ok | ok | Commerzbank |
| DE89 …013001 (typo) | no | fails | ok | Commerzbank |
| DE62 …013001 (changed, recomputed) | yes | ok | ok | Commerzbank |
| DE40 …013009 (changed, recomputed) | yes | ok | ok | Commerzbank |
| DE18 …013017 (changed, recomputed) | yes | ok | ok | Commerzbank |
| NL91 ABNA… | yes | ok | – | ABN AMRO |
| FR14 2004… | yes | ok | ok | La Banque Postale |
| AT61 1904… | yes | ok | – | (no bank data) |
| DE12345 | no | fails | – | wrong length |
Real output, run on 12 November 2026. Malformed rows are not charged.
Two takeaways:
- Typos are caught. The IBAN check digits (ISO 7064 MOD-97) exist exactly for that, and the one-digit typo fails.
- Deliberate changes are not. Recompute the two check digits and the IBAN is mathematically perfect. For these three accounts the German national account check passed as well. To every format rule, a fraudulent IBAN at the same bank looks exactly like a real one.
A validator answers "is this a well-formed IBAN, and which bank is it?". It cannot answer "does this account belong to my supplier?".
What the validator is good for in an agent
The useful signal is not valid, it is the comparison with what you already know:
| Signal | Source | What the agent should do |
|---|---|---|
valid: false |
validator | reject, ask for corrected invoice |
| IBAN differs from vendor master data | your ERP | hold payment, never update master data automatically |
bankName / bic differs from the known bank |
validator + ERP | hold, flag as high risk |
| country of the bank differs from the supplier's country | validator + ERP | hold, flag as high risk |
| new IBAN confirmed by the supplier through a known channel | human | release |
Here is that rule as code:
def iban_decision(invoice_iban: str, vendor: dict, check: dict) -> tuple[str, str]:
"""vendor = your master data, check = one row from the validator."""
if not check["valid"]:
return "reject", check["error"]
if check["iban"].replace(" ", "") == vendor["iban"].replace(" ", ""):
return "pay", "IBAN matches master data"
reasons = ["IBAN differs from master data"]
if check.get("bic") and vendor.get("bic") and check["bic"][:8] != vendor["bic"][:8]:
reasons.append(f"bank changed: {vendor.get('bank')} -> {check.get('bankName')}")
if check["countryCode"] != vendor["iban"][:2]:
reasons.append("bank country changed")
return "hold", "; ".join(reasons) + " - confirm with supplier via known phone number"
The important design choice: the agent can never move from "hold" to "pay" on its own. It can prepare the evidence (old vs new bank, invoice, sender address), but the release needs a human or a bank-side confirmation.
Verification of Payee does the part a validator cannot
Since October 2025, EU payment service providers have to offer Verification of Payee for euro credit transfers: before you send money, your bank checks whether the payee name matches the account holder of that IBAN and tells you "match", "close match" or "no match". That is the check that would expose the fraudulent IBANs above, because the name on the account would not be your supplier's.
So the full chain for an accounts-payable agent looks like this:
- Format and bank (validator): cheap, offline, catches typos and tells you which bank.
- Master-data comparison (your system): catches changes.
- Verification of Payee (your bank, at payment time): catches wrong account holders.
- Human release for every change.
Try it
IBAN Validator & Bank Lookup on Apify: bulk IBAN validation with MOD-97 and national checksums, SEPA flag, bank name and BIC (German banks from the Bundesbank file), $0.0005 per IBAN, runs offline inside the actor. For the full supplier check (company register, VAT ID, IBAN) see our free Agent Skill verify-supplier-de.
This is about payment hygiene, not legal advice.
Question: if you let an agent prepare payments, where do you draw the line: may it ever update vendor bank details, or is that always a human step?
Top comments (1)
The recomputed-check-digit rows are the whole post, and they are worth more than the conclusion you drew from them. MOD-97 was never a fraud control. It is a transcription control. It exists so that a human copying an account number off paper gets caught, and it does that job well, which is why it has survived unchanged.
Your table's real finding is one line: never update master data automatically. That is the control. Everything above it is advisory.
Where I would push. "IBAN differs from vendor master data" only works for a supplier you have paid before. A first invoice from a genuinely new supplier has nothing to differ from, and that case is a large share of invoice fraud. For it, the only signal not authored by the party you are checking is the name on the account, answered by the receiving bank. In the euro area that is Verification of Payee, mandatory since October 2025. The UK has had Confirmation of Payee since 2019.
And the limit on that, since people skip it. VoP tells you the name on the account matches the name you typed. The fraudster told you the name. If the invoice says Acme Logistics Ltd and the account is held by Acme Logistics Ltd, you get a Match and you have learned nothing about whether that is your Acme. It catches a mule account opened under some other name. It does not catch a company incorporated to look like your supplier.
So: the validator for typos, master data for changes, VoP for who controls the account, and a person for a first payment to a party nobody has paid before. Your agent's job on a changed IBAN is to stop, which is what you said.