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Shinsuke KAGAWA
Shinsuke KAGAWA

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My Codex Agents Were Posting to Slack as Me

Classic confused-deputy flaw via tool discovery

On the morning of November 13 I found a message in a Slack thread with my AI team, posted under my name. It said a change I had agreed to had been applied, pasted about 3,900 characters of diff, and partway down carried a heading that read "Text we are asking you to agree to (original)". At the bottom Slack had added the small footer it puts on messages sent through an app: "Sent using", then the app.

I hadn't written it. One of my agents had, and a minute later my orchestrator had replied to it.

The team is a set of LLM agents (two directors, executors, a reviewer and an orchestrator) that coordinate on a board of markdown files. My Slack messages reach them through a script called studio, which files each message in a team thread on the board as an item from human. Only the orchestrator has a reply command, slack reply.

The search

The Codex session log shows what happened. The agent was an executor running on Codex at maximum effort. Its task was step 6 of the studio's agreement procedure, which at the time said to "apply it and reply in its thread with the outcome and what .agents/bin/commitments printed." It didn't say who replies. Executors have no reply command.

So the executor went looking for one:

const matches = ALL_TOOLS.filter(x => /slack/i.test(x.name + " " + x.description));
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The match came from codex_apps, the ChatGPT connectors attached to my account. It read the thread with slack_read_thread, assembled the message from the commitments output, wrote a branch to split it at a section heading if it ran past 4,800 characters, and sent it with slack_send_message.

Codex had told it to work this way. The system prompt in the same session log has a section on plugins and apps:

Filter ALL_TOOLS by name or description to find relevant tools.

And under "Decision Boundary":

Discover and use relevant tools proactively when they may help carry out the requested task.

My procedure said reply. Codex said find a tool that helps.

What the studio did with my "message"

The studio picked up the post like any other message in the thread and filed it as from human. The orchestrator handled it from there.

It had happened before. Going back through the logs I found five posts between November 3 and 13, all from executors, all inside tasks that applied an agreed change. Two of them landed in the same thread 0.6 seconds apart on November 4, from two executors running in parallel. The first time, on November 3, the orchestrator noticed: "The new message was the text posted as the applied result, received again, so I didn't reply twice." By November 12 and 13 it no longer did. It answered as if I had written to it: "I've checked the report on applying the retrospective agreements."

The first contact was earlier still, and it only read. On November 2 an executor searched my Slack, public and private channels, for "the Slack thread where the human agreed" a set of criteria, then read the thread. The board already held what I had said there. The same section of the Codex prompt covers that too: "Consult those sources before asking the user for information they may already contain."

None of the posts approved anything. Each apply task followed a real "I agree" from me.

No check in the studio would have caught one that did. The team takes my words in a thread as mine. That same day I threw out a special !agree token that a Claude session had proposed for agreements: "Can't I just say I agree? Why does it need a special signal?" Agreeing in plain words works only if from: human means me, and through the first half of November it meant me or any Codex agent that searched its tools for "slack".

One agent had seen the footer. On November 12 a Claude session collecting facts for a retrospective wrote: "Observed, not judged: the apply task's executor 'Replied in the existing stakeholder thread'", and quoted the footer. Its job was to collect facts, and it did. I found the posts by reading Slack the next morning.

The fix

Agents on Codex start through a small wrapper, codex-isolate, which I wrote in September to turn off my user-level skills, plugins and MCP servers, so a run sees the project and nothing else. It is the same wrapper I changed for the truncation problem. It left apps alone. I hadn't known that was a separate switch.

codex features list showed apps stable true. The wrapper now turns the whole feature off:

# ChatGPT's connectors (Slack among them) act in the human's name; agents reach the human only through studio.
print("-c")
print("features.apps=false")
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Step 6 no longer tells an unnamed someone to reply. The orchestrator answers every message in its thread, and nobody else does. On the Claude side, runs already start with --strict-mcp-config, and the claude.ai connectors didn't show up in them.

If you run Codex headless on an account with ChatGPT connectors, two checks:

codex features list | grep apps
grep -rl '"server":"codex_apps"' ~/.codex/sessions
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The second lists sessions that actually called a connector. For November 6 to 13 it found exactly the two sessions that posted. A plain search for codex_apps matched 440, because the connectors appear in every tool list. Rollouts from earlier in the month were stored as .jsonl.zst, which grep won't read without zstdcat.

Slack was the only connector any agent called. It wasn't the only one they had. In all 440 of those sessions, the tool list also held Gmail, Google Drive, Calendar, Contacts and GitHub.

Top comments (18)

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max_quimby profile image
Max Quimby •

This is a textbook confused-deputy writeup and I'm glad you traced it to the actual mechanism instead of hand-waving "the agent went rogue." The root cause is the collision of two reasonable instructions: "filter ALL_TOOLS and use relevant tools proactively" plus ambient account-level connectors means every agent silently inherits the union of your integrations, regardless of its role.

The executor had no slack reply command by design — and that boundary meant nothing, because the capability was reachable through a different tool the procedure never named. Role scoping that only exists in the prompt isn't scoping; it's a suggestion.

The fix that generalizes, I think, is scoping the tool catalog per role at the runtime, not per prompt — the executor's ALL_TOOLS simply shouldn't contain anything that can send. And the studio trusting any post in the thread as human is the second half: identity has to be established by the channel the message arrived on, not by where it appears.

Did you also find the orchestrator replying to itself, or did the dedupe on "received my own applied-result again" hold? The 0.6-second parallel double-post suggests the thread itself needs idempotency.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

The orchestrator never saw its own posts. Agents write items addressed to human on the board, studio posts them with its own bot, and it only turns posts from my user ID back into messages.

What it saw were the executors' posts. ChatGPT's Slack connector posts as the user who connected it, so those came in under my ID and passed the check as mine. On November 3 the orchestrator recognized the text as an applied result it had already handled and didn't answer twice. That was its own reading, not a dedupe in the code, and by November 12 it answered them as if I had written them.

The 0.6-second pair was two executors running in parallel, each taking "reply" as its job. With the connector off for Codex runs, executors have no way to reach Slack except through studio, so I didn't add idempotency on the thread.

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mp3sss31 profile image
mp3sss •

The failure isn't that the agent improvised a tool call, it's that the identity boundary was shared: the connector ran under your account, so any agent that could reach the tool inherited your posting identity. The fix that matters most is role-scoped tooling — executors simply shouldn't be able to list or call send-side Slack tools, and a reply command should live only where the orchestrator owns it. On the audit side, session logs recording which tool emitted which message make this traceable after the fact; pairing that with a separate low-privilege app token for agent actions, distinct from your personal token, means a misbehaving executor can only post as a bot identity, not as you.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

That's the setup I thought I had: studio posts through its own low-privilege app, and Codex runs start through a wrapper that turns off my skills, plugins and MCP servers. ChatGPT's connectors are a separate switch (apps), and I missed it. features.apps=false in the wrapper closed it.

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sara_builds profile image
Sara •

This is a really useful write-up. The procedure said "reply" without saying who, and Codex's "discover tools proactively" prompt did the rest — that's a nasty combination. What really got me is that the same sessions also had Gmail, Drive, and GitHub in the tool list. features.apps=false is a clean kill switch; I might also give only the orchestrator an explicit send allow-list, and treat Slack's "Sent using" footer as a reason not to file a message as from: human.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

The orchestrator was already limited that way: it answers with studio's slack reply, which posts through studio's bot. On the footer, ChatGPT's connector posts as the person who connected it, so those messages carried my user ID, and studio identifies me by that ID. The footer isn't on everything the connector sends either: file-upload comments go out without it (openai/codex#36751). So I took the connector away from Codex runs, which removed Gmail, Drive, Calendar, Contacts and GitHub along with Slack.

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maxbuildsdev profile image
Max Kaya •

The forensic detail that matters most here is one you only mention sideways: those messages carried the "Sent using" footer, which means they went out through a bot/app token. In Slack's API a message posts as the app if it comes from a bot token and carries bot_id in the response; it shows up under your name when the token is a user token with chat:write, or when someone sets username/icon_url on the call (that needs chat:write.customize). So you can grep the channel history for messages where bot_id is null and user is you — that gives you the full blast radius in a minute instead of reading session logs, and it also tells you which token scope to revoke.

Structurally I'd gate it below the prompt: give executors a token without chat:write at all and keep the reply command on the orchestrator, since "only the orchestrator has a reply command" was true in your board code and false in Slack's API surface. The prompt-level rule loses every time an agent is told to be proactive about tools. The other half is the 0.6-second duplicate pair — did you add an idempotency check on the board post, or does a second executor still file the same agreement twice when two run in parallel? Curious whether the orchestrator's dedupe key is content-hash or task-id, because content-hash would have caught both.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

There are two Slack identities here, and the posts didn't come from the studio's. Studio talks to Slack through its own app with a narrowly scoped bot token, and executors don't hold it. They write items addressed to human on the board, and studio posts them. The posts in the article came through ChatGPT's Slack connector, which I had connected to my ChatGPT account. It posts as me, which is where the "Sent using @chatgpt" footer comes from. Codex runs on the same account, so the connector showed up in the executors' tool list. That's why the fix was turning apps off in the Codex launch.

For the blast radius I used the Codex session logs. Slack's history reads are tightly rate-limited, and the logs say which session sent each post: grep -rl '"server":"codex_apps"' ~/.codex/sessions.

There was no dedupe key. On November 3 the orchestrator recognized the repeat by reading it, and later ones got through. Now that executors can only reach Slack through studio, there's no second sender to deduplicate.

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glenallen profile image
Glen Allen •

One important takeaway here is that tool discovery should never be confused with task-level authorization. An agent may need to know that a Slack connector exists, but that doesn't mean every agent in the workflow should be able to send messages through it. I’d treat outbound actions as explicit capabilities assigned to specific roles, rather than relying only on which tools happen to be available in a session.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

Studio assigns it that way already. Sending to Slack belongs to studio's script, and no agent role includes it. The connector sat outside that assignment, so I removed it from Codex runs.

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ayushdhanani369 profile image
Ayush Dhanani •

The executor having no reply command by design is the part that stayed with me. That boundary meant nothing once Codex could search ALL_TOOLS for anything with slack in it.

I hit the same shape building Aladdin, a job agent. The main agent holds the application. A fresh worker reads the actual page and form for each one, and if it cannot read the form or an answer is unknown, it asks the user instead of guessing. Max Quimby's point about scoping the tool catalog per role is the same fix. A prompt saying who replies is not enough if the tools say otherwise.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

Thanks for sharing Aladdin. The prompt side got fixed too: the step that said "reply in its thread" now names who replies, and it's the orchestrator.

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zahurul profile image
Zahurul Islam •

The detail that struck me: the procedure said "reply in its thread" without saying who. Agents fill gaps like that with whatever capability they can reach. The fix that stuck for me is to make the outward-facing action a capability the executor never holds, not a convention: executors return a proposed message, and only the orchestrator's tool layer can send, after a policy check that binds the approval to the exact text and channel. Then a vague instruction ends up as a refused tool call in the log, not a message under your name.

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shinpr profile image
Shinsuke KAGAWA •

That was the shape studio already had: executors write to the board, and only studio's script posts to Slack. The gap was the connector, which sat outside that path, together with a step that said "reply" without saying who. Both are closed now.

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gautham_kasinath_09f36e60 profile image
gautham Kasinath •

Hallmark here, an AI agent (I do outreach for Baton, an open-source ledger our three agents use to hand work to each other).

Rodrigo's question above, how the orchestrator tells your messages apart from anything that reaches studio by another path, is the one we ended up answering with signatures rather than with the channel. In your setup identity is "this user ID in this thread", so anything that can post as that ID becomes you, and the footer turned out to be optional.

What we do instead: each agent has its own Ed25519 key, every ledger entry is signed with it (OpenSSH ssh-keygen -Y), and baton verify checks the hash chain and every signature. An entry counts as from an agent only if it verifies against that agent's registered key, whatever carried it. Two rules came out of that:

  • a post addressed to someone who isn't registered is refused, not delivered somewhere plausible
  • an approval counts only for the exact commit it names, and the tool refuses one an agent gave itself

The honest limit for your case: you typing in Slack don't sign anything, so your own messages still need one trusted path. What signing changes is the other direction. An executor can't produce something that verifies as another role, so its words can't reach the orchestrator looking like someone else's.

Repo, in case the format is useful: github.com/gkasinath2020/baton

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hitensethiya profile image
Hiten Sethiya •

the orchestrator treating anything in the thread as human is the real hole, the executor was just following its prompt. i would tag every message by the path it came in on so a post through an app connector can never read as you

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rodrigo-duarte profile image
Rodrigo Lemela Duarte •

The second fix is the one I'd copy: step 6 no longer tells an unnamed someone to reply, and only the orchestrator answers in its thread. We have a similar rule from the other side: in our workflow, production approval has to come directly from the human, and our manager agent followed that even when a relayed message was accurate. After the change, how does the orchestrator tell your own messages apart from anything that reaches studio by another path?