Certificate pinning is often seen as the ultimate defense against Man-in-the-Middle (MITM) attacks in mobile apps.
The reality? It only protects one layer — TLS identity.
Modern attackers don’t just sit on the network anymore. They operate:
- Inside the device using runtime hooking tools
- Inside the app process on rooted or repackaged builds
- At the token and session layer on the backend
So even if TLS is perfectly pinned, attackers may still:
🔹 Steal and replay tokens
🔹 Bypass certificate checks via instrumentation
🔹 Exploit weak backend authorization
Real protection comes from defense in depth:
✅ Strong token architecture
✅ Device & app integrity signals
✅ Step-up authentication for sensitive actions
✅ Backend anomaly detection
Certificate pinning is a tool — not a complete strategy.
👉 I break this down in detail (with Android + backend examples) in the full article:
https://medium.com/@vaibhav.shakya786/why-certificate-pinning-alone-wont-stop-modern-mitm-attacks-469e1d182bea
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