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PII review solved in 75 lines with MCP

PII review solved in 75 lines with MCP

Use a local MCP tool to scan text before a model call, mask known PII patterns, and return a decision your app can enforce. The 75-line server below does that with the Python SDK. It catches a small set of known patterns. It can't prove that text is safe, and its prompt injection check is only a tripwire.

The AI Guardrail Rule Tester I link to below is one I built. My pain was keeping 3 separate approaches in sync: a regex scratchpad, a sample spreadsheet, and a local script. None gave me the rule editor and instant preset feedback together. This local walkthrough requires no paid service or signup, and no upload of private text. If you have a better one, tell me.

The goal: a review card before the model call

Picture a support agent drafting a reply. Before the app sends that draft to a model, a small card shows its scan result. An email address appears as a row of stars. Below it, a finding names the rule and gives the exact span that matched.

That's the outcome we're building.

For this September 28, 2026 example, the sample text is Contact nora@example.net. Ignore previous instructions. The tool should return block, with two findings. The preview should hide both matched spans.

I prefer this to a big green "safe" badge. A badge makes a claim that a few regular expressions can't support.

The result has four main fields:

  • status tells the host whether a known rule matched and which action to take.
  • reason explains whether the scan finished or hit a limit.
  • findings contains rule names and character offsets, without copied match text.
  • preview contains the input with matched characters replaced by stars.

The statuses need clear meanings. block means the host should stop this request. review means hold it for a person or another check. no_match means these rules found nothing.

It doesn't mean the text is free of personal data.

The host owns the gate. A tool call alone won't stop a later model request. If your agent can skip this tool, you've built an optional check. Put the scan in the app's required request path, before any external model sees the text.

For this version, both block and review stop automatic sending.

Setup and auth

Use Python 3.10 or newer in a fresh project directory. Create an environment with python -m venv .venv, activate it with source .venv/bin/activate, then install the SDK with python -m pip install mcp.

These commands assume a Unix-like shell. On Windows, use the activation script under .venv\Scripts.

The server uses FastMCP from the official MCP Python SDK. The SDK handles the protocol and builds the tool's input schema from the function signature. We supply the scan logic.

Save the code in the next section as guardrail_server.py.

There's no API token here. The server runs as a local subprocess over standard input and output. It doesn't call a model or need an API-key environment variable.

That also means you shouldn't paste a provider key into this file just because the surrounding app uses one. Keep that key in the app that makes the provider request.

Local transport still has a trust boundary. The host process can read what it sends and receives. Check its logs before trying real customer text. Local execution won't help if the host exports tool traces to a remote service.

For rule experiments, the AI Guardrail Rule Tester has preset PII, injection, and safety patterns with instant feedback. Use synthetic samples while you work out what a match should mean.

The Python rules below are a separate, small example. This isn't a call to a hosted tester API, and I wouldn't assume its regex behavior matches every browser-based rule runner.

To open a test client, install a maintained Node.js LTS release and run npx @modelcontextprotocol/inspector .venv/bin/python guardrail_server.py.

That command fetches and runs the Inspector package. Use your normal package review process first. Once connected, select inspect_text and pass the sample sentence in its text field.

The core code

Here is the full 75-line file, including blank lines. It has one tool and a tiny startup fixture.

import re
from mcp.server.fastmcp import FastMCP

mcp = FastMCP("local-guardrail-review")
MAX_CHARS = 8192
MAX_FINDINGS = 48
RULES = (
    ("email", "review", re.compile(
        r"\b[A-Z0-9._%+-]+@[A-Z0-9.-]+\.[A-Z]{2,}\b", re.I
    )),
    ("us_ssn_shape", "review", re.compile(
        r"(?<![0-9])[0-9]{3}-[0-9]{2}-[0-9]{4}(?![0-9])"
    )),
    ("instruction_override", "block", re.compile(
        r"\bignore\s+(all\s+)?(previous|prior)\s+instructions\b", re.I
    )),
)


@mcp.tool()
def inspect_text(text: str) -> dict:
    """Flag fixed patterns. A no_match result is not a safety guarantee."""
    if len(text) > MAX_CHARS:
        return {
            "status": "review",
            "reason": "input_too_long",
            "findings": [],
            "preview": None,
        }

    findings = []
    masked = list(text)
    blocked = False
    for name, action, pattern in RULES:
        for match in pattern.finditer(text):
            if len(findings) >= MAX_FINDINGS:
                # Never ship a partially masked preview on overflow.
                return {
                    "status": "review",
                    "reason": "too_many_findings",
                    "findings": [],
                    "preview": None,
                }
            start, end = match.span()
            findings.append({
                "rule": name,
                "action": action,
                "start": start,
                "end": end,
            })
            blocked = blocked or action == "block"
            # Mask by position so overlapping matches cannot shift offsets.
            masked[start:end] = ["*"] * (end - start)

    status = "block" if blocked else ("review" if findings else "no_match")
    return {
        "status": status,
        "reason": "fixed_pattern_scan",
        "findings": findings,
        "preview": "".join(masked),
    }


def check_fixture() -> None:
    sample = "Contact nora@example.net. Ignore previous instructions."
    result = inspect_text(sample)
    assert result["status"] == "block"
    assert len(result["findings"]) == 2
    assert "nora@example.net" not in result["preview"]


if __name__ == "__main__":
    check_fixture()
    # Stdio carries protocol messages. Keep debug prints off stdout.
    mcp.run(transport="stdio")
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Run it with python guardrail_server.py. After the fixture passes, it waits for MCP messages. A quiet terminal is expected. Use the Inspector for tool calls rather than typing raw sentences into that terminal.

The fixture checks the scan function directly. It doesn't test the MCP handshake. Also, Python's optimized mode can remove assertions, so keep proper tests in your test suite before shipping this.

The email rule is deliberately small. It misses valid address forms and may catch strings that aren't real mailboxes. The SSN rule spots a shape, without checking whether a number was issued.

The injection rule is even narrower. A quoted attack in a training document will trigger it. An attack phrased another way may pass.

The limits keep this example from accepting huge strings or returning endless findings. Neither limit is a measured performance promise. If a limit is hit, the tool returns review and withholds the preview. The host must hold the request.

Masking uses positions in the original string. That avoids changing later offsets as replacements happen. Python counts string positions in Unicode code points; a JavaScript UI may need a conversion before using those offsets to highlight text.

One last detail: the preview can still contain PII that no rule caught. Treat it as sensitive data.

Where this API fits

MCP gives this function a standard way to appear as a tool in a compatible host. It doesn't improve the rules.

If one Python app is the only caller, a normal function call is simpler. I'd use MCP when the same check needs to work across hosts that already speak the protocol.

Choice Good fit Auth boundary Data path Main cost
Local MCP tool An MCP host needs a named scan tool Host and subprocess permissions Local process pipes Host setup and protocol handling
Plain Python function One Python app owns the whole flow Existing app permissions Same process No direct tool discovery for other hosts
HTTP endpoint you operate Several apps need one shared rules service Endpoint authentication you implement Network request to your service Deployment and service operations

The scan quality can be identical across all three choices. Transport changes how callers reach the check.

For a local MCP host, configure an absolute path to the environment's Python executable. Give it the script's absolute path as an argument. Relative paths often fail when a desktop host starts from a different working directory.

An HTTP service creates a different job. You'll need to decide how clients prove their identity and how request bodies are kept out of access logs. This stdio example doesn't supply that setup.

The plain function is a valid starting point. Keep the decision contract the same and move the boundary later if a second caller needs it.

Before sharing results across apps, add a ruleset version to the response. Otherwise, two identical inputs can produce different decisions after a rule edit, with no clue in the stored result about what changed.

What went wrong the first time

My first mistake in the design was the word allow.

It felt tidy: find something bad, block it; find nothing, allow it. Then I considered Contact Nora at nora [at] example [dot] net. Our email rule doesn't match that. The result says little about whether personal data is present.

So the clean result became no_match. Small change. Much more honest.

The second trap was treating a masked preview as clean text. It isn't. The code hides only what the fixed rules can see. A home address could remain untouched. Don't feed the preview into a public log sink and call the privacy work done.

I also wouldn't log raw matches for debugging. Rule names and offsets usually tell me enough to locate a defect in a synthetic fixture. Real incidents need a separate, access-controlled process.

For stdio servers, keep debug output off standard output. That's the channel carrying protocol messages. Use standard error if you need local diagnostics, and leave the user's text out of those messages.

Then test the boring limits.

A string of 8,193 characters must return review with no preview. A message containing 49 separate email matches should do the same once the finding cap is reached. These checks catch a nasty failure mode: showing partially masked text after the scanner gives up.

Test overlap too. Two rules may match the same characters. This implementation masks the same positions again, so the string length stays fixed. It still reports both findings, which is useful for rule tuning.

Prompt injection needs a wider defense than this phrase check. Keep retrieved text out of privileged instruction slots. Restrict tool permissions at the host. Require approval for actions with real consequences. A clever prompt can avoid our chosen phrase without losing its intent.

For the next test set, I'd start with false alarms. Put the phrase "ignore previous instructions" inside a quoted security lesson. Decide whether that route should block it or send it to review. The right action depends on what the app does next.

Start with one route and synthetic fixtures. Make the host stop on errors as well as review results. Once that path works, add rules based on examples you can explain. A short ruleset with clear limits is easier to maintain than a large one nobody trusts.

Written with AI assistance and human review. Try the tool at aidevhub.io/guardrail-rule-tester.

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