I've analyzed 70+ MCP servers while building integrations, and I keep seeing the same myths repeated in GitHub issues, Discord channels, and production codebases. Time to set the record straight.
Myth 1: "stdio Transport Is Just for Localhost"
Reality: stdio is a deployment choice, not a technical limitation.
Yes, stdio uses standard input/output pipes. No, that doesn't mean it's localhost-only. You can absolutely wrap stdio servers in SSH tunnels, containerized environments, or process managers for remote access. The real constraint is process boundaries, not network topology.
The myth persists because most examples show local filesystem access. But I've seen production systems using stdio servers across Kubernetes pods with perfect reliability.
Myth 2: "MCP Is Just Another REST API"
Biggest misconception in the ecosystem.
MCP is a protocol for LLM-tool communication, not a generic API standard. The key difference? Bidirectional negotiation.
REST: Client requests, server responds. Done.
MCP: LLM discovers capabilities, requests sampling, server can prompt back for clarification, resources update dynamically.
If you're treating MCP like REST with extra steps, you're missing the point entirely. MCP enables agentic workflows where the LLM decides which tools to chain together.
Myth 3: "You Need OAuth for Production MCP Servers"
Reality Check: OAuth is overkill for 80% of use cases.
Unless you're building multi-tenant SaaS where users authenticate with third-party providers, Bearer tokens or API keys are perfectly acceptable. I've seen teams waste weeks implementing OAuth flows for internal tools that never needed user delegation.
The security model should match your threat model:
- Internal tools? API keys with IP allowlists
- User-delegated access? OAuth 2.1
- Machine-to-machine? mTLS or signed JWTs
Don't cargo-cult security patterns.
Myth 4: "Prompt Injection Isn't a Real Threat"
This one scares me.
Developers dismiss prompt injection as "theoretical" until production LLMs start leaking API keys. CVE-2025-6514 proved this isn't academic—real MCP servers were exploited by attackers embedding commands in user input.
The attack surface is every parameter your tools accept. If you're not validating, escaping, and using allowlists, you're one malicious user away from a breach.
"But my LLM provider has safeguards!" Cool. Defense in depth means you implement validation too.
Myth 5: "SSE Is Always Better Than HTTP for MCP"
Nuance matters here.
SSE (Server-Sent Events) shines for real-time updates—streaming logs, live dashboards, progressive data feeds. But it's unidirectional. The server pushes, the client receives.
For request-response patterns (90% of tool calls), HTTP is simpler, more debuggable, and works through corporate firewalls without IT approval.
The best architecture? Support multiple transports and let deployment requirements dictate the choice. Start with stdio for dev, use SSE for browsers, scale to HTTP for production microservices.
Open Question for the Community
What MCP myths have you encountered?
I'm particularly curious about:
- Authentication patterns people are actually using in production
- Horror stories from treating MCP like REST
- Creative uses of transport protocols I haven't considered
- Security practices that actually work (not just theory)
Drop your experiences below. If enough people share the "MCP is too complex" myth, that's my next post.
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What myth did I miss? What are you still confused about?
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