EU Chat Control would force messaging apps to scan messages before/after encryption — a compliance order aimed at the app layer, not your device or network.
I wrote up the technical breakdown of why some architectures simply can't comply, even under legal pressure:
- No central server = nothing to seize or subpoena
- No phone number/email account = nothing to attach a legal order to
- zk-SNARKs hide sender, receiver, and content — even on a public ledger
- Post-quantum key exchange (ML-KEM-768) closes the "harvest now, decrypt later" gap
Full breakdown, with a comparison to Signal/Threema's "comply or leave" dilemma vs. an architecture that structurally can't comply either way:
👉 https://z-text.org/eu-escape-room-chat-control-vs-z-text/
Curious what this community thinks about the EU's Digital Markets Act already forcing iOS sideloading — it's an interesting side effect that undercuts app-store delisting as an enforcement path too.
Top comments (1)
Some comments may only be visible to logged-in visitors. Sign in to view all comments.